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Abstract  
ABSTRACT 
 
In 2001, 58 % of the motorised trips on a typical day were made by using public transport in 
Santiago, the capital of Chile. Comparing this with its proportion in 1991 (71 %) and 1977 
(83 %) a clear decline in public transport use can be seen. The improvement of the public 
transport system is crucial to stop its decline in the modal split, and to accomplish a more 
sustainable urban transport system (together with complementary policies: for instance car 
parking restrictions, bicycle facilities). Based on positive experiences provided by three 
selected European metropolitan areas (Greater London, Berlin and Madrid) and taking into 
account theoretic and empirical evidence investigated by the author in previous studies and 
field trips, the aim of this research is to identify and analyse aspects in which the public 
transport system of Santiago de Chile can be improved. An important part of this research is 
the comparison and analysis of the socio-economic and transport data of the four 
metropolitan areas. During this analysis, two topics were identified and selected for further 
research: the institutional organisation of public transport (transport authority) and the fare 
structure of public transport. 
 
In the case of the transport authority, the proposed solution for Santiago is the creation of a 
regional transport authority, responsible for the planning and implementation of both public 
and private transport policies, strategic plans and projects. It should also be responsible for 
the non-motorised modes and for urban planning and land-use definitions at the regional 
level. Responsibilities from other areas different to the transportation could also be 
transferred to the regional authority, as long as they have a regional scope. The regional 
government should change its appointment system, in the direction of directly elected head 
and representatives. 
 
Travelcards allowing unlimited public transport use in a certain period (e.g. a month) may 
have a positive impact on public transport demand. Their implementation is recommended 
for Santiago. No technical problems for its introduction are detected, being the main difficulty 
an eventual unwillingness at the decision-making level. The relation between the fare and 
the trip-length is discussed. A mostly flat fare is recommended for Santiago. The 
differentiation of fares in peak and off-peak periods is also analysed. As shown in a 
numerical simulation, it is possible to increase both patronage and revenue through this 
measure. The average fare in Santiago is marginally lower than in Berlin and Madrid. 
Comparing it with the disposable income of the population, the public transport in Santiago is 
more expensive than in London, Madrid and Berlin. Unlike the European case study areas, 
the public transport system in Santiago does not receive operational subsidies. These kind 
of subsides are fully justified by the economic theory in the case of urban public transport, 
and also represent a clear policy decision in the direction of giving incentives to the use of 
public transport. A subsidy in Santiago would be more likely, if it were not financed by fiscal 
expenditure but other sources (e.g. congestion charging). A regressive cross-subsidy from 
full-fare payers to the students should be eliminated, providing a compensation for the 
reduced students’ fare. 
 
During the time of this research the public transport system of Santiago was undergoing a 
major change under the name “Transantiago”. All the analyses are made assuming that 
Transantiago is already implemented, i.e. the recommendations are centred in future 
improvement for the new system. 
Index i 
INDEX 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
2. Analysis of Santiago and its Transport System 3 
2.1. Socio-economic Aspects 3 
2.2. Modal Split Changes 6 
2.3. Other Characteristics of the Trips 8 
2.4. Private Car: Large Investment in Urban Highways by the Beginning of the 2000s 10 
2.5. Metro, the Pride of Santiago’s Public Transport System (and Other Rail Services)  11 
2.6. Buses: on-the-Street Competition and Bad Service 12 
2.7. Shared-Taxis: Cars Offering Bus-like Services 15 
2.8. Critical Analysis of Transantiago, the New Bus System in Santiago 16 
 
3. Analysis of Greater London and its Transport System 30 
3.1. Socio-economic Aspects in a Multi-racial World-city 30 
3.2. Modal Split 35 
3.3. Other Characteristics of the Trips 37 
3.4. Transport Authority: Transport for London 39 
3.5. Car Travel 39 
3.6. The Underground and Suburban Rail Systems 40 
3.7. Bus System 42 
3.8. Central London Congestion Charging Scheme 45 
 
4. Analysis of Berlin and its Transport System 47 
4.1. Socio-economic Description and Car Ownership 47 
4.2. Modal Split and Generation Rates 51 
4.3. Purpose, Length and Speed of the Trips 54 
4.4. Organisation of the Public Transport System 55 
4.5. Car Travel 56 
4.6. The Underground, Tram and Suburban Rail Systems 57 
4.7. Bus System 58 
4.8. Recent Changes in the Public Transport System: MetroLines 59 
 
5. Analysis of Madrid and its Transport System 61 
5.1. Socio-economic Description 61 
5.2. Modal Split and Public Transport Demand 67 
5.3. Purpose, Length and Duration of the Trips 69 
5.4. Public Transport Authority: Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid 69 
5.5. Car Travel 69 
5.6. Metro and Suburban Rail 70 
5.7. Bus System 72 
 
Index ii 
6. Comparison of the Metropolitan Areas and their Public Transport 74 
6.1. Socio-economic Comparison 74 
6.2. Modal Split Analysis 76 
6.3. Comparison of the Underground, Tram and Suburban Rail Supplies 79 
6.4. Bus Supply Comparison 81 
6.5. A Final Comment on the Comparison of the Metropolitan Areas 83 
 
7. Transport Authority: European Experiences and Recommendations for 
Santiago 85 
7.1. The Public Transport Institutional Organisation in Santiago 85 
7.1.1. Municipalities and the regional government 86 
7.1.2. Transport and telecommunications ministry 87 
7.1.3. Other ministries involved in the transport system 87 
7.1.4. Publicly owned operators 88 
7.1.5. Coordinating commissions 88 
7.1.6. Role of the president of Chile 90 
7.2. Public Transport Authorities in Selected European Metropolitan Areas 91 
7.2.1. Greater London 91 
7.2.2. Berlin 93 
7.2.3. Madrid 96 
7.3. Comparison and Discussion of the Public Transport Authorities of London, Berlin, 
Madrid and Santiago 98 
7.4. Recommendations for Santiago and Conclusions 102 
7.4.1. About a public transport authority for Santiago, similar to the solutions in Madrid and Berlin 103 
7.4.2. A regional transport authority for Santiago’s metropolitan region 104 
7.4.3. Conclusions 109 
 
8. Fares’ Structure in the Public Transport: European Experiences and 
Recommendations for Santiago 113 
8.1. Fares in the Public Transport of Santiago 113 
8.2. Fares in the Public Transport of the Selected European Metropolitan Areas 115 
8.2.1. Greater London 115 
8.2.2. Berlin 118 
8.2.3. Madrid 120 
8.3. Comparison, Discussion and Recommendations for Santiago 123 
8.3.1. Fare integration 123 
8.3.2. Travelcards exist in the European metropolitan areas… and in Santiago?  124 
8.3.3. Relation between fare and trip length 135 
8.3.4. Reduced fares in specific periods or areas 137 
8.3.5. Average fare 142 
8.3.6. Subsidies and financial equilibrium 144 
8.3.7. Conclusions 150 
Index iii 
 
9. Conclusions 152 
9.1. Comparison between the Metropolitan Areas 152 
9.2. Institutional Organisation of the Public Transport 153 
9.3. Fare Structure and Price 156 
9.4. Subsidy for the Operation of the Public Transport 159 
9.5. Future Research 160 
9.6. Summary of Recommendations 161 
 
References 162 
 
Appendix A: Bibliographic Review about Factors that Affect the Demand 
for Public Transport and their Elasticities A-1 
A.1 Demand-elasticity with Respect to the Fare A-1 
A.2 Demand-elasticity with Respect to the Vehicle-kilometres A-4 
A.3 Demand-elasticity with Respect to the Income of the Population A-5 
A.4 Other Factors that Affect the Demand for Public Transport A-6 
A.5 Conclusions A-8 
 
Index iv 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Chilean Income Distribution in Year 2000 4 
Table 2.2: Households, Cars and Motorisation Rate Evolution 4 
Table 2.3: Population and Motorisation Rate per Municipality in Santiago 5 
Table 2.4: Income and Motorisation Rate per Area in 2001 6 
Table 2.5: Modal Split Working Day in Santiago in 2001 7 
Table 2.6: Modal Split Working Day and Morning Peak in Santiago in 2001 7 
Table 2.7: Evolution of the Modal Split 8 
Table 2.8: Motorised Trips Purpose, Year 2001 9 
Table 2.9: Evolution of the Motorised Trips Generation Rate 9 
Table 2.10: Evolution of the Metro Demand and Supply 11 
 
Table 3.1: Population in Greater London by Age 30 
Table 3.2: Population in Inner and Outer London 33 
Table 3.3: Households in Inner and Outer London 33 
Table 3.4: Modal Split Average Day in Greater London in 2003 35 
Table 3.5: Modal Split Evolution in Central London, Morning Peak 37 
Table 3.6: Trip Length and Speed by Mode in Greater London in 2003 38 
Table 3.7: Travel Times to Work, by Area of Workplace 38 
Table 3.8: Car Occupancy Evolution in Greater London 39 
Table 3.9: Taxis in Greater London 40 
Table 3.10: Fare Evolution in London Underground 41 
Table 3.11: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Area in 1995/97 43 
Table 3.12: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Gender in 1995/97 44 
Table 3.13: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Number of Household Cars in 1995/97 44 
Table 3.14: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Age Group in 1995/97 44 
Table 3.15: Fare Evolution in London Buses 44 
 
Table 4.1: Berlin Boroughs 47 
Table 4.2: Population in Berlin by Gender 48 
Table 4.3: German Income Distribution in Year 2003 49 
Table 4.4: Jobs in Berlin 49 
Table 4.5: Income and Motorisation Rate in the Boroughs of Berlin 50 
Table 4.6: Modal Split Evolution in Berlin 51 
Table 4.7: Public Transport Modal Split in Berlin 52 
Table 4.8: Trip Generation Rates by Gender in Berlin in 1998 52 
Table 4.9: Trip Generation Rates by Age in Berlin in 1998 52 
Table 4.10: Public Transport Modal Split by Age in Berlin in 1998 53 
Table 4.11: Trip Generation Rates by Main Activity in Berlin in 1998 53 
Table 4.12: Trip Generation Rates by Main Activity in Berlin in 1998 53 
Table 4.13: Trip Generation Rates in Western and Eastern Berlin in 1998 53 
Table 4.14: Trips Purpose in Berlin in 1998 54 
Table 4.15: Trip Length Distribution in the Public Transport in Berlin in 1998 54 
Table 4.16: Public Transport Average Speeds in Berlin in 2005 54 
Table 4.17: Yearly Patronage of the BVG 55 
Table 4.18: Yearly Patronage of the S-Bahn 56 
Table 4.19: Park and Ride Facilities in Berlin in 2002 56 
Table 4.20: Taxis in Berlin 57 
Index v 
Table 4.21: Evolution of the Underground System in Berlin 57 
Table 4.22: Evolution of the Tramway System in Berlin 58 
Table 4.23: Average Age of the S-Bahn Fleet 58 
Table 4.24: Evolution of the S-Bahn System in Berlin 58 
Table 4.25: Evolution of the Bus Lanes in Berlin 59 
 
Table 5.1: Population, Area and Density in Madrid Region in 1996 61 
Table 5.2: Evolution of the Population in Madrid 62 
Table 5.3: Unemployment Rate in Madrid Region 66 
Table 5.4: Cars and Motorisation Rate in Madrid Region 66 
Table 5.5: Evolution of the Modal Split in Madrid Region 67 
Table 5.6: Public Transport Modal Split in Madrid Region in 2002 67 
Table 5.7: Evolution of the Public Transport Modal Split in Madrid 68 
Table 5.8: Trip Purpose in Madrid Region in 1996 69 
Table 5.9: Evolution of the Demand of the Metro System in Madrid 70 
Table 5.10: Evolution of the Demand of the Suburban Rail System in Madrid 71 
Table 5.11: Evolution of the Supply of the Urban Buses in Madrid 72 
Table 5.12: Evolution of the Demand of the Urban Bus System in Madrid 72 
Table 5.13: Evolution of the Demand of the Suburban Bus System in Madrid 73 
 
Table 6.1: Population, Area and Density of the Metropolitan Areas in 2005 74 
Table 6.2: Per Capita Annual GDP 75 
Table 6.3: Inequity Index in the Four Countries 75 
Table 6.4: Average Yearly Motorisation Rate Increase 76 
Table 6.5: Modal Split of the Motorised Trips 77 
Table 6.6: Public Transport Modal Split 77 
Table 6.7: Yearly Public Transport Trips per Inhabitant 78 
Table 6.8: Metro Supply Comparison 79 
Table 6.9: Tram Supply Comparison 80 
Table 6.10: Suburban Rail Supply Comparison 80 
Table 6.11: Metro, Tram and Suburban Rail Supplies per Inhabitant 81 
Table 6.12: Bus Supply Comparison 82 
Table 6.13: Bus Supply per Inhabitant 83 
 
Table 8.1: Example of Underground and DLR Single Fares in Greater London in 2006 117 
Table 8.2: Example of Travelcard Costs in Greater London in 2006 117 
Table 8.3: Main Expenses of Transport for London in 2003/2004 118 
Table 8.4: Example of Fares in Berlin in 2006 119 
Table 8.5: Yearly Subsidy for the Operation of the Public Transport in Berlin 120 
Table 8.6: Yearly Investment in Streets and Rail Modes in Berlin 120 
Table 8.7: Example of Suburban Rail Fares in Madrid Region in 2006 121 
Table 8.8: Example of Travelcard Costs in Madrid in 2006 122 
Table 8.9: Main Public Transport Expenses in Madrid Region in 2003 122 
Table 8.10: Operational Subsidy in Madrid Region in 2003 123 
Table 8.11: Population, Area and Fare Zones in Each Metropolitan Area 135 
Table 8.12: Impact of Time-Differentiated Single Fare on Demand and Revenue (Short Term) 140 
Table 8.13: Impact of Time-Differentiated Single Fare on Demand and Revenue (Long Term) 141 
Table 8.14: Average Fare 142 
Table 8.15: How Expensive is Public Transport in Each Metropolitan Area? – Nominal GDP 143 
Index vi 
Table 8.16: How Expensive is Public Transport in Each Metropolitan Area? – Big Mac Index 143 
Table 8.17: How Expensive is Public Transport in Each Metropolitan Area? – GDP (PPP) 144 
Table 8.18: Operation Costs, Fare Revenues and Subsidies 145 
Table 8.19: Impact of a Subsidy on Demand and Revenue (Overall Fare Changes) 149 
Table 8.20: Impact of a Subsidy on Demand and Revenue (Off-Peak Fare Changes) 149 
 
Table 9.1: Summary of Main Socio-Economic Characteristics 152 
Table 9.2: Summary of Main Pubic Transport Characteristics 152 
 
Table A-1: Fare Elasticities Recommended by Litman (2004) A-2 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of the Population in Santiago 3 
Figure 2.2: Santiago in Six Areas 6 
Figure 2.3: Modal Split Working Day and Morning Peak in Santiago in 2001 8 
Figure 2.4: Motorised Trips by Purpose on a Weekday in 2001 9 
Figure 2.5: New Urban Highways in Santiago 10 
Figure 2.6: Metro Network in 2003 11 
Figure 2.7: Metro Network in 2006 11 
Figure 2.8: Bus Lines in 2003 13 
Figure 2.9: Morning Peak High Demand Bus Streets 14 
Figure 2.10: Example of the Main Buses Network and Local Areas 21 
 
Figure 3.1: Greater London’s Population: Actual (1971-2003) and Predicted (2004-2016) 30 
Figure 3.2: Greater London and Great Britain Income Distributions 1999-2000 31 
Figure 3.3: Car Ownership and Income Levels 1981-2002 32 
Figure 3.4: Boroughs in Greater London 33 
Figure 3.5: Population Density in 2004 34 
Figure 3.6: Population Growth between 1989 and 2003 34 
Figure 3.7: Weekday Modal Split by Time of Day in Greater London 35 
Figure 3.8: Weekday Modal Split by Age Group in Greater London 36 
Figure 3.9: Modal Split by Area for Motorised Trips in Greater London 36 
Figure 3.10: Public Transport Modal Evolution in Greater London 37 
Figure 3.11: Bus and Underground Journey-Length Distribution in Greater London 37 
Figure 3.12: Traffic Speed Evolution in Greater London, Morning Peak 40 
Figure 3.13: Trips by Hour in London Underground (2002) 41 
Figure 3.14: Trips by Hour in Greater London Buses (2002) 43 
Figure 3.15: Bus Passenger Journey Trends across the UK 43 
 
Figure 4.1: Berlin Boroughs and Population Density 48 
Figure 4.2: Berlin Population between 1950 and 2003 (Million) 48 
Figure 4.3: Average Monthly Household Income in the Boroughs of Berlin 50 
Figure 4.4: Motorisation Rate in the Boroughs of Berlin 51 
Figure 4.5: Evolution of the Yearly Patronage of BVG and S-Bahn (million trips) 55 
Figure 4.6: German Federal States: Brandenburg and Berlin 56 
Index vii 
Figure 5.1: Territorial Structure of Madrid Region 61 
Figure 5.2: Evolution of the Population in Madrid 62 
Figure 5.3: Madrid Region in 11 Zones 63 
Figure 5.4: Population Density in Madrid Region in 2002 63 
Figure 5.5: Gross Disposable Income per Capita in Madrid Region in 2000 64 
Figure 5.6: Gross Disposable Income per Capita in Madrid City in 2000 65 
Figure 5.7: Evolution of the Unemployment Rate in Madrid and Spain (%) 66 
Figure 5.8: Evolution of the Public Transport Demand in Madrid Region 68 
Figure 5.9: Metro and Light Rail Plan 2003-2007 in Madrid 71 
Figure 5.10: Bus/HOV Facility in Madrid 73 
 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of the Population 74 
Figure 6.2: Evolution of the Motorisation Rates 76 
Figure 6.3: Modal Split of the Motorised Trips 77 
Figure 6.4: Modal Split of the Public Transport Trips 78 
Figure 6.5: Yearly Public Transport Trips per Inhabitant 79 
Figure 6.6: Network Length of the Rail Modes 80 
Figure 6.7: Rail Modes Supply per Inhabitant 81 
Figure 6.8: Number of Buses in Each Metropolitan Area 82 
Figure 6.9: Buses per Million Inhabitants 83 
 
Figure 7.1: Metropolitan Region of Santiago 86 
Figure 7.2: Spatial Coverage and Transportation-Related Responsibilities of the Greater 
London Authority 92 
Figure 7.3: Single Political Authority Responsible for Public Transport in the Metropolitan 
Areas 98 
Figure 7.4: Main Distinctive Characteristics of the Technical Transport Authorities in London, 
Berlin and Madrid 99 
Figure 7.5: Main Responsibilities of a Public Transport Authority 102 
Figure 7.6: Spatial Coverage and Transportation Related Responsibilities of the Proposed 
Regional Authority for Santiago 106 
Figure 7.7: Current Institutional Organisation of the Transport System in Santiago 111 
Figure 7.8: Proposed Institutional Organisation for Santiago’s Transport System 112 
 
Figure 8.1: Greater London Fare Zones and the Boroughs 116 
Figure 8.2: Greater London Fare Zones and the Underground 116 
Figure 8.3: Berlin Fare Zones 118 
Figure 8.4: Fare Zones in Madrid Region 121 
Figure 8.5: Fare Integration in the Metropolitan Areas (Single Fares) 123 
Figure 8.6: Fare Integration in the Metropolitan Areas (Travelcards) 124 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
1. Introduction 
 
As many Latin-American countries, Chile presents a few large metropolitan areas where 
most of the population live. Public transport in these metropolitan areas is mostly privately 
owned, generally disordered and technically inefficient, but carries nearly all the urban trips. 
The private car has a smaller but growing importance in the transport system. Santiago, the 
capital of Chile, is a good example of this. In 2001, 58 % of the motorised trips on a typical 
day were made by using public transport. Comparing this with its proportion in 1991 (71 %) 
and 1977 (83 %) a clear decline in public transport use can be seen. The increase in the 
number of cars has lead to more congestion and pollution. The improvement of the public 
transport system is crucial to stop the decline in the modal split, and to accomplish a more 
sustainable urban transport system. 
 
In comparison with Santiago, public transport in many European metropolitan areas is much 
better organised. One aspect in which the typical Latin-American metropolitan area differs 
from the European one, is that in the latter there is always a local authority that plays an 
important role in the planning, control and sometimes, in the operation of the public transport 
system. Concerning the quality of the service, European buses carefully respect schedules 
and frequencies, and the accident risk is low. The typical Latin-American on-the-street 
competition is practically unknown in European bus systems, with the UK being the only 
exception. But even there it has changed significantly in the last years and the early 
irregularities have largely disappeared. My main question was: Is it possible to learn from the 
European experiences in order to improve the public transport system in a metropolitan area 
like Santiago? 
 
The general aim of this research was the development of normative guidelines and 
recommendations for the improvement of the public transport system in Santiago. For that 
reason, the experiences in three large European capital cities have been studied. The 
selection of the European cases was made by searching for metropolitan areas with a 
population size similar to the one of Santiago. In addition, the metropolitan areas had to 
have an internationally recognised high-quality public transport system. Furthermore, the 
language skills of the author were taken into account in the election. Hence London, Berlin 
and Madrid were finally selected for the investigation. 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Firstly, chapters 2 to 6 present and compare 
socio-economic and transport data for the four researched metropolitan areas. During this 
work special attention was put on the identification of topics where lessons from the 
European experiences could be drawn in order to improve public transport in Santiago. Two 
of these issues were then selected for further analysis. They are presented in chapters 7 and 
8: the institutional organisation of public transport (e.g. transport authority) and the fare 
structure of public transport.  
 
During the time of this research the public transport system of Santiago was undergoing a 
major change (under the name “Transantiago”), which will modify the organisation of the bus 
system significantly (10 private companies would replace some 4,000 previous private 
operators), the routes design (main bus routes will complement the metro network, while 
local bus lines will feed both main bus lines and the metro) and the fare system (an 
integrated fare structure for buses and metro will be implemented together with a new 
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electronic payment device). Therefore, although Transantiago was not yet put into operation 
by the end of this investigation, all the analyses are made assuming that Transantiago is 
already implemented, i.e. the recommendations are centred in future improvement for the 
new Transantiago system. A good knowledge of that project, thanks to the fact that the 
author worked on its design at the Chilean transportation planning office (Sectra) before 
starting the Ph.D., was essential for the research. Transantiago is explained and analysed in 
detail in chapter 2. 
 
The recommendations for the improvement of public transport in Santiago that have been 
developed are mainly based on the European experiences analysed, but they also take into 
account theoretic and empirical evidence investigated by the author in previous studies and 
field trips. 
 
The focus of this research is on the improvement of public transport. Nevertheless, these 
improvements have to be complemented with other policies in order to accomplish a 
sustainable urban transport system. Congestion charging, car parking restrictions, 
pedestrianisations and bicycle facilities are some examples of other necessary measures. 
 
We will start by discussing the socio-economic aspects of Santiago de Chile and its 
transportation system. 
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2 Analysis of Santiago and its Transport System 
 
2.1 Socio-economic Aspects 
 
Santiago is the capital city of Chile. In 2005 the metropolitan area of Gran Santiago (Greater 
Santiago) had 5.9 million inhabitants while Chile as a whole had a population of 16.0 million. 
The evolution of the population in Gran Santiago is shown in figure 2.1. Having more than 
one third of the national population, Santiago is by far the largest city in the country. The 
second and third largest agglomerations have just 620,000 (Concepción-Talcahuano) and 
586,000 (Valparaíso-Viña del Mar) inhabitants respectively. Santiago has an average 
population density of 6,900 people/km2 in an area of 860 km2. 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of the Population in Santiago 
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In economic terms, the importance of Santiago is even greater in the country, as 47 % of the 
Chilean gross domestic product (GDP) is generated there. The Chilean per capita annual 
GDP rose between 1984 and 2000 at an average yearly rate of 4.7 %, reaching US$ 4,600 
(€ 4,700) in 2000 (Casen, 2000). As shown in table 2.1, the income distribution is quite 
regressive: the income of the richest 20 % of the Chilean households is 15.3 times higher 
than the income of the poorest 20 %. The richest 20 % of the population receive 57.5 % of 
the total income. A better income distribution has been recognised in the last years by all 
political sectors as a key issue for the future development of the country. 
 
Chapter 2 Analysis of Santiago and its Transport System 4 
Table 2.1: Chilean Income Distribution in Year 2000 
Quintile (1) Household income (US$) % 
I 133 3.8 
II 287 8.1 
III 432 12.2 
IV 650 18.4 
V 2,029 57.5 
(1)
 Each quintile is a fifth of the population. Quintile I represents the poorest 20 % of 
the population; quintile V represents the richest 20 % of the people. 
Source: CASEN (2000) 
 
The increase of income levels, along with a permanent rise of the city population, has yielded 
a very fast increase in the number of cars in Santiago in the last decades. Table 2.2 shows 
that between 1977 and 2001 the number of households increased 2.3 times whereas the 
number of cars quadruplicated.  
 
Table 2.2: Households, Cars and Motorisation Rate Evolution 
Year Households Vehicles Vehicles/1.000 inhabitants 
1977 650,000 208,000 60 
1991 1,163,000 419,000 94 
2001 1,514,000 855,000 148 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
The increase in the motorisation rate is mainly explained by the growth in the income levels. 
The motorisation rate is still low in comparison with developed metropolitan areas as we will 
show later, and it will certainly continue rising in the next decades. 
 
The city of Santiago is administratively divided into 38 municipalities. Each of them has a 
democratic elected Mayor. No single political authority responsible for the entire city exists. 
Table 2.3 shows the population and the motorisation rate of the different municipalities in 
2001. The municipality of Santiago Centro corresponds to the historical centre of the city 
accounting for less than 4% of the population of the metropolitan area. It can be seen that 
the motorisation rate is very heterogeneous among the municipalities. The highest 
motorisation rate is 429.2 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in Vitacura, while the lowest is only 52.0 
cars per 1,000 inhabitants in La Pintana. This is due to an unequal income distribution 
among the municipalities explained by the localisation of the high-income families mainly in 
the eastern municipalities, as can be seen below. 
 
The municipalities of Santiago are usually grouped into six areas (figure 2.2) as follows: 
 
• North: Conchalí, Independencia, Huechuraba, Quilicura, Recoleta, Renca, Colina 
and Lampa. 
• East: La Reina, Las Condes, Lo Barnechea, Ñuñoa, Providencia and Vitacura. 
• South-East: La Florida, Macul, Peñalolén, Puente Alto and Pirque. 
• South: El Bosque, La Cisterna, La Granja, La Pintana, Lo Espejo, Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda, San Bernardo, San Joaquín, San Miguel, San Ramón and Calera de Tango. 
• West: Cerrillos, Cerro Navia, Estación Central, Lo Prado, Maipú, Pudahuel and 
Quinta Normal. 
• Centre: Santiago Centro 
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Table 2.3: Population and Motorisation Rate per Municipality in Santiago 
Municipality Population Vehicles/1,000 inhab 
Calera de Tango 18,392 147.4 
Cerrillos 72,703 120.7 
Cerro Navia 143,791 87.4 
Colina 81,230 98.6 
Conchalí 132,226 108.8 
El Bosque 181,971 101.4 
Estación Central 125,499 119.6 
Huechuraba 68,321 107.9 
Independencia 71,184 143.3 
La Cisterna 83,896 135.2 
La Florida 381,515 159.2 
La Granja 126,767 78.3 
La Pintana 185,069 52.0 
La Reina 104,703 321.7 
Lampa 46,924 109.2 
Las Condes 279,204 378.0 
Lo Barnechea 92,725 306.9 
Lo Espejo 115,913 68.4 
Lo Prado 107,372 91.8 
Macul 113,575 184.9 
Maipú 488,939 151.0 
Ñuñoa 176,969 232.5 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda 104,649 81.6 
Peñalolén 211,239 152.6 
Pirque 19,871 164.8 
Providencia 139,395 310.3 
Pudahuel 201,098 99.9 
Puente Alto 557,880 102.0 
Quilicura 138,541 127.7 
Quinta Normal 101,412 116.3 
Recoleta 149,934 104.0 
Renca 134,401 93.8 
San Bernardo 232,435 91.7 
San Joaquín 98,166 106.3 
San Miguel 80,006 189.0 
San Ramón 90,562 69.4 
Santiago Centro 230,674 123.2 
Vitacura 83,466 429.2 
TOTAL 5,772,617 148.1 
Source: EOD (2001) 
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Figure 2.2: Santiago in Six Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 shows the population, the average household income and the motorisation rate in 
each one of these six areas. It can be clearly seen that the richest families live in the East 
Area, and that it is there where the highest motorisation rate exists. The Centre Area has the 
second highest income level and the third highest motorisation rate, but both are far below 
the income and motorisation rate of the East Area. The lowest income is in the South Area, 
which also has the lowest motorisation rate. 
 
Table 2.4: Income and Motorisation Rate per Area in 2001 
Area Population 
Household 
income 
(US$/month) 
Vehicles/1,000 
inhabitants 
North 822,761 114 110.6 
East 876,462 607 328.5 
South-East 1,284,080 147 135.6 
South 1,317,826 109 92.3 
West 1,240,814 120 122.4 
Centre 230,674 190 123.2 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
 
 
2.2  Modal Split Changes 
 
According to the last Origin-Destination Survey (EOD, 2001), on a typical workday 16.3 
million trips are made in Santiago. From those 10.0 million are motorised and 6.3 million are 
non-motorised trips (walking, cycling). The methodology of this survey considers that a trip is 
every movement made in the public space independent of its length. This is why there is 
such a high proportion of non-motorised trips. As usual, a trip is defined as a change in 
activities and may therefore contain transfers. For example, a trip that is made partly by bus 
and partly by metro (two stages) is only counted once. 
NORTH 
SOUTH 
SOUTH-EAST 
WEST 
EAST 
CENTRE 
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In table 2.5 the modal split for a typical working day in Santiago in 2001 is presented. The 
main motorised modes are bus and car, which are much more used than taxi, shared-taxi 
and the metro. Shared-taxis exist in Santiago and other Chilean cities, being even the main 
public transport mode in some medium-size cities. Shared-taxis consist of cars that run on 
specific routes at fixed intervals. I.e. a shared-taxi route is very similar to a bus route, but with 
smaller vehicles. As one of the seats of the shared-taxi is occupied by the driver, there are 
only 4 seats available for passengers. 
 
Table 2.5: Modal Split Working Day in Santiago in 2001 
Transport mode Trips (thousand) % 
Car 3,860.0 23.7 
Bus 4,220.9 25.9 
Taxi 206.8 1.3 
Shared-Taxi 398.2 2.4 
Metro 370.8 2.3 
Car – Metro 29.6 0.2 
Bus – Metro 177.9 1.1 
Shared-Taxi - Metro 68.4 0.4 
Taxi – Metro 10.2 0.1 
Others – Metro 17.7 0.1 
Walking 5,978.4 36.7 
School Bus 406.9 2.5 
Bicycle 303.9 1.9 
Others 234.3 1.4 
TOTAL 16,284.0 100.0 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
Combined modes (e.g. car – metro) have little importance when compared with the main 
pure modes. Therefore, the modal split is shown again in table 2.6 aggregating the data into 
six main modes, and both for a complete workday and its morning peak (between 7:30 and 
8:30 when 1,880,000 trips are made). 
 
Table 2.6: Modal Split Working Day and Morning Peak in Santiago in 2001 
Modal split complete day Modal split morning peak Transport 
mode Trips 
(thousand) % 
Trips 
(thousand) % 
Walking  5,978.4  36.7  479.4  25.5 
Others  945.1  5.8  167.3  8.9 
Taxi and Sh.Tx.  605.0  3.7  47.0  2.5 
Metro  674.6  4.1  97.8  5.2 
Car  3,860.0  23.7  556.5  29.6 
Bus  4,220.9  25.9  532.0  28.3 
TOTAL  16,284.0  100.0  1,880.0  100.0 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the information of table 2.6 in graphs. It can be seen that most of the 
motorised modes increase their modal split in the morning peak, compared with the modal 
split of the complete day. This is particularly important in the case of the car. On the contrary, 
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the modal split of the walking trips (which are usually undercounted) is lower in the morning 
peak than during the complete day. It also shows the relatively small share of metro trips. 
 
Figure 2.3: Modal Split Working Day and Morning Peak in Santiago in 2001 
 
 
Complete day Morning peak 
 
The increase in the income levels and motorisation rate, along with the bad quality of the bus 
system, yielded an important decrease in the public transport modal split during the last 
decades. Moreover, the car use has augmented and congestion has increased steadily. 
Considering only the motorised trips1, table 2.7 shows the strong decline of the public 
transport modal split.  
 
Table 2.7: Evolution of the Modal Split 
Year 
Public 
transport 
(%) 
Private 
transport 
(%) 
Others 
(%) 
1977 83.4 11.6 5.0 
1991 70.5 19.7 9.8 
2001 51.9 39.2 8.9 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
It has to be said that this relative decline in the public transport modal split does not imply an 
absolute decline in the number of public transport trips. In fact, as the population of the city 
and the number of trips per person have increased, the absolute number of public transport 
trips has increased as well. But the absolute number of car trips has augmented much more 
rapidly. 
 
 
 
2.3 Other Characteristics of the Trips 
 
Figure 2.4 shows a histogram of motorised trips divided by trip-purpose for the year 2001. 
The histogram is divided into 15-minute intervals. Three peak periods can be recognised. 
                                            
1
 In the last Origin-Destination Survey there was a methodological change that makes it impossible to compare 
the non-motorised trips with those in the previous surveys. 
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The morning peak is much higher than the midday and afternoon peaks. The purpose “other” 
(shopping, health, social, etc.) dominates in the complete day figures (table 2.8), but in the 
morning peak, the work and study trips are the most important ones. There is a strong 
concentration of study trips in just half an hour in the morning. Efforts are being made to 
change the time at which some schools begin, in order to reduce the number of study-trips 
during the morning peak. It is worth noting that during the last years the motorised trips with 
the purpose “other” have strongly increased due to the growth in the income levels. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Motorised Trips by Purpose on a Weekday in 2001 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
Table 2.8: Motorised Trips Purpose, Year 2001 
Purpose Morning peak (%) 
Complete day 
(%) 
Other 21.0 44.6 
Study 36.0 19.1 
Work 43.0 36.3 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
Table 2.9 shows how the number of motorised trips per person has changed in the last 
decades. The motorised trips generation rate doubled between 1977 and 2001. 
 
Table 2.9: Evolution of the Motorised Trips Generation Rate 
Year Motorised daily 
trips per person 
1977 0.87 
1991 1.29 
2001 1.74 
Source: EOD (2001) 
 
It can be seen that the mobility in Santiago is changing. Some of the more evident 
modifications are that the people have more cars and make a higher proportion of trips in 
them, and that the people are making more trips in general. The increase in income is 
probably the main reason that explains this change, combined with a bad-quality bus system. 
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2.4 Private car: large investment in urban highways by the beginning 
of the 2000s 
 
Although the declared urban transport policy of the last governments in Chile had been to 
promote the use of public transport and rationalise the use of cars, between 2001 and 2006 a 
total of 150 km of urban highways were constructed in Santiago (figure 2.5), with a total 
investment of US$ 2,000 million. This is by far the most important development of new road 
infrastructure in the history of Santiago.  
 
Figure 2.5: New Urban Highways in Santiago 
 
 
The north-south connection (Autopista Central) and the ring highway (Autopista Vespucio 
Norte Express and Autopista Vespucio Sur) correspond to major improvements of existing 
roads, in order to achieve highway standards on them. In contrast, the east-west highway 
(Costanera Norte) that connects the high-income east with the centre and the west (close to 
the international airport of Santiago) is a completely new highway. It runs partly on the north 
side of the main river of Santiago (Mapocho River) and partly in a tunnel under it. 
 
All these highways are being constructed and partially financed by the private sector. Their 
construction and operation over a period of 30 years was tendered to private companies, 
which will receive revenues from tolls that the users will have to pay. The tolls will be paid 
electronically so that the cars do not need to stop at the toll points. 
 
This concession system has been used previously in interurban highways in Chile, and is 
similar to the one used in Madrid for the construction of the metro extension Line 9 and the 
intermodal transfer station Avenida de América (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2003). 
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2.5 Metro, the Pride of Santiago’s Public Transport System (and Other 
Rail Services) 
 
In 2003 Santiago had 3 metro lines (figure 2.6) with a total length of 40 km and 52 stations. 
The average distance between stations is 800 metres. Most of the network (69 %) is 
underground whereas 16 % runs on surface and 15 % is elevated. All the trains roll on 
pneumatic wheels (French technology) and the operation is automatic. Nevertheless, all the 
trains have a driver and they can also be driven manually. The average commercial speed in 
the entire network is 32 km/h (Metro de Santiago, 2003b pp3-4). 
 
Figure 2.6: Metro Network in 2003 
 
Figure 2.7: Metro Network in 2006 
 
Note: Line 3 has not yet been constructed. 
 
In 2005 the metro had 133 trains with a total of 636 vehicles (Metro de Santiago, 2005). The 
evolution of the demand and supply is presented in table 2.10. The yearly patronage of the 
metro has been continuously growing along with the network expansion, reaching 267 million 
passengers in 2005. The number of vehicle-kilometres reached 51 million in 2005. 
 
Table 2.10: Evolution of the Metro Demand and Supply 
Year Passengers (million) 
Network 
(km) 
Veh-km 
(million) 
1979 94 21.1 16 
1984 111 25.6 19 
1989 153 27.3 20 
1994 167 27.3 23 
1999 185 37.6 34 
2003 203 40.3 41 
2005 267 67.3 51 
Sources: Metro de Santiago (2003b p4, p6, p28; 2005) 
 
The first metro line opened in Santiago in 1975 with a length of 8.2 km. The metro is 
operated by a public owned company (Metro S.A.), which does not receive operational 
subsidies. This implies that the fare revenues and other secondary revenues (e.g. 
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advertisement) have to cover all the operational costs. In 2003, fare revenues accounted for 
90 % of the operational incomes whereas advertisement, shop rental rents and other 
incomes represented 5 %, 3 % and 2 % respectively (Metro de Santiago, 2003a pp35-37). 
The total operational income in 2003 was 60,143 million Chilean pesos, i.e. € 77 million, 
while the cost of the operation was € 75 million (Metro de Santiago, 2003c p51). 
 
Frequencies are generally high. In the peak hour the interval is lower than two minutes on 
the east-west line number 1. The metro system is perceived as a very quick, comfortable, 
reliable and clean mode. It is used by people of all income groups and it has a very strong 
company image. Nevertheless, the modal split was relatively low in 2001, as shown in table 
2.6. This is explained by the short length of the system (only 40 km in a metropolitan area of 
5.4 million inhabitants), as can be seen in figure 2.6, and by the competition that it had by 
buses. In fact, there were many bus lines that ran parallel to the metro lines. As passengers 
would have had to pay a double fare to transfer from a bus to the metro, there were many 
users who stayed on the bus, in spite of its worse perceived service level. 
 
42 new kilometres were added to the metro network between 2004 and 2006 (figure 2.7). 
The new infrastructure, including a new line (L4), had an investment cost of US$ 1,400 
million. As was the case with the urban highways, this is the most important extension of the 
metro since it was inaugurated in 1975. In fact, the network was more than doubled with 
these new 42 km. The cost of these extensions is financed by the Chilean State, but for the 
first time part of the infrastructure cost will be paid by Metro S.A., i.e. by the metro users. 
 
In addition, there is an urban rail service in Santiago (Metrotren) running only one line along 
the main long-distance rail track that connects Santiago with the cities of the central-south of 
the country (Temuco, Chillán, etc.). Metrotren is operated by the state owned Empresa de 
Ferrocarriles del Estado (EFE). The main cities that are connected with Santiago by the 
Metrotren (Rancagua and San Fernando) are 87 and 142 km away from the capital, implying 
that Metrotren provides an interurban service. Nevertheless, there are five stations inside 
Santiago, which are mainly used for urban trips. Although these urban trips represent only 
0.1 % of the public transport trips in Santiago, the use of Metrotren has shown an impressive 
growth after its creation in 1990. The urban and interurban patronage of Metrotren rose from 
1.9 million passengers in 1994 to 7.6 million trips in 2004. The supply grew from 22 
departures in 1994 to 94 departures in 2005 (EFE, 2005). 
 
 
 
2.6 Buses: on-the-Street Competition and Bad Service 
 
In 2005 there were 380 bus lines in Santiago with an average length of 60 km (adding both 
directions). The network is presented in figure 2.8. One can see a wide spatial coverage and 
many lines overlapping in some parts of their routes. Hence it is possible to travel without 
transfer between many origin-destination points. Therefore, the average number of transfers 
per trip was only 0.1 for bus trips and less than 0.2 for trips using bus and/or metro. This very 
low value was also explained by the absence of integrated fares. Transfers implied that a 
new fare had to be paid making them very expensive. 
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Figure 2.8: Bus Lines in 2003 
 
 
The high demands and the overlapping of routes produced very high frequencies in many 
streets. In the main street of Santiago (Alameda), there were more than 600 buses per hour 
per direction in 2001 close to the central rail station (Sectra, 2001). Regarding the high bus 
demands, figure 2.9 shows the streets where there were more than 5,000 passengers per 
hour in one direction in the morning peak in 2001. The highest bus demand was again in 
Alameda close to the central rail station, where more than 30,000 passengers per hour travel 
in the morning peak in west-east direction (Sectra, 2001). It is interesting to note that the 
highest metro demand was found in the line that runs exactly under Alameda and practically 
in the same point and direction. Thus another 30,000 passengers per hour were travelling by 
the metro in the morning peak. Altogether the impressive amount of 60,000 public transport 
passengers per hour in one direction was counted. In one year 1,200 million bus trips were 
made (2001). 
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Figure 2.9: Morning Peak High Demand Bus Streets 
 
Source: Sectra (2001) 
 
There were around 8,000 buses in Santiago in 2005, all of them privately owned and 
operated by approximately 4,000 “companies”. In fact, circa 2,500 bus owners had just one 
bus, and another 1,000 owned 2 or 3 vehicles. There were only 3 companies with more than 
50 buses (Sectra, 2003). The fare, which was directly collected by the bus driver, had to 
cover all the operational costs, as the operators did not receive any subsidy. Trying to 
maximise the number of passengers carried in each bus, each operator paid part of the fares 
collected to the driver. Therefore, the driver’s wage was proportional to the number of 
passengers he carried. If the driver wanted to earn more money, he had to compete with all 
the other buses to catch as many passengers as possible. 
 
Although there were different models of buses in 2004, they were very homogeneous in 
terms of size and capacity. The typical bus was 10 to 12 meters long with a capacity of 60 to 
80 passengers, half of them seated. There were no low-floor vehicles and it was practically 
impossible to board them in a wheelchair or with a baby carriage. There were some smaller 
vehicles (40 passengers), mainly on the lines that operated in agreement with Metro S.A. as 
feeder routes with an integrated fare. 
 
Bus lanes are generally not respected by car drivers in Santiago. Therefore, some effort has 
been made in order to build physically segregated bus roads. Nevertheless, in 2004 there 
was only a partial physical segregation in the main road of Santiago (Alameda) and a fully 
segregated bus road of just 4 km in a secondary street (Avenida Grecia). 
 
An interesting and brave effort in order to improve the circulation of the buses was made in 
2001 when 82 km of the main streets of Santiago were declared bus-only roads in the 
morning peak period. There was a big concern in the public opinion about the congestion 
problems that this measure might produce in other streets of the metropolitan area. All the 
discussions before the implementation of this measure about its negative effects helped to 
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inform the public about it. So the people were able to decide in advance if they wanted to 
change their travel behaviour, and many of them did so. In fact, traffic counts revealed that 
many car drivers changed their travel times (they travelled earlier before the bus-only period, 
alleviating the peak period), and public transport increased its patronage. Therefore, no 
important worse conditions were seen on alternative streets. This result is consistent with 
experiences in many other metropolitan areas in the world where road capacity reductions 
were carried out, as reported by Cairns et al. (1998). 
 
As these bus-only streets are an administrative measure, they can easily be revoked. 
Therefore, it is impossible to be sure if this bus priority measure will remain in the future. In 
2004, general traffic was already allowed in some of the original bus-only streets, with the 
aim of alleviating the traffic impact of the closure of major streets that were affected by the 
construction of the new highways or the metro extensions. 
 
An ambitious plan to improve the bus system in Santiago started its implementation in 2005 
and is scheduled to be completed by the beginning of 2007. A detailed description of this 
system, called Transantiago, is presented below. 
 
 
 
2.7 Shared-Taxis: Cars Offering Bus-like Services 
 
The shared-taxi is a public transport mode that uses cars running on specific routes with 
regular intervals. The services are similar to a typical bus service, but with smaller vehicles 
(cars). Mainly, there were two types of shared-taxi services in Santiago in 2003. The first was 
a long-distance service that linked the centre of Santiago with the periphery. These services 
were more expensive than buses or metro, but they were faster. In addition, they could 
slightly change their routes in order to get closer to a passenger’s destination if he asked for 
(and sometimes also paid a little extra). The second type was feeder services to metro 
stations or local centres in peripheral zones. Shared-taxis’ fares were not integrated with 
other public transport modes. They were privately owned and did not receive operational 
subsidies. 
 
As can be seen in table 2.5, the modal split of the shared-taxi was small in comparison with 
car or bus. Al the same, it was comparable to the modal split of metro. In fact, in some 
peripheral municipalities (e.g. Puente Alto and Maipú) the shared-taxi played a very 
important role in the local trips. A total of some 200 million trips was made in shared-taxis in 
2001. 
 
The shared-taxi industry was still deregulated in terms of fares and route design in 2003. 
This produced a big increase in their services, especially feeder routes that compete with 
buses for that demand segment. Many of these vehicles were only used as shared-taxis in 
the peak periods, being used as normal taxis in the off-peak. In 2003 the total fleet of taxis 
and shared-taxis was fixed, in order to avoid a further increase of it. Nevertheless, there was 
still the possibility of transforming normal taxis into shared-taxis. 
 
An attempt to introduce regulations in the shared-taxi industry is being made with a route 
tendering process that began at the end of 2003. The longer routes that linked the periphery 
of the metropolitan area with the centre were eliminated, and only shorter feeder or local 
routes should remain. 
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2.8 Critical Analysis of Transantiago, the New Bus System in 
Santiago 
 
Prior to 1975, bus lines, frequencies and fares were defined by the authority. The operators 
were not allowed to introduce changes and the bus system was highly inflexible 
(Transantiago, 2005a). Afterwards, a process of deregulation began in the industry. 
 
By 1980 the bus system was completely deregulated in terms of fares, frequencies and route 
design. The entrance to the industry needed the authorisation of the Transport Ministry, but 
an incorporation application was never denied, except for formal reasons. In 1988 even the 
need for this authorisation was eliminated, and therefore any bus passing a mechanical test 
could operate without any restriction on fares or routes (Fernández, 1994). 
 
Fares grew constantly in real terms and this was accompanied by increases in the vehicle 
fleet, which in turn made the fares rise again and so on. Between 1979 and 1989 the bus 
fleet doubled and the fare more than doubled in real terms. Small buses were mostly used 
and high levels of congestion, pollution and accidents were observed. On the other hand, 
route density and frequencies increased, reducing walking and waiting times (Fernández, 
1994). There was no actual competition in fares or service quality because after the 
government stopped regulating the industry, a cartel of operators took over the control of the 
activity (Darbera, 1993; Fernández, 1994). The only competition was on the streets, with 
buses fighting to catch the next passenger. 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s a big effort was made to move competition from the streets of 
Santiago to a competitive tendering process. Only the routes that crossed the centre were 
tendered, i.e. the routes with higher demands. This broke the operators’ cartel and they 
actually competed in the tendering process that granted operation concessions for three 
years. But in the next process almost all routes were tendered. In addition, some conditions 
of the tender only allowed current operators to participate in the tendering. Because of these 
facts, the operators could act as a cartel again, agreeing in advance on a distribution of the 
routes among them and avoiding a real competition in the tender2. 
 
This new system had some success in diminishing the excessive number of buses, reducing 
the fares and improving the technical conditions of the vehicles. Nevertheless, those lines 
with small operators (owning a few vehicles each) did never act as a real company. On the 
contrary, each bus owner managed his own income, independent of the revenues of the 
other buses. So, competition in the streets remained reality even among vehicles of the 
same line. Because of this, uncertainty in waiting and travel times and high levels of accident 
risk did not disappear. 
 
On the other hand, the authorities did not increase their role in the planning of the bus 
system. Only small changes in the route designs were made during the 1990s, and those 
were propositions of the operators, which were normally accepted by the authority. The fares 
were regulated, but the authority could not change them at will. Initial fares were determined 
in the tendering process, and afterwards they changed according to a mathematical equation 
established in the contracts that reflected the variations in the operation costs. 
 
                                            
2
 In the last tender 97 % of the operators asked for the maximal fare allowed and 76 % presented an offer for only 
one route, although offers for up to two routes were permitted (Sectra, 2003). 
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Diagnosis of the bus system by the early 2000s 
 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the bus system still presented important problems that 
produced a very bad perception of bus services by the population. Surveys comparing the 
satisfaction of the people with different public services (water, electricity, supermarkets, etc.) 
always showed public transport at the last places. So the bus system was mainly used by 
those who did not have an alternative. As the motorisation rate increased, a higher 
proportion of the people could switch to the car, explaining the drastic drop in the public 
transport modal split in the last decades (see table 2.5). 
 
The main negative characteristics of the bus system are listed and explained here: 
 
1. Waiting times were unpredictable and sometimes high because buses competed 
on-the-street not only with other lines, but also with other vehicles from the same line. 
It was normal to see two or even three buses from the same line travelling together, 
“fighting” to catch the passengers at the next stop. This form of operation intensified 
bus bunching, increasing headways and waiting times. And even worse, a passenger 
waiting at a low-demand stop could undergo the highly frustrating experience of 
seeing how one or more buses he would like to board do not stop, because they are 
trying to arrive first at a following high-demand stop. 
 
2. This form of competition, together with drivers who are working too many hours a 
day, implied a high accident risk as well as stressed and often aggressive drivers 
who were anything but friendly to the users. 
 
3. Moreover, this aggressive form of driving increased the noise and pollutant 
emissions of the system. On the other hand, both an excess of buses running in the 
off-peak periods and the overlapping (competition) of bus lines and metro increased 
the perception that the bus system was highly pollutant. Nevertheless, strict emission 
norms were introduced in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s almost all the 
vehicles fulfilled the emission norm Euro II, while new buses had to fulfil Euro III. 
 
4. Lack of cleaning and preventive maintenance: Buses were not cleaned enough 
and they deteriorated quickly, as not-critical damages were not repaired soon (graffiti, 
damaged seats, dents, etc.). Moreover, only the few bigger companies did preventive 
maintenance, while the small operators used their buses until something broke. And 
when this happened, the vehicle had to be fixed as soon as possible, because having 
their vehicles in the garage for maintenance was perceived as a direct loss of 
revenue (as their only income was the fares directly paid in the bus). Nevertheless, 
after the tendering of the 1990s, buses could not exceed a maximal age of 10 or 12 
years, so that new vehicles were continuously entering the fleet. 
 
5. Although not directly perceived by the users, inefficiencies in the route and 
frequency design had an impact on the fares. Firstly, every bus line was designed 
over the years with the aim of maximising the number of passengers on that route. 
Secondly, given that every bus generated income only when it was running on the 
street, no operator was willing to let it in the garage in the low-demand periods. All 
this implied an excess of veh-km that had to be paid for by the fares. 
 
6. Almost no users’ information was available. 
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On the other hand, there were the following positive aspects for the bus users: 
 
1. Though unstable, frequencies were high (some 8 buses per line per hour on average) 
not only in peak periods, but also during off-peaks and at weekends. Moreover, as 
many lines overlapped, passengers could use different lines and had therefore very 
low waiting times. In addition, there was a high probability of getting a seat 
during off-peak periods and at weekends. 
 
2. There was a high density of routes, yielding low access (walking) times. 
 
3. As bus lines were long and many of them overlapped, it was possible to travel 
between many origins and destinations in a direct route, i.e. without a transfer.  
 
In spite of their impact on the operation costs, the operators always maintained the following 
two characteristics: 
 
• The driver’s wage was directly dependent on the number of passengers he 
caught. The resulting on-the-street competition implied higher operation and 
maintenance costs. 
• All buses were in operation in the off-peak periods, yielding higher operation 
costs than if some buses would have been run only in the peak periods. 
 
Why did the operators have such a strange behaviour, operating in a form that implied higher 
costs for them? Two aspects of the system have to be kept in mind to understand this 
paradox. First, there were more than 4,000 operators and the majority of the buses belonged 
to an operator that owned less than 4 buses. And second, lines overlapped in extended 
sections of their routes so that many passengers could travel indistinctly in different lines. 
This means that the potential demand (and income) was shared among distinct lines. 
 
If one operator had decided to pay a fixed salary to his drivers, his vehicles would have 
transported fewer passengers, because of the on-the-street competition of other buses. His 
income would have fallen. If he had decided to let some of his buses rest in off-peak periods, 
again he would have lost some passengers that would have been transported by other 
operators. It has to be taken into account that the marginal cost of running a bus in the 
off-peak was quite low: according to the cost estimations made by Sectra (2003), if a bus ran 
an additional cycle of 60 km, the consume of fuel, lubricants, tyres, the payment of the driver, 
etc., could be recovered with just 50 passengers boarding the vehicle, i.e. less than one 
passenger boarding per kilometre. Therefore, running a cycle in the off-peak normally 
produced a profit, even with a very low occupancy of the bus. 
 
The cartel did not have power enough to reach an agreement among all the 4,000 operators 
in order to change the salary policy or the off-peak operation frequencies. In fact, if such a 
change had been agreed, the system would have been in an unstable equilibrium, as every 
operator would have had an economic incentive to change back to the previous behaviour. 
On the contrary, the observed behaviour was a stable equilibrium, because no operator had 
an incentive to change his form of operation. The only way in which lower frequencies in 
off-peak periods could actually be implemented was through a number plate based running 
restriction that the authority implemented with the aim of diminishing the pollutant emissions 
of the industry. 
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On the other hand, a similar analysis can be made to explain the absence of express 
services and shorter lines. These would have reduced the total operation cost of the system, 
but every operator perceived that making a change in those directions would have reduced 
his potential demand and earnings. 
 
On the whole, the existence of too many operators sharing the demand was one of the key 
aspects of the problem, yielding incorrect economic incentives for operators and drivers. In 
addition, a coordinated design of routes and frequencies was needed! It is interesting to note 
that the problems of the public transport system of Santiago were similar to the problems of 
many other Latin-American metropolitan areas. 
 
The strategy behind the new plan 
 
A substantial change was needed in the bus system of Santiago if the decline in the public 
transport modal split was to be stopped. The following strategic points were considered in the 
design of the final plan: 
 
• The participation of the authority in the planning and regulation of the system had to 
be increased, but keeping the operation in the private sector. 
• The improvements had to encompass the entire bus system, not just a part of it (e.g. 
selected corridors). 
• A new route and frequency design had to be introduced, coordinating the bus lines 
not only among each other, but also with the metro. 
• An integrated fare system encompassing both buses and metro also needed to be 
implemented. 
• The property structure of the industry needed to be changed, from thousands of bus 
owners with a few vehicles each to several larger bus companies. 
• The economic incentives perceived by the operators had to be corrected, in order to 
eliminate the on-the-street competition and reach a higher quality in the service. 
• The positive characteristics of the previous system should be maintained: high 
frequencies, high route density and low level of transfers. 
• The fares had to be kept at similar levels, without operational subsidy. Though 
economic justifications for subsidising the public transport were known (Jara-Díaz 
and Gschwender, 2005), the absence of any operational subsidy was an active 
political restriction. 
• Any change in the laws should be avoided, in order to reduce the risk of delays due to 
political discussions. Two already existing laws could be used: firstly, a law allowing 
to regulate the operation of the transport system when high congestion, pollution or 
accident levels existed (which was created for the tendering processes of the 1990s), 
and secondly, a law that allowed the concession of infrastructure investment to the 
private sector. 
• Intensive requirements of new infrastructure should not be a key aspect of the plan, in 
order to allow it to be implemented even in the absence of funds for the construction 
of new infrastructure. 
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Main aspects of the proposed new system 
 
1. A public transport authority and private companies 
 
Following successful experiences in other Latin-American metropolitan areas (e.g. Bogotá), 
the creation of a public transport authority that contracts private companies to operate the 
buses, tickets selling and income management was proposed. This transport authority 
should be responsible for the coordination of services and fares. The final design also 
incorporated the externalisation of the information management. So, the authority tendered 
to the private sector the following three concessions: 
 
1. The operation of the buses, which are run by different private companies: this issue 
will be explained more in detail later. Following the public transport organisation 
models defined by Costa (1996), this corresponds to the “authority and multiple 
operators” model, which is also used in some European metropolitan areas as 
London and Copenhagen (see Haubitz 2004 for the latter). 
 
2. A finance administrator (Administrador Financiero de Transantiago, AFT): the main 
tasks of this concessionary are 
a) the selling and charging of a contactless smartcard that will become the main 
payment form in buses and the metro, 
b) the administration of the revenues and payment to the bus operators, metro 
and other agents, according to the payment conditions established in the 
different contracts and the instructions of the authority regarding penalties and 
rewards and 
c) providing, installing and maintaining ticket-reading machines for the buses.  
 
3. An information manager and users’ information provider (Servicios de 
Información y Atención a Usuarios de Transantiago, SIAUT): the main tasks of this 
concessionary are  
a) the collection, storing and distribution of operational information from the 
buses (GPS position, etc.),  
b) processing the operational information and producing reports for the authority, 
in order to supervise the fulfilment of the contracts and determine penalties 
and rewards and 
c) provide users’ information. 
 
The payment to the AFT will be a fixed amount plus a percentage of the users’ fares. The 
SIAUT will receive a fixed payment. 
 
2. New bus routes structure and operators’ payment system 
 
A new design for bus routes, frequencies and vehicle sizes, along with a new bus operators’ 
payment system was proposed, with the aim of eliminating the on-the-street competition and 
avoiding excess of offer due to competition both among bus lines and between bus and 
metro lines. 
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The routes scheme proposed included three complementary public transport networks: 
 
• The metro lines. 
• A network of main bus routes. 
• A network of local and feeder bus lines, organised in separate areas. 
 
Figure 2.10 shows an example of the main bus routes network (dark lines) and the local 
areas (in different colours). Local bus lines and metro lines are not shown in the figure. 
 
Figure 2.10: Example of the Main Buses Network and Local Areas 
 
Source: Sectra (Chilean Transportation Planning Office) 
 
The decision of dividing the bus system in two separate networks was made with the aims of 
 
• reaching a better adjustment between demand and offer through the use of bigger 
vehicles in the main routes and smaller ones in the feeder lines, and 
• allowing the authority to make a good planning of the main routes. In effect, 
considering the difficulty that the design and adjustment over the time of all the bus 
lines imply, the idea was that the authority should play a more important role in the 
design of the main routes (where the city development and the patronage are more 
consolidated), and that the adjustment of the feeder lines should be proposed by the 
operators themselves. So it was necessary to give them adequate incentives in this 
direction. On the other hand, the available data and the design tools developed by the 
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authority were able to give adequate answers to the route design on the main lines, 
but were not reliable enough in the periphery of the metropolitan area where the 
demand is spread across and changes quickly. 
 
Some experiences of dividing a bus system into main and feeder lines already existed in 
other Latin-American metropolitan areas, for instance in Quito and Bogotá. 
 
 
It was known that the decision of dividing the bus system into two networks would imply an 
increase in the transfers. Therefore, the route design should avoid a high number of transfers 
at least inside every network. This meant that in every network overlapping routes allowing 
direct trips should be preferred to single corridor lines. Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2003a) 
showed that the former tends to be a better option when the demand levels are high. 
 
Having these considerations in mind, the following solution was proposed for each bus 
network: First, in the case of the main bus routes, the objectives of eliminating on-the-street 
competition and minimising transfers inside the network could be reached by overlapping 
routes and a payment to the operators mainly dependent on the veh-km (to avoid on-the-
street competition). And second, for the local and feeder lines, the objectives of eliminating 
on-the-street competition and giving incentives to adjust the services and look for demand 
increases could be reached through separate areas with a monopolistic operator in each of 
them and a payment to the operators dependent on the number of passengers carried (as an 
incentive to the adjustment of the services). Again, there is a similarity between this 
proposition and the systems in other Latin-American metropolitan areas. For example in the 
TransMilenio bus system in Bogotá, the payment to the operators also depends on the 
veh-km on the main routes and on the passengers carried on the feeder routes. 
 
Nevertheless, the decision-makers finally decided that all bus operators should be paid 
according to the passengers carried, i.e. in a similar way as they were historically paid. 
Therefore, the payment system had to be changed in the case of the main lines. The final 
design considers that the revenue received by the bus operators depends on the number of 
passengers carried, but is semi-guaranteed, in order to reduce the operators’ risk and try to 
increase the number of bidders: if the actual demand differs from a reference figure, the 
operators only perceive a drop (or increase) in their income representing 10 % of the 
demand change.  
 
The new routes and frequencies were designed by using a tool developed by the authority 
(Sectra, 2001). This design model optimises the frequencies considering the total users’ and 
operators’ cost, an approach that has been reviewed by Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2003b). 
In addition, routes are generated by using heuristics. More details about this design model 
can be found in Sectra (2001), Malbran et al. (2004) and Fernández and De Cea (2007). 
 
3. New fare structure and ticketing system 
 
There was a high level of consensus among the transport experts about the need of an 
integrated fare for the public transport system. Moreover, the new routes structure could not 
be implemented without integrated fares. In effect, as additional transfers would appear, the 
old pay-each-time-you-board scheme would have implied higher fares for those trips that 
would already have been penalised by the new transfers.  
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Travelcards allowing unlimited travel within a period of time (week, month, etc.) were not 
considered, at least for the first years. Therefore, in this case the integrated fare system 
implies that the total fare that a passenger has to pay for a trip with transfers is fewer than 
the addition of the single fares that would have to be paid separately for each stage of the 
trip. When a transfer is made, a reduced fare (eventually zero) is charged. In order to 
introduce such a fare structure, a technological change is necessary. A paying method that 
“remembers” if the passenger already paid is needed, in order to recognise if the user has to 
be charged the full fare or the reduced transfer fare. The introduction of a smartcard as the 
main paying device is therefore a key aspect of the proposed system. Nevertheless, it will 
also be possible to pay in cash, but at a substantially higher fare and without the possibility of 
fare integration (“emergency” fare). 
 
In addition, a new form of understanding between fare and revenue was needed. Formerly, 
the operators’ income was the fare. In the new system, the money takes longer to reach the 
operator, as it first has to be charged to the smartcard, then the smartcard has to be read by 
the ticket machines inside the vehicles (which subtract the fare from the smartcard) and 
finally the finance administrator (AFT) has to periodically pay to the operators according to 
the rules established in the contracts. 
 
Under the new fare system, what the user pays (the fare) will normally be different to what 
the operator receives for transporting the passenger. Nevertheless, as no direct operational 
subsidy is considered, equilibrium between incomes and operators’ costs has to be reached. 
This equilibrium implies that a relationship between fares and operators’ payments has to 
exist. In fact, given a fare structure, it is possible to estimate the value of each fare as 
follows: 
 
Let di be the demand for each type of fare, i.e. the number of passengers that pay each one 
of the different available fares. If fi is the value of each fare, which has to be determined, the 
total income (I) paid by the users is 
 
   ∑ ⋅=
i
ii fdI . (1) 
 
On the other hand, let pj be the patronage of each operator and cj the payment that each 
operator receives for every passenger, i.e. the unitary cost of each operator for the system. If 
all the other costs of the system, e.g. the payment to the SIAUT, are assumed fixed (A), then 
the total cost of the system (C) can be written as 
 
 AcpC
j
jj +⋅=∑   . (2) 
 
If relations between the different fares fi are defined ( f1 = α f2 , etc.) it is possible to obtain the 
value of every fi as a function of di, pj, cj and A, by equalling (1) and (2). Thus, the 
dependence of the users’ fares (fi) with the payment to the operators (cj) can be seen. The 
values of cj and A will be known, as they are results of the different tenders. But the values of 
di and pj have to be predicted in order to calculate equilibrium fares. 
 
Thus a fare structure and the relationships between the different fare types were defined by 
the authority, but the actual values of the distinct fares will be a result not only of the unitary 
payments arising from every tender, but also from predictions of the demand. In order to 
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avoid short-term deficits due to unexpected changes in the demand, a compensation fund 
(administrated by the AFT) will be maintained. 
 
4. New property structure for the bus industry 
 
The property structure of the bus operators industry had to be changed in order to have 
larger companies. Each tendering unit should have a fleet of some hundred buses or more3. 
Furthermore, longer periods of concession were considered, especially in the cases in which 
only new buses were allowed. When this was the case, the concession period should be 
approximately the same as the allowed vehicles’ lifespan (10 years for diesel buses). It was 
considered that all this would also increase the attractiveness of the business for new 
operators, and would therefore increase competition in the tendering processes. 
 
After defining the set of roads that would form the network for the main bus routes, the 
design of these main bus routes using the previously described model yielded approximately 
50 main lines. These were finally grouped into 5 tendering units, with some 500 buses each, 
trying to avoid the coexistence of different operators in the same streets. Nevertheless, in a 
few cases there will be different operators running lines in the same street. In the case of the 
feeder lines, 10 areas were defined, trying to follow the existent inner frontiers of the 
metropolitan area (rivers, hills, roadways, etc.). All the feeder and local lines inside each area 
were tendered together, and each area needed some 200 buses or less. So a total of 15 
tenders were made for the operation of the buses, implying that there would be at the most 
that number of operators. In order to prevent monopolistic powers in the industry, a single 
operator could not win more than two main-routes concessions or more than four 
concessions in total. 
 
5. Awards and penalties scheme 
 
In order to give incentives to the operators aiming to drastically improve the quality of the 
service, a system of penalties and awards was proposed. Hence a list of faults (e.g. running 
with open doors, boarding or alighting passengers in an unauthorised place, etc.) and 
corresponding penalties was defined in the contracts. All the income generated by the 
penalties will be returned to the operators through a system of awards that considers 
punctuality and users’ satisfaction. A similar penalties/awards scheme is applied in the bus 
operation in TransMilenio (Bogotá). 
 
6. Financial balance 
 
The operation of the new system had to be financed with the income of the fares paid by the 
users, which should not be significantly higher than the previous fares. No operational 
subsidy was considered. Though, new cost items would emerge, for example for the ticketing 
system (AFT), and the information management and users’ information (SIAUT). In addition, 
new infrastructure was needed in those points where there will be a high number of transfers. 
Some of this new infrastructure has to be paid for by the system itself. 
 
 
 
                                            
3
 This means that the small operators with one or a few buses would have to group themselves in larger 
companies if they wanted to continue in the industry. 
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An infrastructure plan consisting of the following components is considered: 
 
• 14 km of segregated busways, in addition to the existing 11 km, 
• one big interchange station between metro and buses, 
• 35 smaller transfer stations, 
• road surface and geometric improvements on 63 km of the main roads, 
• two strategic road connections and 
• improvement of about 5,000 bus stops. 
 
The cost of this infrastructure plan is approximately € 210 million. 25 % of it will be publicly 
financed, while the other 75 % correspond to private investment that will be charged to the 
users’ fares (Transantiago, 2005c). In addition, a part of the investment in new metro lines 
will also be charged to the fares. 
 
 
On the other hand, an important reduction in the bus operation costs was expected. Thanks 
to the new route design and the complementary conception of the bus lines (between them 
and the metro), a better match between demand and capacity will be achieved. 
 
Cost estimations considering all these variations showed that a financial equilibrium could be 
reached, maintaining the fares in similar levels as they were, i.e. with an average normal fare 
around € 0.45 and an average students’ fare of € 0.15. 
 
Additional aspects of the plan 
 
Together with normal 10-12 m long buses, 18 m articulated buses will be introduced in some 
of the main routes. 25 m biarticulated vehicles were not considered because a competitive 
market for their provision seemed not to be sure, as too few providers existed. The local or 
feeder lines will operate with normal buses and 8 m minibuses. All the new buses have to 
fulfil stricter noise limits and the Euro III emission norm. Excluding the minibuses, all the new 
vehicles will be partially low-floor with pneumatic suspension and a ramp for wheelchairs (all 
novelties in Santiago). In two of the five main lines concessions the operators had to acquire 
a completely new fleet (approximately 1,200 buses) and the concession period is 10 years 
but can be extended to 16 years if low-emission vehicles are introduced (natural gas, hybrids 
or electric vehicles). In the other concessions, existing vehicles could be used. The other 
three main lines concessions have a period of three years, which may be extended if new 
vehicles are introduced. The duration of the local concessions is five years. 
 
Express services stopping only at the most important bus stops were considered in the main 
network in order to allow shorter travel times and reduce the fleet size and costs. Preliminary 
estimations suggested that the main bus fleet could be reduced between 5 % and 9 % 
through the introduction of express services. 
 
The total fleet will be reduced from 8,000 buses in 2003 to some 5,000 vehicles, but the 
average size of the buses will increase. So the total capacity of the bus fleet will be reduced 
by approximately 25 %. The metro will significantly increase its participation in the public 
transport trips by extending its network and the non-competitive design of the bus routes. In 
terms of public transport trip stages, the participation of the metro grows roughly from 30 % 
to 40 %. The reduction of the bus fleet, together with the fulfilment of the Euro III emission 
norm, will produce a huge decrease in the total emissions of the public transport system. 
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This is very important because the air quality is a very sensible issue in Santiago where 
smog is a serious problem every winter. 
 
An important increase in the number of transfers is expected. The previous figure of less 
than 0.2 transfers per public transport trip will be increased to some 0.8. In spite of this 
growth, the average trip should still have less than 2 stages. 
 
The payment per passenger received by the bus operators will be adjusted over time 
according to a mathematical formula established in the contracts, which reflects the impact in 
the operation costs of changes in the prices of the production factors (fuel, wheels, oil, etc.). 
The passengers’ fares will also be adjusted, according to these changes in the payment to 
the operators, in order to maintain the financial equilibrium. Neither the authority nor the 
operators can change the fares at will. 
 
Several measures were considered in order to reduce the financial risk of the bus operators 
and attract more companies to participate in the tenders. As already explained, the 
patronage-dependent revenue is semi-guaranteed, as only 10 % of the difference between 
the actual and the reference demands are transferred to the operators. Other examples of 
this risk control are: 
 
• A minimum income is guaranteed, varying between 85 % and 60 % of the reference 
income depending on the type of concession (main lines with/without new buses and 
feeder lines). 
• If at the end of the concession the accumulated revenues are lower than expected, 
the concession period can be extended up to 24 months until an expected present 
value of the incomes is reached. 
• Revenue adjustments in case of changes in the patronage due to changes in the 
commercial speeds are considered. 
• The compensation fund assures the payment in the first months, even if big mistakes 
would have been made in the prediction of fares or demands, and assures that the 
payments to the operators can be made if important drops in the demand occur in the 
future. 
• In order to assure a long-term financial sustainability, it is even established that if the 
fares reach an upper limit, measures to rationalise the use of the car will be 
introduced with the aim of increasing public transport use (Transantiago, 2005b). 
 
Without considering public investment in infrastructure, the system has an estimated total 
yearly cost of € 570 million. From this cost, 43 % corresponds to the main bus routes, 32 % 
to the metro, 14 % to the feeder and local lines, 5.5 % to the finance administrator (AFT) and 
the information provider (SIAUT) and 5.5 % to infrastructure (Transantiago, 2005b). 
 
Discussion and final comments 
 
The design of the main aspects of this plan, aiming to improve the public transport system 
(especially the buses) in Santiago de Chile, began at the end of 2001. The bids for the 
operation of the buses were awarded in January 2005 to 10 different operators. Some of the 
winner companies are formed by former bus operators of Santiago, while others correspond 
to new Chilean and foreign operators. The AFT was in turn awarded to a partnership of the 
biggest Chilean banks and a technology company in April 2005. The tendering process of the 
SIAUT was finished during the first semester of 2006. The implementation phase of the new 
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system began in October 2005 and by the beginning of 2007 all aspects of the new system 
should be fully implemented. 
 
For the main-routes tenders, between two and seven bids were received for each tender. 
The highest number of bids was in the tenders where a completely new fleet was required. 
The lower interest in the tenders with old buses is partially explained by some uncertainty 
about the market of used buses in Santiago (it is not allowed to import used buses). In the 
case of the feeder and local area tenders, between three and five bids were received for 
each one. The financial conditions of the different offers show that a previous agreement 
among the bidders is highly unlikely to have occurred. In the future, it will be important to be 
able to maintain the competition in the bus tendering processes. The next round should 
begin in 2008, and it would be unfortunate to repeat the mistakes of the 1990s, when 
tendering processes did not achieve competitive conditions. 
 
It still has to be seen whether the winners of the tenders assumed adequate conditions for 
their bids. An eventual occurrence of the “winner’s curse”, i.e. a too optimistic bidder winning 
the concession and having financial problems later, cannot be discarded as the tendering 
procedure selected the best financial (cheaper) offer from those which were technically 
eligible. 
 
It will also be interesting to discover if the new system will achieve the elimination of 
on-the-street competition, especially along the main routes. In the local areas, special 
attention has to be put into the process of attracting new patronage and adapting the 
services. Do the operators have the right incentives in this direction? This has to be carefully 
analysed in order to introduce, if necessary, changes in the new tenders. 
 
It is interesting to note that the massive introduction of the contactless smartcard was very 
attractive for the banks as its technology allows using it also for other purposes as, for 
example, a money card to pay for retailing. The smartcard will reach a large number of 
people, many of whom do not have any other bank product because of their low incomes. 
This aspect was relevant in increasing the interest of the banks in participating in the tender 
of the finance administrator (AFT). Which new functions (outside the transport system) will be 
added to the smartcard is still unknown, as this has to be decided by the banks that form the 
AFT. 
 
There were important technical and political conditions that helped or were useful for the 
design and implementation of the new system. Technically, the availability of good travel 
information from origin-destination surveys was crucial, as well as the modelling capacity. It 
is not to be overlooked that a new model for the design of routes and frequencies was 
implemented and used, based on a long tradition of modelling knowledge in Chile. In 
addition, a good knowledge of the particular conditions and deficiencies of the public 
transport system in Santiago de Chile was indispensable. 
 
Politically, the tendering experiences of the 1990s, together with the law that allowed them, 
were extremely useful. A change in the complete bus system cannot be imagined in the 
absence of previous tendering processes. In fact, if the former deregulated bus system were 
still in force, the authorities would have been practically obliged to negotiate with the 
operators and the changes of the system would have been much more difficult. Most 
probably, the changes would have only been able to reach a part of the bus system, 
maintaining the rest more or less in the same previous conditions, as a niche for the old 
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operators. This is what happened in Quito (Trole), Bogotá (TransMilenio) and previously in 
Santiago when the metro was built and extended without changing anything in the bus 
system. Now all the operators in Santiago had contracts with an expiring date and after that 
period they did not have any legal right to continue operating. This facilitated the changes in 
the system. 
 
Moreover, the public opinion about the bus system and the bus operators was very bad. This 
helped the authorities to change the system. The strikes made by the bus operators in 
opposition to the new plan were strongly rejected by the population. Even the arrest, 
because of the stopping of the traffic in many streets of Santiago, of some of the bus 
operators’ representatives after one of the most serious strike in opposition to the plan, was 
well received by the citizens and the press. Without this strong support from the population, it 
would have been much more difficult for the authorities to make progress with the plan. 
Finally many of the former operators participated in the new bids, after forming companies as 
required by the tender. The same occurred in Bogotá when the operation of TransMilenio 
was tendered some years before. 
 
In addition, the fact that successful experiences of significant changes in the bus system 
were known in other Latin-American metropolitan areas (Quito and especially Bogotá), made 
it easier for the decision-makers to convince themselves that it was possible to succeed with 
such a plan. 
 
In the other cases there was a strong political figure promoting and defending the plan, for 
instance in Curitiba, Quito and Bogotá. In Santiago, the lack of such a political leader, 
together with an unclear institutional design behind the transport system, brought some 
difficulties that even put at risk the implementation of the plan. It was the president of the 
country, as the only political authority superior to all the different government departments 
involved in the design and execution of the plan, who had to decide about key aspects of the 
implementation. 
 
The creation of a transport authority was one of the key aspects of this plan. So far, a 
secretary called “Transantiago”, who has the executive responsibility and coordinates the 
different government departments related with the public transport system, has taken this 
role. But will this institutional design be adequate to the future development of the public 
transport system? Or should a political transport authority be created, concentrating all the 
responsibilities that are still spread out between different government departments and local 
authorities? These questions will be analysed in detail in chapter 7, where deeper changes in 
the institutional organisation of the transport system in Santiago will be proposed, taking into 
account the experiences of three large European capital cities. 
 
A challenge is the provision of congestion-free infrastructure for the buses. Only a minor part 
of the main bus routes network (25 km from a total of about 350 km) will have segregated 
right of way in 2007. Some other main streets have been declared car-free in the morning 
peak period in the last years, as a way to improve the commercial speed of the buses. But 
this is a soft policy measure and it is difficult to assume that it will survive over time. In fact, 
after its introduction in 2000 the length of this car-free network has been reduced year after 
year. Considering the rapid growth in the motorisation rate, the extension of the physically 
segregated buslane network should be a priority in order to prevent the future negative 
impacts of the congestion in the circulation of the buses. The guarantee offered by the 
authority of compensating the bus operators for losses in the demand which can be 
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attributed to drops in the commercial speed is an interesting incentive for the authorities to 
seek avoiding the impact of congestion in the buses. 
 
Other possibilities of improvements can be recognised. Transfers will increase drastically due 
to the new routes scheme. This is the main loss for the users (probably the only one) in 
comparison to the previous system. Would it be possible to reduce the number of transfers in 
the future, as it is known that ceteris paribus they negatively affect the demand because of a 
worse perception of the system’s quality? On the other hand, given the high heterogeneity of 
the population in Santiago in terms of income, it could be interesting to analyse the creation 
of different public transport products. For example, an expensive high-quality service that 
should compete with the car for the high-income users, and a cheaper service directed to the 
low-income population. 
 
The fare integration introduced for buses and metro should be extended to other minor public 
transport modes in the future, for instance suburban rail and shared-taxis. In addition, the 
creation of travelcards (unlimited travel in a month, week, etc.), which seem to be an 
interesting option in order to augment the patronage (Hass-Klau and Crampton, 2002; Matas, 
2004), or other price strategies to encourage the frequent use of the system should be 
analysed. This fares’ structure issue will be further analysed in chapter 8 and 
recommendations for its improvement will be proposed, after comparing the new fare system 
with the observed systems in three large European capitals. 
 
All the changes in the bus services and the integration between buses and metro represent a 
deep improvement in the public transport system of Santiago de Chile. Nevertheless, in order 
to reach a sustainable transport system, further efforts have to be made for example in the 
internalisation of the costs of the car users and in the encouragement of non-motorised 
modes. 
 
In the next chapters we will analyse our three study areas. We will start with Greater London. 
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3 Analysis of Greater London and its Transport System 
 
3.1 Socio-economic Aspects in a Multi-racial World-city 
 
The population of Greater London, the capital city of England and the United Kingdom, 
reached its peak of 8.6 million in 1939. Driven by policies of decentralisation and the decline 
of the industries, Greater London’s population fell significantly to 6.8 million people by 1983. 
However, since 1989 Greater London has been one of the most rapidly growing major 
metropolitan areas in Europe, adding half a million people in fifteen years, with 800,000 more 
expected in the next 15 years. In 2004, Greater London’s population was estimated to be 
almost 7.4 million people (table 3.1), being the largest city in the European Union. 8.1 million 
people are expected to live in Greater London by 2016, as shown in figure 3.1 (GLA, 2004). 
Greater London has an average density of 4,700 people/km2 (CfIT, 2001), but some central 
areas can have more than 10,000 people per square kilometre (see figure 3.5 below). The 
London metropolitan area or commuter belt has an estimated population of some 14 million 
(Demographia, 2007a). 
 
Table 3.1: Population in Greater London by Age (a) 
Year 0-14 years 15-64 years 65 and over TOTAL 
1971 1.6 4.9 1.0 7.5 
1981 1.2 4.5 1.1 6.8 
1991 1.3 4.6 0.9 6.8 
1996 1.4 4.6 0.9 6.9 
2001 1.4 5.0 0.9 7.3 
2002 1.4 5.1 0.9 7.4 
2003 1.4 5.1 0.9 7.4 
2004 1.3 5.2 0.9 7.4 
(a)
 Population in million 
Sources: TfL (2003, 2005d) 
 
Figure 3.1: Greater London’s Population: Actual (1971-2003) and Predicted (2004-2016) 
 
Source: GLA (2004 p25) 
 
Greater London is one of the most ethnically diverse metropolitan areas in the world. 
According to the last census, in 2001, more than 300 languages are spoken and 50 
non-indigenous communities with a population of more than 10,000 live in Greater London 
(Guardian Unlimited, 2005). Nearly one third of the Londoners are from black and minority 
ethnic communities, including some mainly white minority groups such as Irish, Cypriot and 
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Turkish communities. A significant growth in black and minority ethnic communities is 
projected over the next years. International in and out-migration has been high and is 
projected to remain so. The impact of migration has had a rejuvenating effect on London's 
age structure; people moving to London tend to be young adults, such as students or first 
time employees, while those moving out are mostly older workers, retired people and young 
families (GLA, 2004). 
 
The annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Greater London was US$ 25,300 in 
2002. While Greater London has just 12 per cent of the UK’s population, it accounts for 18 
per cent of the UK’s total output. Greater London has one of the most internationally 
competitive business and financial service sectors in the world. The UK capital competes 
with Paris, Frankfurt and New York for major businesses rather than against the UK’s other 
major metropolitan areas (GLA, 2004). 
 
According to the Greater London Authority (GLA, 2004), London’s economy is growing and 
636,000 new jobs are expected to be created until 2016. There has been an important 
change in London’s employment structure in the last 30 years, as 600,000 jobs in business 
services were created and 600,000 jobs in manufacturing were lost. After business services, 
the second main driver of jobs creation has been other services, primarily dominated by the 
leisure and people-orientated services sector, and hotels and restaurants that are closely 
linked to the growth of tourism. The retail sector expanded significantly in the 1990s, 
following earlier losses, as did employment in health and education. Most other sectors 
declined in employment. 
 
However, Greater London has the second highest unemployment rate in England, after the 
North East of England. While the unemployment rate for white Londoners is in line with the 
rate for white people in the rest of the UK at 5.1 per cent, the rate for ethnic minorities is 13.5 
per cent (GLA, 2004). On the other hand, Greater London has the highest GDP per capita in 
the UK. However, it has higher concentrations of individuals in both high and low-income 
bands than the rest of Great Britain as can be seen in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Greater London and Great Britain Income Distributions 1999-2000 
Source: GLA (2004 p32) 
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Housing costs in Greater London are both a cause and a consequence of the polarisation of 
incomes. Before housing costs are taken into account, the ratio between disposable incomes 
at the top and bottom of the income distribution is 5:1 in London. After housing costs, the 
ratio rises to 7:1 (GLA, 2004). According to the United Nations Development Programme, the 
richest 20 % of the population in Great Britain have an income 7.2 times higher to the 
poorest 20 % (UNDP, 2005a). 
 
Car ownership rates in Greater London showed little change in the last years, having risen 
only 3.6 % between 1998 and 2002. Over a third of Greater London households did not own 
a car in 2002, when the motorisation rate was around 350 cars every 1,000 inhabitants. By 
contrast, the motorisation rate in the metropolitan areas outside London showed a 16 % 
increase over the same period, from 360 to 410 cars every 1,000 inhabitants (TfL, 2003). 
 
Figure 3.3 shows how car ownership levels and trends differ in Greater London and the other 
metropolitan areas in the UK. Greater London shows a much lower rate of increase despite 
strongly rising earnings. 
 
Figure 3.3: Car Ownership and Income Levels 1981-2002 
 Source: TfL (2003 p19) 
 
Greater London was established in 1965 as an administrative unit covering the London 
metropolis. Since 2000 its authority consists of an elected Mayor and a 25-member 
Assembly. It is divided into 32 boroughs, with a status similar to metropolitan districts, and 
also the City of London, which is a City Corporation and has a number of additional roles 
(ONS, 2005; GLA, 2004 p vii). The 32 boroughs and the City of London are shown in figure 
3.4, where the dark line shows the boundaries between what is usually called “inner” and 
“outer” London. 
 
The population in inner and outer London in the last years is presented in table 3.2. Table 3.3 
shows the number of households in inner and outer London and the average size of the 
households. It can be seen that outer London has a higher number of households and 
inhabitants than inner London. 
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Figure 3.4: Boroughs in Greater London 
 
 
Table 3.2: Population in Inner and Outer London (a) 
Year Inner London Outer London TOTAL 
1971 3.0 4.5 7.5 
1981 2.5 4.3 6.8 
1991 2.6 4.2 6.8 
1996 2.6 4.3 6.9 
2001 2.8 4.5 7.3 
2004 2.9 4.5 7.4 
(a)
 Population in million 
Sources: TfL (2003, 2005d) 
 
Table 3.3: Households in Inner and Outer London 
Year Inner London (million) 
Outer London 
(million) 
TOTAL 
(million) 
Household 
size 
1981 1,04 1,60 2,64 2.54 
1991 1,14 1,70 2,84 2.39 
1996 1,20 1,77 2,97 2.32 
2001 1,22 1,80 3,02 2.35 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
Greater London is a polycentric metropolitan area. Many of these centres have a long history 
as the focus of their community’s activities, often dating back to the original settlements, such 
as Hampstead or Richmond. The centre (the City, Westminster and surrounds) has always 
been a powerful place of government, trade and culture. London’s patterns of growth have 
helped to create significant differences between its sub-regions. For example, east London 
has been more industrial in character and, owing to 20th century industrial decline, has 
suffered greater problems of low income and social disadvantage than most areas in west 
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London. London north of the river has historically accommodated the main centres of 
government, business and culture, compared to the more predominantly residential nature of 
south London (GLA, 2004). 
 
The highest population densities are observed in the central boroughs (figure 3.5), with more 
than 10,000 people per square kilometre in Hammersmith & Fulham, Kensington & Chelsea, 
Westminster, Islington, Hackney and Tower Hamlets. 
 
Figure 3.5: Population Density in 2004 
 
Source: ONS (2006) 
 
Almost all boroughs (with the exception of Barking & Dagenham and Havering) have seen 
their populations increase in the past decade. The most acute build-up of population has 
been in the centre and the boroughs to the south west, reinforcing the historic trend towards 
residential development in south London (figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6: Population Growth between 1989 and 2003 
 
Source: GLA (2004 p22) 
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3.2 Modal Split 
 
According to Transport for London (TfL, 2003) 25.7 million trips are made in Greater London 
in an average day (considering weekdays and weekends). As can be seen in table 3.4, more 
trips are made by car/motorcycle (42.8 %) than public transport (33.8 %). 
 
Table 3.4: Modal Split Average Day in Greater London in 2003 
Transport mode Trips (million) % 
Bus 4.2 16.3 
Underground 2.6 10.1 
Rail 1.8 7.0 
DLR (a) 0.1 0.4 
Car/motorcycle 11.0 42.8 
Taxi 0.2 0.8 
Walking 5.5 21.4 
Bicycle 0.3 1.2 
TOTAL 25.7 100.0 
(a)
 Docklands Light Railway 
Source: TfL (2003 p21) 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the modal split in different periods of a weekday. It can be seen that the 
public transport share of trips is higher in the peak periods (especially in the morning) than in 
the rest of the periods. 
 
Figure 3.7: Weekday Modal Split by Time of Day in Greater London (a) 
 
(a)
 Considers trip-stages made by Greater London residents. 
Source: TfL (2003 p29). 
 
On the other hand, figure 3.8 shows the modal split for different age groups. The 20-34 year 
old age group is the most frequent user of public transport in the Greater London area. From 
them, the 20-24 age group uses more bus than rail modes, while the 25-34 age group does 
exactly the opposite. 
 
In figure 3.9, the modal split of the motorised trips (i.e. excluding walking and bicycle) is 
presented for different areas. This figure shows that public transport accounts for 64 % of 
travel in the central area of London and for 77 % of trips to and from the central area. 
Outside the central area, the car is the principal mode of travel with 66 % of trips. Central 
London is a 27 km2 area (1.7 % of Greater London), formed mainly by the City of London, the 
centre and south of Westminster, and also small parts of the boroughs of Islington, Camden, 
Kensington & Chelsea, Lambeth and Southwark. 
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Figure 3.8: Weekday Modal Split by Age Group in Greater London (a) 
 
(a)
 Considers trips made by Greater London residents. 
Source: TfL (2003 p32). 
 
Figure 3.9: Modal Split by Area for Motorised Trips in Greater London (a) 
 
(a)
 Considers trip-stages made by Greater London residents. 
Source: TfL (2003 p30). 
 
In figure 3.10 the evolution of the public transport modal share is presented. Public 
transport’s share of trips rose from 29 % to 32 % during the 1990s and continued rising 
thereafter. 
 
In 2002 more than 1 million people were estimated to have entered central London on a 
typical weekday in the morning peak (between 7am and 10am). These trips are mainly done 
by public transport, as can be seen in table 3.5. Moreover, the public transport modal share 
has been rising in the last years, while the private car use has fallen. Between 1992 and 
2002, 45,000 fewer trips were made by car. 
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Figure 3.10: Public Transport Modal Evolution in Greater London (a) 
 
(a)
 Non-motorised trips are also considered in the total trips when calculating the percentages. 
Source: TfL (2003). 
 
Table 3.5: Modal Split Evolution in Central London, Morning Peak 
Year Public Transport (%) Private Transport (%) Others (%) 
1992 82.9 16.2 0.9 
1997 83.3 14.9 1.8 
2002 87.0 11.2 1.8 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
 
 
3.3 Other Characteristics of the Trips 
 
Despite the continuing growth in journey lengths, the majority of trips in Greater London are 
still relatively short, half of them being less than 2 km long (TfL, 2004a). Figure 3.11 shows 
the distance travelled in the main public transport modes. It can be seen that the average 
distance travelled by underground is higher than by bus, a fact that is explained by the higher 
commercial speed of the underground and its large network. 
 
Figure 3.11: Bus and Underground Journey-Length Distribution in Greater London 
 
Source: TfL (2003 p15). 
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Table 3.6 presents the average trip length and speed for every mode. Rail modes are the 
fastest and the longest trips are made by rail and car. The slowest modes are the 
non-motorised ones, in which the shortest trips are made. 
 
Table 3.6: Trip Length and Speed by Mode in Greater London in 2003 
Transport mode Average trip 
length (km) 
Average speed 
(km/h) 
Bus 3.7 18 
Underground 7.8 32 
Rail 28.3 56 
DLR (a) 5.1 29 
Car/motorcycle 11.6 29 
Taxi 8.4 23 
Walking 0.8 5 
Bicycle 3.2 16 
TOTAL 8.7 24 
(a)
 Docklands Light Railway 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
Regarding travel times, table 3.7 shows the average times involved in the travel to work, 
separated by area of workplace. In general, the more central the workplace, the longer is the 
travel time. The differences in the travel times between modes are mainly explained by 
distinct travel distances. For instance rail, which is the fastest mode, has the longest travel 
times because the trip distances are the longest. 
 
Table 3.7: Travel Times to Work, by Area of Workplace (a) 
Mode Central 
London 
Rest of Inner 
London 
Outer 
London 
All Greater 
London 
Bus 50 40 37 42 
Underground 50 53 52 51 
Rail 71 66 61 69 
Car 54 39 31 35 
Motorcycle 38 30 24 31 
Walking 20 14 13 14 
Bicycle 31 27 19 25 
AVERAGE 57 42 31 43 
(a)
 Times in minutes 
Source: TfL (2003) 
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3.4 Transport Authority: Transport for London 
 
Transport for London (TfL) is the local authority responsible for the capital's transport system. 
It is accountable to the Mayor of London and is responsible for delivering the Mayor's 
transport strategy. 
 
TfL manages London's buses, the Underground, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and 
London trams. It also runs London’s river services, Victoria Coach Station and London's 
Transport Museum. As well as operating the central London congestion-charging scheme, 
TfL manages a 580 km network of main roads (including 900 bridges and 10 major tunnels), 
all of Greater London's 4,600 traffic lights; it regulates taxis and the private hire trade. TfL 
also coordinates schemes for transport users with mobility impairments as well as running 
Dial-a-Ride schemes. In addition, TfL undertakes works in order to improve conditions for 
walkers, cyclists, drivers and freight and it implements proposals for reducing congestion on 
London's streets (TfL, 2004b). A more detailed analysis of Transport for London can be 
found in chapter 7. 
 
 
 
3.5 Car Travel 
 
There are some 4,600 traffic signals in Greater London, all of which are owned and 
maintained by TfL, as explained before. Over half of these can be remotely adjusted and 
1,200 are managed through an advanced traffic control system called SCOOT, which allows 
timings to be adapted automatically to suit local changes in traffic volume and direction (TfL, 
2004c). 
 
Table 3.8 shows the occupants per vehicle entering central London during the morning peak. 
The average car occupancy has practically remained fixed at some 1.3 people per car 
between 1992 and 2004. 
 
Table 3.8: Car Occupancy Evolution in Greater London (a) 
Year Average car occupancy 
1992 1.32 
1998 1.34 
2004 1.37 
(a)
 Vehicles entering central London during morning peak 
Source: TfL (2005d p8) 
 
The number of licensed taxis has been growing by about 2 % annually in Greater London. 
Table 3.9 shows that there were 21,000 licensed taxis in 2005. 
 
Traffic speeds have been declining in Greater London since 1970 (figure 3.12). However, 
following the introduction of a congestion-charging scheme in central London in 2003, traffic 
speeds averaged 17 km/h (10.6 mph), an increase of 7 % over 2000 (TfL, 2003). 
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Table 3.9: Taxis in Greater London 
Year Licensed taxis 
1985 13,800 
1990 16,300 
1995 18,300 
2000 19,400 
2005 21,000 
Source: TfL (2005d) 
 
Figure 3.12: Traffic Speed Evolution in Greater London, Morning Peak 
 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
 
 
3.6 The Underground and Suburban Rail Systems 
 
In 2006 Greater London had 12 underground lines operating in a 408 km long network, 
mostly located to the north of the River Thames. There were 255 underground stations and 
21 depots and workshops. The London Underground had 598 trains with a total of 4,070 
cars. In one year, nearly 70 million train-km were run, providing approximately 60,000 million 
passenger place-km (TfL, 2006c; LUL, 2003; EMTA, 2004a). In 2005, 976 million passenger 
journeys were made, yielding 7,606 million passenger-km (TfL, 2005d, p19). 
 
In 2002, the London Underground operated 19 hours a day and the vehicles were 23 years 
old in average (EMTA, 2004b). Its average commercial speed was 33 km/h in 2006 (TfL, 
2006c). 
 
The responsibility for the Underground was transferred to TfL in 2003 and London 
Underground was merged with TfL (EMTA, 2004a p63). Its history dates back to 1863 when 
the world's first underground railway opened in London. 
 
Figure 3.13 shows that metro travel has sharp peak times on weekdays, more than doubling 
the number of trips of the off-peak. Weekend travel patterns show a more even distribution of 
journeys. 
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Figure 3.13: Trips by Hour in London Underground (2002) 
 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
Although metro fares have increased in the last years (table 3.10), its growth has been at a 
smaller rate than the index of London weekly earnings per head (TfL, 2003). 
 
Table 3.10: Fare Evolution in London Underground 
Year 
Average fare per 
passenger-km (a) 
1971 10.7 
1981 14.6 
1993 13.7 
1997 15.5 
2002 15.7 
(a)
 Pence, at 2002 prices 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
Besides the 12 Underground lines, in 2006 Greater London had 31 km of a fully 
automatically operated rail system called Docklands Light Railway (DLR). It had 38 stations 
and 47 trains with a total of 94 vehicles (DLR, 2003; TfL, 2006d). 
 
In a supply of 3.3 million train-km in 2005, 50.1 million passenger journeys were made, 
implying 243 million passenger-km. The average commercial speed of the DLR was 29 km/h 
(TfL, 2003, 2005d p23). 
 
Docklands Light Railway, a subsidiary of TfL, owns the infrastructure of this line and 
franchises its operation to private companies (EMTA, 2004a p63). An extension of the DLR 
network to London City Airport was recently constructed, and a further extension to Woolwich 
Arsenal is planned to open in 2008 (TfL, 2004e). 
 
In addition, there were 788 km of National Rail lines in Greater London in 2003 (TfL, 2004e). 
Ten private companies operate in this network, with an average speed of 56 km/h. In 2004, 
502 million National Rail trips were made in Greater London, half of them having both the 
origin and the destiny inside Greater London (TfL, 2005d p 22). 69 % of the National Rail 
trips in Greater London are made for work purposes (TfL, 2003). 
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The responsibility for the management of the rail services collectively known as the North 
London Railway will be transferred to TfL by 2007. TfL will manage the concession, which 
will be run under the name “Overground” by a train operator to standards specified by TfL. 
London Overground services will also run on the East London Railway when it opens in 2010 
(TfL, 2006e, 2006f). 
 
After the closure of the last old tramways in 1952, a new generation of trams was introduced 
in Greater London in May 2000, after over 12 years of development and construction. In 
2006 the Croydon Tramlink had 3 lines running over a 28 km long network with 38 stops. 
The vehicles are 30 m long and each of the 24 trams can carry up to 240 people. Croydon 
Tramlink has seen a 3 % year-by-year growth in patronage with approximately 22 million 
passenger journeys being made in 2004/05 (12 months). The system is operated by a 
concessionaire, Tramtrack Croydon Ltd, on behalf of Transport for London (TfL, 2004f; 
2005d p24; 2006g). 
 
Two new tram schemes are being planned for London. The first is the West London Tram, 
which may open by 2012 (TfL, 2004g). The second is the Cross River Tram, which could 
also be opened by 2012 (TfL, 2004f). Extensions to the existing Tramlink are being analysed 
as well. 
 
 
 
3.7 Bus System 
 
In 2005, Greater London had more than 700 bus lines over a 3,730 km long network with 
some 17,500 stops. There were over 6,800 scheduled buses and approximately 20 operators 
(EMTA 2005b p71; TfL 2006h). 450 million veh-km were run and 1,793 million passenger 
journeys were made, yielding 6,755 million passenger-km. The average number of 
passengers per bus was 15 (TfL, 2005d p17). The average commercial speed of London 
Buses was 16,5 km/h in 2002. The fleet was 7.4 years old in average and 85 % of it 
corresponded to low floor buses (EMTA, 2004b). 90 % of all Greater London households are 
within 400 m of a bus service (TfL, 2003). 
 
London Buses, which is part of TfL, manages the bus services. It plans the routes, specifies 
service levels, monitors the service quality and is responsible for bus stops. The bus services 
are run by private operators working under contract to London Buses (EMTA, 2004a p63). 
 
Figure 3.14 shows that bus travel has two peak times on weekdays, but these peaks are not 
so high as in the case of the Underground (figure 3.13). Weekend travel patterns show a 
more even distribution of journeys. 
 
Bus passengers have been declining in the UK since 1975 (figure 3.15). Nevertheless, 
London Buses patronage stabilised during the 80s and rose since 1993 reaching in 2003 the 
volume that it had in 1975. 
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Figure 3.14: Trips by Hour in Greater London Buses (2002) 
 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
Figure 3.15: Bus Passenger Journey Trends across the UK 
 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
Matthews et al. (2001) analysed the average weekly bus trip rates in Greater London, based 
on National Travel Survey data. Some of their results are presented in the following tables. It 
can be seen that a higher number of bus trips per person is found in Inner London in 
comparison to Outer London. On the other hand, women use buses more than men, and 
inhabitants of households without cars have much higher bus trip rates than those from 
households with cars. Regarding age groups, people over 60 years have the highest bus trip 
rate, followed by the persons between 20 and 29 years. 
 
Table 3.11: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Area in 1995/97 
Area Bus trip rate 
Inner London 2.81 
Outer London 1.97 
Greater London 2.30 
Source: Matthews et al. (2001) 
 
Chapter 3 Analysis of Greater London and its Transport System 44 
 
Table 3.12: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Gender in 1995/97 
Gender Bus trip rate 
Male 2.02 
Female 2.56 
Source: Matthews et al. (2001) 
 
Table 3.13: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Number of Household Cars in 1995/97 
Cars in the 
household 
Bus trip rate 
None 4.03 
One 1.69 
Two or more 0.68 
Source: Matthews et al. (2001) 
 
Table 3.14: Average Weekly Bus Trips by Age Group in 1995/97 
Age group Bus trip rate 
19 years or less 2.19 
20-29 2.44 
30-39 2.12 
40-49 2.24 
50-59 1.86 
60 years or more 2.82 
Source: Matthews et al. (2001) 
 
Bus fares increased in the last decades, but they have fallen in the last years, as can be 
seen in table 3.15. In 2002 the real fare was at a level comparable to the 70s. 
 
Table 3.15: Fare Evolution in London Buses 
Year Average fare per passenger-km (a) 
1971 12.7 
1981 12.4 
1993 14.7 
1997 14.9 
2002 12.2 
(a)
 Pence at 2002 prices 
Source: TfL (2003) 
 
There have been interesting improvements in London buses in the last years. Off-peak 
frequencies have been increased and more night services have been introduced. The 
number of night buses increased by 28 %. Users’ information has been improved in several 
forms. Over 300 local bus maps were designed, trying to reach the simplicity of the 
well-known Tube map. All London Underground stations now have bus maps and information 
on local bus routes, so it should be easier to find out how to continue the journey from the 
station. Five large bus maps covering different parts of Greater London were also designed. 
A free Internet service called “Journey Planner” was also developed. It allows finding out the 
quickest and easiest routes for a specific public transport trip across Greater London. It is 
possible to register to receive emails and text messages into a PC or a mobile phone 
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providing real-time travel information on bus journeys and other modes of public transport 
(TfL, 2004h). 
 
 
 
3.8 Central London Congestion Charging Scheme 
 
The congestion-charging scheme was introduced in February 2003. The scheme implies that 
every car driver has to pay 8 pounds (€ 12) per day if he enters a defined area in central 
London. The congestion-charging scheme operates between 07:00 and 18.30 Monday to 
Friday, excluding Public Holidays. By law, all money raised from congestion charging has to 
be spent on London‘s transport facilities. During its first year of operation congestion 
charging generated £68 million (€ 102 million) for spending on transport improvements (TfL, 
2004e). Routes and frequencies of buses were improved in order to offer a better option for 
those who are not willing to pay the charge. 
 
In 2003 approximately 550,000 congestion charge payments were made each week. 65,000 
to 70,000 daily car trips were no longer made to the charging zone during charging hours. 
From these, between 50 % and 60 % have transferred to public transport, 20 % to 30 % now 
divert around the charging zone (these being trips with both origins and destinations outside 
of the zone), and 15 % to 25 % have made other adaptations, such as changing the timing of 
trips (TfL, 2004d). 
 
Congestion (delays) was reduced by 30 %, and the volume of traffic by 15 %. Though, there 
is no evidence of systematic increases in traffic outside of charging hours on weekdays or 
weekends in response to the introduction of the charge. In addition, there is no evidence of 
systematic increases in traffic on local roads outside the charging zone during charging 
hours, in response to the introduction of the charge (TfL, 2004d). 
 
Comparative analyses of the many influences on the central London economy throughout 
2003 suggest that the direct impact of congestion charging has been small. London’s 
economy has been subject to a wide range of influences during 2003. Collectively, these 
have had a much greater impact on the central London economy than congestion charging. 
They have also made the task of identifying and quantifying congestion-charging-related 
impacts more difficult (TfL, 2004d). 
 
During a typical weekday morning peak, 106,000 passengers entered the 
congestion-charging zone on 560 buses in Autumn 2003. This represents a 38 % increase in 
patronage and a 23 % increase in service provision compared with 2002, yielding an 
increase in average occupancies per bus. Transport for London estimates that about half of 
the increased patronage is due to congestion charging (TfL, 2004d). 
 
The reliability of bus services has improved, both within the charging zone and more widely 
across Greater London. Within the charging zone additional waiting time due to service 
irregularity fell by 30 %, whereas disruption due to traffic delays fell by 60 %. Overall bus 
speeds within the charging zone improved by 6 %. The improvement within the zone is 
greater than that observed in other areas of Greater London (TfL, 2004d). 
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After the introduction of the congestion charge, bus journey times in central London 
decreased by 15 %. This improvement is not only explained by the reduction in the 
congestion levels, but also by a better enforcement of bus lanes (there are over 1,400 
cameras monitoring bus lanes) and by the introduction of “pay before you board” in central 
London in August 2003. As passengers do not have to pay in the bus anymore, boarding 
times are faster implying better commercial speeds (TfL, 2004h). 
 
This combined strategy of congestion charging and improved bus services has resulted in 
the first ever modal shift from private car usage to public transport, against the trend 
elsewhere in the UK and the world (TfL, 2004e). 
 
In addition, congestion charging has had a very positive effect on cycling levels in central 
London. Cycle flows into the charging zone have increased by around 30 % (TfL, 2004i). 
Despite the recent rise, the level of cycling in London, less than 2 %, is low compared to 
other European metropolitan areas: 4.5 % in Vienna, 10 % in Berlin, 13 % in Munich, 20 % in 
Copenhagen and 28 % in Amsterdam (TfL, 2004i). 
 
An analysis about the public transport fare system and the financial aspects of public 
transport in Greater London is presented in chapter 8. In the following chapter we will 
analyse the transport system of Berlin. 
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4. Analysis of Berlin and its Transport System 
 
4.1 Socio-economic Description and Car Ownership 
 
Berlin has a surface of 892 km2 (SLB, 2004d) and an average density of 3,802 inhabitants 
per km2. When Greater Berlin was established in 1920 there were 20 administrative units and 
after the reunification in 1990 there were 23 units (SLB, 2004g). Since 1 January 2001 Berlin 
is divided in twelve boroughs as listed in table 4.1, where the area, population and density of 
each borough is presented. 
 
Table 4.1: Berlin Boroughs 
Number Borough Area (km2) 
Population 
(million) 
Population density 
(people/km2) 
01 Mitte 39 0.32 8,231 
02 Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 20 0.26 12,800 
03 Pankow 103 0.35 3,379 
04 Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf 65 0.32 4,846 
05 Spandau 92 0.23 2,457 
06 Steglitz-Zehlendorf 103 0.29 2,796 
07 Tempelhof-Schöneberg 53 0.34 6,340 
08 Neukölln 45 0.31 6,822 
09 Treptow-Köpenick 168 0.23 1,393 
10 Marzahn-Hellersdorf 62 0.25 4,081 
11 Lichtenberg 52 0.26 4,981 
12 Reinickendorf 89 0.25 2,764 
 TOTAL 891 3.4 3,802    
Source: SLB (2004f) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the population density of the boroughs. The largest borough is 
Treptow-Köpenick (168 km2) in the south-east of Berlin, but the northern borough of Pankow 
is where more people live (348,000 persons). The highest density is in the borough of 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (12,800 people/km2) near to the centre of the city. 
 
After the reunification of West and East Germany in 1989 Berlin became the capital city of 
Germany. Berlin’s population decreased between the 50s and the 70s and had a strong 
increase in the 80s (figure 4.2 and table 4.2), reaching its peak of 3,475,000 inhabitants in 
1993. Many inhabitants moved into the surrounding countryside after the reunification, but 
this process declined considerably after 1999 and the population stabilised at 3.39 million 
(SfS, 2004a). In 2006 the population of Berlin was 3,399,000. No important changes in the 
total population are expected in the next 10 years, according to the estimations of the body 
responsible for planning in Berlin, Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung (SfS, 2003 p37). 
 
There were 1,884,900 households in Berlin in 2003, 50.1 % were single person households, 
30.6 % had 2 people and 19.3 % had 3 or more people. The average family size was only 
1.8 people per household (SLB, 2004e p6 (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin)). 
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Figure 4.1: Berlin Boroughs and Population Density 
 
Source: SLB (2004f) 
 
Figure 4.2: Berlin Population between 1950 and 2003 (Million) 
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Source: SLB (2004c) 
 
Table 4.2: Population in Berlin by Gender 
Year Population (million) Male (%) Female (%) 
1950 3.34 42.5 57.5 
1960 3.27 42.5 57.5 
1970 3.21 43.8 56.2 
1980 3.05 45.5 54.5 
1990 3.43 47.5 52.5 
2000 3.38 48.6 51.4 
2003 3.39 48.7 51.3 
2006 3.40 48.9 51.1 
Sources: SLB (2004c, 2006a) 
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The annual gross domestic product (GDP) in Berlin was € 77,274 million in 2003 (SLB, 
2004a). For a population of 3.4 million this implies an annual per capita GDP of € 22,700. 
Table 4.3 shows the income distribution in Germany in 2003. It can be seen that the richest 
20 % of the population (quintile V) receives 39.0 % of the total income, while the poorest fifth 
receives 7.3 % of it. This means that the richest 20 % have an average income 5.3 times 
higher than the poorest 20 % of the people. 
 
Table 4.3: German Income Distribution in Year 2003 
Quintile (a) % 
I 7.3 
II 12.4 
III 17.4 
IV 23.9 
V 39.0 
(a)
 Each quintile is a fifth of the population. Quintile I represents the 
poorest 20 % of the population, whereas quintile V represents the 
richest 20 % of the people. 
Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (2005 p60) 
 
In 2003 there were 1,505,000 jobs in Berlin (SLB, 2004b). This number has been declining in 
the last decade (table 4.4). A still unequal distribution of the jobs between West and East 
Berlin implies that substantially more people in the eastern districts must travel longer 
distances to their job in the western side of the city (SfS, 2004a). 
 
Table 4.4: Jobs in Berlin 
Year Jobs (million) 
1995 1.61 
1997 1.55 
1999 1.54 
2001 1.55 
2003 1.51 
Source: SLB (2004b) 
 
After the reunification, eastern Berlin suffered a dramatic economic decline caused by the 
collapse of the huge state-owned enterprises, the widespread loss of its foreign markets to 
the east, and the overwhelming productivity advantage enjoyed by West German industry. 
But the situation in western Berlin in 1990 was also dramatic. There was a large shift in 
industrial potential, particularly acute in the manufacturing sector, as subsidies that had 
supported West Berlin's industry dried up and producers began relocating their factories 
outside the city limits. All these factors combined provoked a high loss of jobs in the 
manufacturing and trade sectors. This negative trend could only be slightly offset by the 
steady increase in the city's travel and tourism industry or by the all too hesitant growth 
experienced in the service sectors (SLB, 2000). 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the average monthly income of the households. It can be seen that the 
highest incomes are found in some peripheral boroughs. The highest average household 
incomes are in the boroughs of Steglitz-Zehlendorf (6) and Marzahn-Hellersdorf (10), 
whereas the lowest are in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (2) and Mitte (1), as shown in table 4.5. 
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Figure 4.3: Average Monthly Household Income in the Boroughs of Berlin 
 
Source: SLB (2004g) 
 
Table 4.5: Income and Motorisation Rate in the Boroughs of Berlin 
 Borough 
Average monthly 
household Income 
( € ) 
Motorisation rate 
(cars per 1,000 
inhabitants) 
01 Mitte 1,275 292 
02 Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 1,225 259 
03 Pankow 1,375 355 
04 Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf 1,600 391 
05 Spandau 1,575 376 
06 Steglitz-Zehlendorf 1,875 425 
07 Tempelhof-Schöneberg 1,475 379 
08 Neukölln 1,375 320 
09 Treptow-Köpenick 1,575 406 
10 Marzahn-Hellersdorf 1,675 385 
11 Lichtenberg 1,475 364 
12 Reinickendorf 1,600 419 
 BERLIN 1,475 365 
Source: SLB (2004g), data for year 2000 
 
Regarding the motorisation rate, the highest numbers are also found in some of the 
peripheral boroughs (figure 4.4), especially in Steglitz-Zehlendorf (6), Reinickendorf (12) and 
Treptow-Köpenick (9). The lowest numbers of cars per inhabitant are found in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg (2) and Mitte (1), as shown in table 4.5. 
 
The average motorisation rate in Berlin has remained very stable over the last years. 
Between 1993 and 2002 it increased by less than 4 % (SfS, 2004e). Two different values 
were found for the motorisation rate in 2002. SLB (2004g) reports 365 cars per 1,000 
inhabitants, while SfS (2004e) informs about 329 cars (including vans) per 1,000 inhabitants.  
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Figure 4.4: Motorisation Rate in the Boroughs of Berlin 
 
Source: SLB (2004g) 
 
 
 
4.2 Modal Split and Generation Rates 
 
On an average day (including weekdays and weekends) 3.05 trips were made by each 
person in Berlin in 1998 (SfS, 2004b). If only weekdays are considered, each person 
travelled 3.31 times on average. Assuming that these figures remained stable, in 2003 a total 
of 10.2 million trips were made on an average day and 11.1 million on a typical weekday. 
 
More trips are made by car than public transport in Berlin (table 4.6). Moreover, the 
difference between both has risen between 1992 and 1998. Although the bicycle has the 
lowest modal split of the four modes presented, it has an important and increasing proportion 
in the total trips. 
 
Table 4.6: Modal Split Evolution in Berlin 
Mode 1992 (%) 1998 (%) 
Public transport 31 27 
Car 35 38 
Walking 27 25 
Bicycle 7 10 
TOTAL 100 100 
Source: SfS (2004c) 
 
The public transport modal split is presented in table 4.7. Underground and bus are the most 
important public transport modes in Berlin, in terms of trip-stages. Nevertheless, the 
suburban rail (S-Bahn) has increased its modal split between 1994 and 2002. The rise in the 
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trip-stages made in the S-Bahn (22.5 % between 1994 and 2002) is mostly explained by the 
development of its network, which grew by 21.9 % during the same years and an impressive 
40.0 % between 1990 and 2002 (see table 4.24 below). 
 
Table 4.7: Public Transport Modal Split in Berlin 
1994 2002 
Mode Trip-stages 
(million/year) % 
Trip-stages 
(million/year) % 
Underground 455.3 35.2 399.2 33.0 
Bus 436.1 33.8 361.3 29.9 
Tram 151.7 11.7 142.5 11.8 
Suburban rail S-Bahn 249.0 19.3 305.0 25.2 
TOTAL 1,292.1 100.0 1,208.0 100.0 
Source: SLB (2003) 
 
Table 4.8 shows that the total trip generation rate is higher in the case of men than in the 
case of women. Nevertheless, females travel more in public transport than men (0.88 trips 
per day against 0.67). 
 
Table 4.8: Trip Generation Rates by Gender in Berlin in 1998 
Gender Public transport (trips/day) 
Other modes 
(trips/day) 
TOTAL 
(trips/day) 
Male 0.67 2.68 3.35 
Female 0.88 2.41 3.29 
Source: SfS (2004b) 
 
In table 4.9 trip generation rates divided by age are shown. People under 44 years make 
more trips per day and also more public transport trips. Even so the highest proportion of 
trips by public transport is for those over 64 years, followed by the younger people (6 to 18 
years) as shown in table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.9: Trip Generation Rates by Age in Berlin in 1998 
Age range Public transport (trips/day) 
Other modes 
(trips/day) 
TOTAL 
(trips/day) 
6 to 18 years 0.84 2.57 3.41 
18 to 44 years 0.81 2.92 3.73 
44 to 64 years 0.72 2.47 3.19 
Over 64 years 0.73 1.56 2.29 
Source: SfS (2004b) 
 
Table 4.11 shows the trip generation rates divided by the main activity of the person. The 
highest trip generation rates are found in the case of university students and part-time 
workers. When only public transport trips are considered, the highest generation rates are for 
university students, followed by school students and part-time workers. Regarding modal 
split, table 4.12 shows that the highest proportion of trips in public transport is found in the 
case of pensioners, followed by university students, unemployed and school students. 
 
Chapter 4 Analysis of Berlin and its Transport System 53 
 
Table 4.10: Public Transport Modal Split by Age in Berlin in 1998 
Age range Public transport (%) Other modes (%) TOTAL (%) 
6 to 18 years 24.6 75.4 100.0 
18 to 44 years 21.7 78.3 100.0 
44 to 64 years 22.6 77.4 100.0 
Over 64 years 31.9 68.1 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on data from SfS (2004b) 
 
Table 4.11: Trip Generation Rates by Main Activity in Berlin in 1998 
Age range Public transport (trips/day) 
Other modes 
(trips/day) 
TOTAL 
(trips/day) 
School student 0.93 2.57 3.50 
University student 1.27 3.16 4.43 
Part-time worker 0.92 3.16 4.08 
Full-time worker 0.66 2.84 3.50 
Unemployed 0.88 2.32 3.20 
Pensioner 0.73 1.75 2.48 
House-wife/husband 0.59 2.54 3.13 
Source: SfS (2004b) 
 
Table 4.12: Trip Generation Rates by Main Activity in Berlin in 1998 
Age range Public transport (%) 
Other modes 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(%) 
School student 26.6 73.4 100.0 
University student 28.7 71.3 100.0 
Part-time worker 22.5 77.5 100.0 
Full-time worker 18.9 81.1 100.0 
Unemployed 27.5 72.5 100.0 
Pensioner 29.4 70.6 100.0 
House-wife/husband 18.8 81.2 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on data from SfS (2004b) 
 
Some differences could be recognised in the trip generation rates in Berlin in 1998, when 
comparing the figures for the west and east boroughs (formerly West and East Berlin). In 
fact, the west boroughs had a slightly higher generation rate of total trips (table 4.13). In 
addition, the east boroughs made a higher proportion of trips on public transport. But as the 
city becomes more homogeneous, these differences will surely tend to disappear.  
 
Table 4.13: Trip Generation Rates in Western and Eastern Berlin in 1998 
Zone Public transport (trips/day) 
Other modes 
(trips/day) 
TOTAL 
(trips/day) 
West boroughs 0.89 2.41 3.30 
East boroughs 0.98 2.28 3.26 
Source: SfS (2004b) 
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4.3 Purpose, Length and Speed of the Trips 
 
Table 4.14 presents the main purposes of the trips in Berlin in 1998. It can be seen that work, 
business and study trips account for only 42.3 % of the total trips. On the other hand, leisure 
is one of the most important purposes of trips. 
 
Table 4.14: Trips Purpose in Berlin in 1998 
Trip purpose % 
Work 23.8 
Business 7.0 
Study 11.5 
Purchase 20.3 
Leisure 22.5 
Other 14.8 
TOTAL 100 
Source: SfS (2004c) 
 
The length of public transport trips is presented in table 4.15. 40 % of these trips are less 
than 5 km long and 30 % are longer than 10 km. 
 
Table 4.15: Trip Length Distribution in the Public Transport in Berlin in 1998 
 
Source: SfS (2004d) 
 
In table 4.16 the average commercial speeds of different public transport modes are 
presented. Not surprisingly, the underground has a higher commercial speed than bus and 
tram (50 % higher). 
 
Table 4.16: Public Transport Average Speeds in Berlin in 2005 
Transport mode Commercial speed (km/h) 
Underground 31.1 
Bus 19.6 
Tram 19.3 
Source: BVG (2006d) 
 
 
 
Trip length % 
Less than 1 km 5 
1 to 3 km 19 
3 to 5 km 16 
5 to 10 km 30 
10 to 15 km 17 
15 to 20 km 8 
Over 20 km 5 
TOTAL 100 
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4.4 Organisation of the Public Transport System 
 
There are two main public transport operators in Berlin: the Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) 
and the S-Bahn Berlin GmbH (S-Bahn). 
 
The BVG operates 151 bus lines, 9 underground lines, 22 tram lines and 6 ferry services. It 
is a public company owned by the city of Berlin (BVG, 2004b). After a peak of more than 
1,000 million passengers in 1993, the patronage of the BVG declined until 1997, when 789 
million passengers were moved. The demand has been growing thereafter, reaching 907 
million in 2005 (figure 4.5 and table 4.17). The occupation factor of the BVG vehicles 
increased from 15.8 % in 2000 to 17.6 % in 2005 (BVG, 2006e p25). 
 
Table 4.17: Yearly Patronage of the BVG 
Year Passengers (million) 
1993 1,020 
1997 789 
2002 799 
2005 907 
Sources: SfS (2004m) and BVG (2004a, 2006d) 
 
The S-Bahn is owned by the DB Regio AG, which is part of the Deutsche Bahn AG, the 
former German public train operator, who began a long privatisation process in 1994. It 
operates 16 suburban rail lines and has had a continuously growing yearly patronage in the 
last years (table 4.18 and figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5: Evolution of the Yearly Patronage of BVG and S-Bahn (million trips) 
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Source: SfS (2004m), BVG (2004a) and SBB (2004b) 
 
After the wall came down, Berlin and the surrounding federal state (Bundesland) of 
Brandenburg (figure 4.6) were interested in handling the aspects of public transport together, 
in order to reconnect Berlin to its hinterland. Thus in 1996 the Verkehrsverbund 
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Berlin-Brandenburg (VBB) was founded. More details about the Verkehrsverbund are given 
in chapter 7. 
 
Table 4.18: Yearly Patronage of the S-Bahn 
Year Passengers (million) 
1991 171 
1995 245 
1999 280 
2003 315 
2005 357 
Sources: SfS (2004m) and SBB (2004b, 2006) 
 
Figure 4.6: German Federal States: Brandenburg and Berlin 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Car Travel 
 
There are 5,300 km of public streets and almost 2,000 traffic signals in Berlin (SfS, 2004h). 
In 2002 there were 45 park and ride facilities in Berlin, with a total of 5,393 parking spaces 
(SfS, 2004g). This implies that park and rides provide space for about 0.5 % of the cars of 
Berlin. The different sizes of these park and rides are shown in table 4.19. 
 
Table 4.19: Park and Ride Facilities in Berlin in 2002 
Size (places) Number 
Under 100 25 
100 to 200 14 
Over 200 6 
TOTAL 45 
Source: SfS (2004g) 
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The number of licensed taxis decreased in the last decade in Berlin (table 4.20). It can be 
seen that 6,800 licensed taxis existed in 2002. 
 
Table 4.20: Taxis in Berlin 
Year Licensed taxis 
1993 7,200 
1997 6,800 
2002 6,800 
Source: SfS (2004f) 
 
 
 
4.6 The Underground, Tram and Suburban Rail Systems 
 
The first underground (U-Bahn) ran in Berlin in 1902 (BVG, 2004i). The underground 
network expanded then continuously until the division of the city, which impacted the 
underground service. In 1961, after the construction of the wall, some underground lines 
were interrupted (BVG, 2006b). The underground station Friedrichstrasse in East Berlin 
became a frontier crossing point between East and West Berlin. Most parts of the 
underground network were in West Berlin, and the majority of the expansions was made in 
that part of the city until 1989, when the wall fell. Table 4.21 shows the evolution of the 
underground system in Berlin in the 1990s, both in terms of network length and number of 
stations. 
 
Table 4.21: Evolution of the Underground System in Berlin 
Year Network length (km) 
1923 42 
1930 76 
1956 78 
1963 89 
1972 103 
1978 112 
1984 121 
1990 135 
1998 143 
2005 144 
Sources: SfS (2004l), Berliner-Untergrundbahn.de (2006) 
 
In 2005 Berlin had 9 underground lines with a total length of 144 km. There were 170 
underground stations with an average distance of 790 m between each other, 1,368 vehicles 
(850 wide gauge and 518 narrow gauge) and 6 depots and workshops. 458 million 
passenger journeys were made and the average commercial speed of the underground 
system in Berlin was 31.1 km/h (BVG, 2004a, 2006c). 
 
The first electric tram of the world ran near Berlin in the year 1881 and the first electric tram 
service in the city was inaugurated in 1895. After the division of Berlin the west side closed 
its tram lines after 1954. The last tramways ran in West Berlin in 1967. In contrast, East 
Berlin preserved and developed the tram services. Therefore, a decade after the reunification 
almost all tram lines are still in the east side of the city. Table 4.22 shows the growth of the 
tramway network in Berlin after 1990. 
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Table 4.22: Evolution of the Tramway System in Berlin 
Year Network length (km) 
1990 173.6 
1994 176.8 
1998 181.6 
2005 187.7 
Sources: SfS (2004l), BVG (2006d) 
 
Berlin had 22 lines of tramways running on a 188 km long network in 2005. 108 km (57.5 %) 
of this network were segregated from the rest of the traffic. There were 373 stations with an 
average distance of 461 m, 600 vehicles and 11 depots and workshops. The average 
commercial speed of the trams was 19.3 km/h. The number of journeys in 2005 was 
estimated to be 167 million (BVG, 2006d). 
 
In addition, there were 16 Suburban Rail (S-Bahn) lines operating a 331 km length network 
in Berlin in 2005 (SBB, 2006). There were 165 S-Bahn stations, yielding an average distance 
of 2 km. The S-Bahn had 733 vehicles and 3 depots and workshops. The average age of the 
vehicles fell drastically from 43.6 years in 1995 to only 6.1 years in 2003 (table 4.23). The 
yearly patronage of the S-Bahn has been continuously rising between 1991 and 2005, 
reaching 357 million passenger journeys, as shown in table 4.18 (SBB, 2004a, 2006).  
 
Table 4.23: Average Age of the S-Bahn Fleet 
Year Average age 
1995 43.6 
1999 27.2 
2003 6.1 
2005 7.2 
Source: SBB (2004b, 2006) 
 
Table 4.24 shows the impressive evolution of the rail system in Berlin after 1990, both in 
terms of network length and number of stations. 
 
Table 4.24: Evolution of the S-Bahn System in Berlin 
Year Network length (km) S-Bahn stations 
1990 182.4 91 
1994 209.5 115 
1998 249.0 129 
2002 255.3 132 
2005 331.0 165 
Sources: SfS (2004l), SBB (2006) 
 
 
 
4.7 Bus System 
 
Berlin had 151 bus lines with a total length of 1,662 and 2,611 stops (6,579 stops if divided 
by direction) in 2005. The average distance between stops was 480 m. There were 1,328 
buses, all of them operated by the municipal Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe, which has 15 depots 
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and workshops for the buses. In one year 404 million passenger journeys were made. The 
average commercial speed of the buses in Berlin was 19.6 km/h in 2005. The express buses 
had a higher average commercial speed of 22.3 km/h (BVG, 2006d). More than 100 km of 
bus lanes existed in Berlin in 2005. Table 4.25 shows the impressive growth of the bus lanes 
network in Berlin in the 1990s. 
 
Regarding the vehicles, in 2005 there were 357 double-deck buses (used in London and 
Berlin, but not generally common in big cities because of its capacity and boarding/alighting 
difficulties given by the small number of doors), 459 articulated buses, 395 simple (one-deck, 
no-articulated) buses and 117 special vehicles (BVG, 2006d). In February 2004 a total of 25 
new very clean diesel buses were introduced. These already fulfil the Euro 5 norm, which will 
not be an obligation until 2008 (BVG, 2004e). On the other hand, in April 2004 one 
hydrogen-powered bus was put experimentally in operation (BVG, 2004f). 
 
Table 4.25: Evolution of the Bus Lanes in Berlin 
Year Bus lanes (km) 
1990 33.8 
1994 67.1 
1998 94.4 
2002 101.5 
2005 101.9 
Source: SfS (2004l) 
 
 
 
4.8 Recent Changes in the Public Transport System: MetroLines 
 
In December 2004 a new concept was introduced in the public transport of Berlin. Under the 
name of “MetroLines” 15 main bus lines and 9 main tram lines which run in corridors where 
no underground or S-Bahn exist began to operate under the following conditions (BVG, 
2004g; BVG, 2004h): 
• at least 20 hours of operation daily, weekdays and at weekends, 
• high frequencies to avoid that passengers need to memorise the schedule, at least 
every 10 minutes, 
• MetroBus lines and MetroTram lines are identified with an M before the number of the 
service. 
 
The MetroLines supplement the existing underground and S-Bahn services, allowing 87 % of 
the population to live and work in the proximity of the core of the new system. The rest of the 
bus and tram lines continued their services with lower frequencies and shorter operation 
hours. Nevertheless, only 0.1 % of the passengers were affected by the service reductions, 
while 3.9 % benefited from the service expansions (BVG, 2004g). 
 
MetroLines were introduced in some corridors with a high number of car trips and low public 
transport modal split, in order to improve the service there and attract more users to the 
public transport (BVG, 2004g). An important objective of the changes is to provide an 
easier-to-understand public transport system. Therefore, new maps for the underground 
(U-Bahn), S-Bahn and MetroLines were designed (BVG, 2004h).   
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In May 2006 the MetroLines began a 24-hours operation, with 10 minutes headways at least 
until 21:00. There were 17 MetroBus lines and 9 MetroTram lines in operation (BVG, 2006a). 
 
We will analyse the public transport fare system and the financial aspects of public transport 
in Berlin in chapter 8. In the following chapter, the transport system of Madrid is analysed. 
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5. Analysis of Madrid and its Transport System 
 
5.1 Socio-economic Description 
 
Madrid is the name of both the capital city of Spain and its region. Madrid Region 
(Comunidad de Madrid) is formed by 179 municipalities, Madrid City being one of them. The 
organisation and location of population, activities and socio-economic features in Madrid 
Region show a well-defined functional structure, as can be recognised in figure 5.1: 
A) Madrid City is the main municipality of the region and concentrates the economic 
activities; 
B) the Madrid metropolitan ring consists of a number of large and medium size 
entities around the municipality of Madrid and has strong relations with the central 
city; 
C) the rest of the region has small and medium size municipalities. 
 
Figure 5.1: Territorial Structure of Madrid Region 
 
Source: Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) 
 
The population, surface and density of the three zones defined in figure 5.1 are presented in 
table 5.1. The population of Madrid City (A) is more than ten times the population of the rest 
of the region (C), while the area of the latter is more than eight times the surface of the 
former. So, the population density in Madrid City is 100 times higher than the density in the 
rest of the region (C). 
 
Table 5.1: Population, Area and Density in Madrid Region in 1996 
Zone Population Area (km2) Density (inhab/km2) 
Madrid City (A) 2,866,850 606.4 4,727.7 
- Central Core 915,318 42.0 21,793.3 
- Rest of the City 1,951,532 564.4 3,457.7 
Metropolitan area (B) 1,913,804 2,280.7 839.1 
Rest of the region (C) 241,636 5,141.4 47.1 
TOTAL REGION 5,022,289 8,028.5 625.6 
Source: Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) 
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The population in Madrid Region has been continuously rising in the last century, reaching 
almost 6 million in 2005 (table 5.2 and figure 5.2). The statistics institute of Madrid Region 
projects that the population will continue growing, reaching 6.5 million in 2012 (IECM, 
2004b). On the other hand, the city of Madrid incremented its population until the 1970s and 
afterwards remained more or less constant between 3.0 and 3.1 million, as can be seen in 
table 5.2 and figure 5.2. Thus, a process of suburbanisation can be recognised in Madrid in 
the last decades (Matas, 2004). The population of the city of Madrid is projected to rise 
slowly in the future, reaching 3.3 million in 2014 (IECM, 2004b). 
 
Table 5.2: Evolution of the Population in Madrid 
Year City population (million) Region population (million) 
1900 0.58 0.78 
1910 0.61 0.88 
1920 0.82 1.07 
1930 1.04 1.38 
1940 1.32 1.58 
1950 1.55 1.93 
1960 2.18 2.60 
1970 3.12 3.76 
1981 3.16 4.69 
1991 3.01 4.95 
2001 2.96 5.37 
2003 3.09 5.72 
2005 3.16 5.96 
Sources: IECM (2004a, 2006a) 
 
Figure 5.2: Evolution of the Population in Madrid 
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Source: IECM (2004a) 
 
Figure 5.3 shows a typical aggregation of the 179 municipalities of Madrid Region into 11 
zones. 
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Figure 5.3: Madrid Region in 11 Zones 
 
Source: Pinto (2004) 
 
Figure 5.4: Population Density in Madrid Region in 2002 
 
Source: IECM (2004d) 
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In 2005 the average population density of Madrid Region was 750 inhabitants per km2. 
Figure 5.4 shows the population density in the municipalities of Madrid Region. It can be 
seen that the higher densities are found in Madrid City and its surrounding municipalities. 
The lower densities are in the north of the region (Sierra Norte), followed by the south-east 
(Sureste Comunidad) and the west (Sierra Sur). The population density in Madrid City was 
5,280 inhabitants per km2 in 2005. 
 
The annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Madrid was US$ 22,800 in 2002 
(EMTA, 2004a p65). Madrid has 13 % of the population of Spain and it accounts for 18 % of 
the GDP of the country. Madrid City and some municipalities near it in the north and west 
have the highest per capita income of the region (figure 5.5). The poorest municipalities are 
in the north (Sierra Norte), south-west (Sierra Sur) and south-east (Sureste Comunidad) 
extremes of Madrid Region. 
 
Figure 5.5: Gross Disposable Income per Capita in Madrid Region in 2000 
 
Source: IECM (2004d) 
 
The distribution of the income inside Madrid City (figure 5.6) shows that the higher income 
districts are near the centre of the city, both in the north-west and the north-east. On the 
other hand, the lower income districts are mainly in the south and south-east of the city. 
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Figure 5.6: Gross Disposable Income per Capita in Madrid City in 2000 
 
Source: Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2006a) 
 
In relation with the income distribution in the entire country, statistics of the United Nations 
show that the richest 20 % of the Spanish population have an income 5.4 times higher than 
the poorest 20 % of the people in Spain (UNDP, 2005a). 
 
There were 2.25 million jobs in 2001 in Madrid Region (EMTA, 2004a p65). Given that the 
employment structure is dominated by the service sector, which accounts for 75 % of the 
total amount of jobs (of which 35 % are in the public sector), jobs have remained heavily 
centralised in Madrid City (Matas, 2004 p196). Basing on different estimations, Matas reports 
that around 70 % of the jobs are in the city and most of them in the city centre. Therefore, the 
urban structure of Madrid predominantly follows a monocentric model with radial trips from 
satellite settlements to the city centre. 
 
The general unemployment rate in Madrid Region is lower than in Spain (figure 5.7). In 2002, 
the unemployment rate in Spain was 16.7 %, much higher than the 7.1 % in Madrid (IECM, 
2004c). 
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Figure 5.7: Evolution of the Unemployment Rate in Madrid and Spain (%) 
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Source: IECM (2004c) 
 
The unemployment rate in Madrid has fallen between 1999 and 2002 (table 5.3). It is 
interesting to note that it is much higher for women than for men and that it is dramatically 
higher in the case of young people, especially those between 16 and 19 years. 
 
Table 5.3: Unemployment Rate in Madrid Region 
Population group 1999 (%) 2002 (%) 
Men 9.3 4.8 
Women 18.2 10.3 
16 to 19 years old 35.4 20.7 
20 to 24 years old 23.0 13.7 
Total 12.9 7.1 
Source: IECM (2004c) 
 
The motorisation rate in Madrid Region increased by 85 % between 1986 and 2002, reaching 
550 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002 (table 5.4). In the same year, Madrid City had 1.7 
million cars and 546 cars per 1,000 inhabitants (IECM, 2004e). 
 
Table 5.4: Cars and Motorisation Rate in Madrid Region 
Year Cars (million) Cars per 1,000 inhab. 
1986 1.4 298 
1991 1.9 387 
1996 2.3 464 
2001 2.9 547 
2002 3.0 550 
Sources: IECM (2004e, 2004f) 
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5.2 Modal Split and Public Transport Demand 
 
According to Madrid’s mobility study of 1996 (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002), 10.6 million trips were 
made in Madrid Region on a typical weekday (2,1 trips per inhabitant). In 2002 the number of 
trips per person per day had slightly increased to 2,2 (EMTA, 2004b). Table 5.5 shows the 
evolution of the modal split in Madrid Region, between 1981 and 1996. It can be seen that 
the modal split of the car increased strongly in that period. Meanwhile, the walking trips 
reduced their proportion from 57.7 % to 37.2 %. In 1996 the modal splits of public transport, 
private vehicle and walking were all close to one third. 
 
Table 5.5: Evolution of the Modal Split in Madrid Region 
Transport mode 1981 (%) 1988 (%) 1996 (%) 
Public transport 28.9 27.4 33.3 
Private vehicle 13.6 20.4 29.5 
Walking 57.7 47.7 37.2 
Sources: Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) and Sanz-Alduán (1999)  
 
Considering only motorised trips in Madrid Region, the modal split of public transport was 
54 %, in comparison to 46 % of the private vehicle. For inner trips within Madrid City the use 
of public transport (66 %) is much higher than the use of the private vehicle (34 %). On the 
contrary, in the metropolitan ring the use of the car is predominant, with a modal split of 70 % 
versus 30 % for the public transport. Considering the trips between the metropolitan ring and 
Madrid City, the distribution is almost equal: public transport 52 % and private vehicle 48 % 
(Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002). 
 
There are four public transport modes in Madrid Region. Two of them operate mainly in 
Madrid City (metro and urban bus) and the other two operate mainly in the rest of the region 
(suburban bus and suburban rail). Table 5.6 presents the distribution of the public transport 
trips between those modes, both in terms of number of passengers and passenger-km. 
Considering passenger trips, urban public transport modes account for 69 % of the modal 
split. On the contrary, when passenger-km are considered, suburban public transport modes 
account for the highest part of the modal split: 62 %. This difference is explained by the 
longer distances travelled by the suburban passengers. 
 
Table 5.6: Public Transport Modal Split in Madrid Region in 2002 
Passengers Passenger-km Public transport 
mode (million) (%) (million) (%) 
Metro 563.8 37 3,156 25 
Urban bus 478.4 32 1,674 13 
Suburban bus 277.8 18 4,403 35 
Suburban rail 193.7 13 3,458 27 
TOTAL 1,513.7 100 12,691 100 
Source: EMTA (2004a) 
 
In table 5.7 the evolution of the public transport modal split between 1998 and 2003 is 
presented. Metro increased its modal split due to important extensions in its network, while 
the urban bus share declined. On the other hand, it can be seen that the suburban modes 
increased their modal split, while the urban public transport modes decreased it (metro + 
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urban bus). This is explained by the suburbanisation process in Madrid Region discussed 
above. 
 
Table 5.7: Evolution of the Public Transport Modal Split in Madrid 
1998 2004 Public transport 
mode Passengers 
(million) % 
Passengers 
(million) % 
Metro 437.0 32 618.4 40 
Urban bus 547.7 40 473.7 30 
Suburban bus 236.6 17 276.2 18 
Suburban rail 143.5 11 195.9 12 
TOTAL 1,364.8 100 1,564.2 100 
Sources: IECM (2004e, 2006b) 
 
Between 1975 and 1985 the total public transport demand decreased by circa 20 % (figure 
5.8), in spite of an important extension of the metro network in the same period. 
Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) argues that the main reasons for this reduction were the lack of 
operational and fare integration between the different operators, and some socio-economic 
tendencies like suburbanisation and income (and motorisation) increases. 
 
Figure 5.8: Evolution of the Public Transport Demand in Madrid Region 
 
Source: Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) 
 
In contrast, between 1986 and 2000 the public transport demand increased by almost 50 %. 
The reasons for this impressive change seem to be the creation of a Regional Transport 
Authority (Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid) together with the implementation of 
measures of modal and fare integration. In terms of fare integration, the creation of a travel 
pass (Abono Transportes), which is presently used in more than 60% of public transport 
trips, is mentioned as one of the key issues (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002; Matas, 2004). On the 
other hand, the policy of strong extensions of the metro network has been continued. 
 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Madrid and its Transport System 69 
 
5.3 Purpose, Length and Duration of the Trips 
 
The purposes of the trips on a typical weekday are shown in table 5.8, according to the 
survey of 1996. It can be seen that 64.8 % of the trips had work or study purposes. 
 
Table 5.8: Trip Purpose in Madrid Region in 1996 
Trip Purpose  (%) 
Work 37.4 
Study 27.4 
Shopping 11.2 
Others 24.0 
Source: Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) 
 
Considering only the motorised trips, the average distance travelled in Madrid was 8.1 km 
and the average duration of the trips was 42.4 minutes (EMTA, 2004b). Both figures 
correspond to the year 2002. 
 
 
 
5.4 Public transport authority: Consorcio Regional de Transportes de 
Madrid 
 
Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid (CRTM) is the local authority responsible for 
the public transport system in Madrid Region. CRTM is an autonomous agency of the 
Regional Government (Comunidad de Madrid). It was created in 1985 as a unique public 
transport authority, gathering responsabilities of the Madrid Region and the adhered local 
governments (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002). At the end of 2002 a total of 175 Municipalities, 
representing practically the entire population of Madrid Region, belonged to CRTM (CRTM, 
2004a). 
 
The main functions of CRTM are (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002): 
• the planning of transport services and definition of coordinated operating programmes 
for all public transport modes, 
• the establishment of an integrated fare system for all the public transport system, 
• the planning of public transport infrastructures and 
• the creation of an overall image for the public transport system. 
 
A more detailed analysis of CRTM is presented in chapter 7. 
 
 
 
5.5 Car Travel 
 
On the average, there were 186 park and ride places per suburban train station in Madrid 
Region in 2002. A comparison of the network lengths of the suburban train and the highways 
yields that there were 0.45 km of suburban train network for every kilometre of highway 
(EMTA, 2004b). 
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On the other hand, there were more than 14,500 taxis in Madrid Region in 2002 (EMTA, 
2004b). 
 
 
 
5.6 Metro and Suburban Rail 
 
The first metro line in Madrid opened in 1919 with a length of 3.5 km. In 1926 the network 
was already 14.6 km long. An important extension of the metro network occurred between 
1979 and 1983, when it grew by circa 50 % reaching a total length of 100 km. Another 
ambitious expansion plan was carried out later between 1995 and 1999, adding another 
57 km to the network, reaching 171 km at the end of that period (Metro de Madrid, 2004a). 
Between 1999 and 2003 a new extension plan was executed, adding another 56 km to the 
metro network (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002). 
 
In 2005 the metro network in Madrid had 12 lines in operation with a total length of 227 km 
and 188 stations: 1 quadruple, 10 triple, 26 double and 151 single, i.e. without connecting 
lines. The rolling stock was comprised of 1,550 cars, with an average age of 11.7 years. The 
total supply of car-kilometres was 154.9 million during 2004. From them, 154.1 million 
corresponded to service car-kilometres. The network supply capacity was 221,909 in the 
peak hour by direction on the whole of the network (CRTM, 2004b, 2006a). In 2002 the 
average commercial speed in the metro system was 26.3 km/h (EMTA, 2004b p25). 
 
618.4 million passengers were transported by metro in 2004 (IECM, 2006b). The demand of 
the metro system has strongly increased in the last years (table 5.9). 
 
Table 5.9: Evolution of the Demand of the Metro System in Madrid 
Year Passengers/year (million) 
1998 437.0 
2000 523.6 
2002 563.8 
2004 618.4 
Sources: IECM (2004e, 2006b) 
 
The average occupancy of the metro vehicles was 14 % in 2002, when a total of 3,156 
million passenger-kilometres were performed by metro and an offer of 22,006 million 
place-kilometres was provided (EMTA, 2004a). 
 
The main metro operator is Metro de Madrid, who is jointly owned by the municipality (75 %) 
and the region (25 %) placing all inherit rights due to shares ownership to CRTM (EMTA, 
2004a p66). Metro de Madrid is responsible for 208 km of the network, all of which are inside 
Madrid City. The other 19 km are outside the municipality of Madrid and are exploited by the 
concession Transportes Ferroviarios de Madrid, which is partially owned by Metro de Madrid. 
Nevertheless, these 19 km are also directly managed by Metro de Madrid (CRTM, 2004b). 
 
A new plan to expand the metro network has been designed, including 42 km of underground 
extensions distributed among 9 of the existing lines and 3 new light rail lines running on the 
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surface with a total length of 31 km (Comunidad de Madrid, 2005). The plan (figure 5.9) 
should be fully implemented by 2007. 
 
Figure 5.9: Metro and Light Rail Plan 2003-2007 in Madrid 
 
Source: Comunidad de Madrid (2005) 
 
In addition to the metro, there were 12 lines of suburban rail (Cercanías Renfe) in Madrid 
Region in 2004 with a total length of 339 km (CRTM, 2006b) and 95 stations. On a working 
day 881,000 passenger trips were made in a programmed service of 1,385 daily trains in 
2003. The rolling stock was formed by 257 trains (Cercanías Renfe, 2003 p7). 868 vehicles 
were in operation in 2002, running 102 million veh-km in a year at an average commercial 
speed of 53.5 km/h (EMTA, 2004b p15). The demand of the suburban rail has also been 
increasing in the last years (table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.10: Evolution of the Demand of the Suburban Rail System in Madrid 
Year Passengers/year (million) 
1998 143.5 
2000 161.2 
2002 193.7 
2004 195.9 
Sources: IECM (2004e, 2006b) 
 
The suburban rail services are run by Renfe, the Spanish National Railways Company, which 
depends on the National Government of Spain (EMTA, 2004a p66). 
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5.7 Bus System 
 
Bus services in Madrid Region can be divided into two types: the urban buses operated by 
Empresa Municipal de Transportes de Madrid (EMT) in Madrid City and the suburban buses 
operated by private companies in the entire region, especially outside Madrid City. 
 
The first buses in Madrid ran in 1924. EMT was formed in 1947 and in 1950 it had a fleet of 
581 vehicles. The fleet grew to 1,332 buses in 1970, reaching 1,824 in 1990 (EMT, 2005a). 
 
In 2005, EMT had 1,958 urban buses operating 194 lines with an average fleet age of 5 
years (CRTM, 2006c). In 2002 the network was 1,547 km long, with 3,972 stops (EMTA, 
2004a). The number of veh-km increased in the last decade while the average speed ranged 
between 14 and 15 km/h (table 5.11). 
 
Table 5.11: Evolution of the Supply of the Urban Buses in Madrid 
Year Veh-km/year (million) Commercial speed (km/h) 
1992 77 14.4 
1995 90 14.7 
1999 94 14.6 
2002 96 14.0 
2004 97 14.0 
Sources: CRTM (2004c, 2006c) 
 
1,715 standard buses, 81 articulated buses and 162 special vehicles composed the fleet 
(EMT, 2005a). This included 4 hydrogen powered buses, which were put experimentally in 
operation in 2004. Urban buses offered 7,739 place-kilometres in 2003 and performed 1,648 
million passenger-kilometres (EMTA, 2005b p74). This yields an average occupancy of 21 % 
of the capacity. 
 
Table 5.12 presents the evolution of the demand of the urban buses in the last decades. The 
highest patronage level was achieved in 1998. Afterwards, the demand decreased by 13 % 
between 1998 and 2004. 
 
Table 5.12: Evolution of the Demand of the Urban Bus System in Madrid 
Year Passengers/year (million) 
1970 357 
1980 467 
1990 440 
1998 548 
2000 531 
2002 478 
2004 475 
Sources: IECM (2004e), EMT (2005a) 
 
A physically separated bus and high occupancy vehicles (HOV) facility was implemented in 
1995 in a 16.1 km long corridor between a suburban village (Las Rozas) and an interchange 
station (Moncloa) near the core of the city (figure 5.10). Although the corridor provides 3 to 4 
general-purpose lanes, during the morning peak period 60 % of the passengers of the 
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corridor accessed Madrid through the BUS/HOV facility. The average car occupancy in the 
corridor increased from 1.36 passengers per car in 1991 to 1.67 in 1996. On the other hand, 
bus users increased by 111 % between 1991 and 1997 in the corridor (Cristóbal-Pinto, 
2002). 
 
Figure 5.10: Bus/HOV Facility in Madrid 
 
Source: Cristóbal-Pinto (2002) 
 
A plan to segregate the bus lanes in Madrid City began to be implemented in 2004, with the 
installation of physical separators along 22 km of bus lanes (EMT, 2005b). These represent 
only a small part of the 112 km of bus lanes that existed in Madrid in 2002 (EMTA, 2004b 
p29). 
 
The suburban bus system in Madrid Region consisted of 389 lines in 2004, operated by 33 
private companies under 44 franchises, with a fleet of 1,749 buses with an average age of 5 
years (CRTM, 2006d). In 2003 the complete network was 3,396 km long, with 6,604 stops 
(EMTA, 2004a). 
 
The demand of the suburban buses increased by 17 % between 1998 and 2004 (table 5.13).  
Suburban buses offered 10,156 place-kilometres in 2003 and performed 4,387 million 
passenger-kilometres (EMTA, 2005b p74), yielding an average occupancy factor of 43 %. 
 
Table 5.13: Evolution of the Demand of the Suburban Bus System in Madrid 
Year Passengers/year (million) 
1998 236.6 
2000 270.1 
2002 277.8 
2004 276.2 
Sources: IECM (2004e, 2006b) 
 
An analysis about the public transport fare system and the financial aspects of public 
transport in Madrid is given in Chapter 8. Based on the data collected and presented in this 
and the previous chapters for London, Berlin, Madrid and Santiago de Chile, a comparison of 
these four cities is presented in the following chapter. 
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6. Comparison of the Metropolitan Areas and their Public 
Transport 
 
6.1 Socio-economic Comparison 
 
As seen in table 6.1, the largest metropolitan area from the four cases compared is Greater 
London, both in terms of population and area. Santiago has the highest density, followed by 
Madrid City, Greater London and Berlin. 
 
Table 6.1: Population, Area and Density of the Metropolitan Areas in 2005 
Metropolitan area Population (million) 
% of national 
population 
Area 
(km2) 
Density 
(people/km2) 
Gran Santiago 5.9  37  860  6,900 
Santiago Region 6.5  40  15,103  430 
Greater London 7.5  12  1,579  4,750 (a) 
Berlin 3.4  4  892  3,800 
Berlin-Brandenburg 6.0  7  30,367  196 
Madrid City 3.2  7  606  5,280 
Madrid Region 6.0  14  8,028  750 
(a)
 The central area has a density of 5,900 people/km2 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
The population in Gran Santiago and Madrid Region have been growing steadily in the last 
50 years, but the population of Madrid City has remained stable since 1970 (figure 6.1). The 
population of Berlin has shown little changes since 1950, while the added population of 
Berlin and Brandenburg remained more or less stable since 1970. The population of Greater 
London declined until 1980 and grew afterwards. 
 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of the Population 
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Source: own elaboration 
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When comparing the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) Santiago has a much lower 
GDP than the European metropolitan areas (table 6.2). For the latter the per capita annual 
GDP is approximately 5 times higher than for Santiago. It is interesting to note that the GDP 
per capita is very close in the European metropolitan areas. 
 
Regarding the relative importance of each metropolitan area in their countries, London and 
Madrid have about 10 % of the national population (table 6.1), but 18 % of the national GDP. 
Santiago has 38 % of the national population and 47 % of the national GDP. The three 
metropolitan areas are important in terms of population in the country, but even more so in 
terms of GDP. In the case of Santiago the “weight” of the city in the country is even greater 
than in London and Madrid. Berlin in contrast has only 4 % of the population of Germany. 
 
Table 6.2: Per Capita Annual GDP 
Metropolitan 
area 
Year Per capita annual GDP (€) 
National GDP produced 
in the capital (%) 
Santiago 2000  4,700 (a) 47 
Greater London 2002  26,500 18 
Berlin 2003  22,700 N/A 
Madrid 2002  23,900 18 
(a)
 Per capita annual GDP of Chile 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Besides the difference in the average income, there are huge differences in the income 
distribution in the researched countries. Table 6.3 shows an inequity index reported by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2005b), which compares the income of the 
richest 10 % of the population with the poorest 10 %. This index has a very high value of 
40.6 in Chile, whereas it ranges between 13.8 and 6.9 in the three European countries 
analysed. 
 
Table 6.3: Inequity Index in the Four Countries 
Country Inequity index (a) 
Chile 40.6 
United Kingdom 13.8 
Germany 6.9 
Spain 9.0 
(a)
 Average income of the richest 10 % divided by the average income 
of the poorest 10 % 
Source: UNDP (2005b) 
 
At the beginning of the 2000s, Madrid Region had the highest motorisation rate (550 cars per 
1,000 inhabitants) of the four metropolitan areas, while Santiago presented the lowest one 
(148 cars per 1,000 inhabitants). Berlin and London had very close figures around the 330 or 
340 cars per 1,000 inhabitants (figure 6.2 and table 6.4). Although yearly data about the 
motorisation rate in Madrid City was not available, in 2002 the motorisation rates in Madrid 
City and Madrid Region were very similar: 546 and 550 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, 
respectively (table 6.4). 
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of the Motorisation Rates 
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Source: own elaboration 
 
In the last decades, the motorisation rates in Santiago and Madrid have been growing much 
faster than in London and Berlin. The average yearly motorisation rate increased in the 
former by 3.8 % and 3.9 % respectively, while the latter grew at only 1.0 % and 0.4 % 
respectively (table 6.4). 
 
Table 6.4: Average Yearly Motorisation Rate Increase 
Metropolitan 
area 
Initial 
year 
Motorisation rate 
(cars / 1,000 
inhab) 
Final 
year 
Motorisation rate 
(cars / 1,000 
inhab) 
Average yearly 
motorisation rate 
increase (%) 
Santiago 1977 60 2001 148 3.8 
Greater London 1981 282 2002 344 1.0 
Berlin 1993 315 2002 327 0.4 
Madrid Region 1986 298 2002 550 3.9 
Madrid City   2002 546  
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
It is possible that Santiago’s motorisation rate continues rising at a high speed, as was the 
case in Madrid. The cases of London and Berlin show that it is also possible to reduce the 
speed of the motorisation rate. With little more than 300 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, the 
motorisation rates in London and Berlin grow by 1 % per year, far more slowly than the 3.9 % 
of Madrid and the 3.8 % of Santiago. 
 
 
 
6.2 Modal Split Analysis 
 
In order to compare the modal splits in the four metropolitan areas, only motorised trips will 
be considered here. In fact, different methodologies when counting the non-motorised trips 
would imply biased comparisons if those trips were considered. The data for each 
metropolitan area correspond to the newest information available about passenger trips, and 
it ranges between 1996 for Madrid and 2003 for London. It can be seen that Santiago had 
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the highest public transport modal split, while Berlin showed the highest use of private 
vehicle (table 6.5 and figure 6.3). 
 
Table 6.5: Modal Split of the Motorised Trips 
Metropolitan area Public transport (%) Private vehicle (%) Year 
Santiago 57 43 2001 
Greater London 44 56 2003 
Berlin 42 58 1998 
Madrid Region 53 47 1996 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Figure 6.3: Modal Split of the Motorised Trips 
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Regarding the distribution of the public transport trips, table 6.6 and figure 6.4 present the 
daily modal split among public transport modes. The bus is the most used public transport 
mode followed by the metro and the rail in almost all the metropolitan areas. The only 
exception is Berlin, where the underground use is slightly higher than the bus use. The 
modal split of tram is important only in Berlin. London has a very small tram network, while 
Santiago and Madrid did not have trams at all in 2006. 
 
Table 6.6: Public Transport Modal Split (a) 
Metropolitan area Bus (%) Metro (%) Rail (%) Tram (%) Year 
Santiago  87 (b)  13 <1 - 2001 
Greater London  48  31 (c) 21 <1  
Berlin  30  33 25 12 2002 
Madrid Region  50  37 13 - 2002 
(a)
 Modal split in terms of passenger trips or stages. (b) Includes bus (79%) and shared-taxi (8%). 
(c)
 Includes Underground (30%) and Docklands Light Railway (1%). 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Berlin presents the most diversified public transport use, with no single public transport mode 
having more than one third of the trips. On the other hand, Santiago presents the highest bus 
modal split, and the lowest use of other public transport modes. This is explained by the 
comparatively smaller metro and urban rail networks, as will be shown later. In London and 
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Madrid, approximately 50% of the public transport trips are made by bus. In both 
metropolitan areas the use of metro is higher than the use of suburban rail, but this effect is 
more pronounced in Madrid than in London. 
 
Figure 6.4: Modal Split of the Public Transport Trips 
Santiago Madrid
Region London Berlin
Tram
Rail
Metro
Bus
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The total number of public transport trips per year is presented in table 6.7, along with the 
yearly public transport trips per inhabitant and the GDP per capita. As can be seen in figure 
6.5, London has the highest rate of public transport trips per inhabitant, followed by Berlin, 
Santiago and Madrid. The most similar figures correspond to Santiago and Madrid. 
 
Table 6.7: Yearly Public Transport Trips per Inhabitant 
Metropolitan 
area 
Year 
Yearly public 
transport trips 
(million) 
Population 
(million) 
Yearly public 
transport trips 
per inhabitant 
Per capita 
annual GDP 
(€) 
Santiago 2001  1,600 (a) 5.5 291  4,700 (b) 
Greater London 2002  3,189 7.3 437  26,500 
Berlin 2003  1,205 3.4 354  22,700 
Madrid Region 2002  1,514 5.5 275  23,900 
(a)
 Some 200 million shared-taxi trips are included. (b) Per capita annual GDP of Chile in 2000. 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Although it is frequently thought in Santiago that its public transport demand is much higher 
than the public transport demand of European metropolitan areas, table 6.7 and figure 6.5 
show that this is not true. Santiago has a comparatively low rate of public transport trips per 
inhabitant. The explanation for this misunderstanding is that the proportion of public transport 
trips made by bus is higher in Santiago than in the European capital cities. This implies that 
most of the public transport trips are made “on the street” in the more visible public transport 
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mode: the bus. On the contrary, the European metropolitan areas “hide” a bigger proportion 
of their public transport trips in massive modes like underground or trains. 
 
Figure 6.5: Yearly Public Transport Trips per Inhabitant 
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6.3 Comparison of the Underground, Tram and Suburban Rail 
Supplies 
 
The metro supply comparison presented in table 6.8 shows that Santiago has a much 
smaller metro system, which was developed during the last decades. This contrasts with the 
much earlier metro systems of the European metropolitan areas, especially the London 
Underground. 
 
Table 6.8: Metro Supply Comparison (a) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Number of 
lines 
Network 
length 
(km) 
Number of 
vehicles 
Average 
commercial 
speed (km/h) 
First line 
opened in 
year 
Santiago (b)  4  67  636 32.0 1975 
Greater London (c)  12  408  4,070 33.0 1863 
Berlin  9  144  1,368 31.1 1902 
Madrid Region  12  227  1,550 26.3 1919 
(a)
 Data corresponds to year 2005. (b) By the end of 2006 Santiago had 4 metro lines with a total length of 83 
km. (c) Includes Underground and Docklands Light Railway. 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Table 6.9 shows the tram systems of the analysed metropolitan areas. It is interesting to note 
that the big tram network of Berlin that runs mainly in the east part of the city complements 
the metro network of the western areas. 
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Table 6.9: Tram Supply Comparison (a) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Number of 
lines 
Network 
length 
(km) 
Number of 
vehicles 
Average 
commercial 
speed (km/h) 
First electric 
line opened 
in year 
Santiago -     
Greater London 3 28 24 N/A  1901 (b) 
Berlin 22 188 600 19.3  1895 
Madrid Region -     
(a)
 Data corresponds to year 2005. (b) No trams ran in London between 1952 and 2000. 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
The suburban rail systems are compared in table 6.10. Again, Santiago has a much smaller 
system than the European metropolitan areas. The higher commercial speed of the rail 
system in Santiago (called Metrotrén) is a result of its mainly interurban character (it has only 
5 stations inside Santiago and a total length of 142 km). 
 
Table 6.10: Suburban Rail Supply Comparison (a) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Number of 
lines 
Network 
length 
(km) 
Number of 
vehicles 
Average 
commercial 
speed (km/h) 
Santiago (b)  1 142 39 81 
Greater London  10 (c) 788 N/A 56 
Berlin (d)  16 331 733 N/A 
Madrid Region  12 339 868 54 
(a)
 Data corresponds to years 2003 to 2005. (b) Metrotrén is mainly an interurban service, 
with 5 stations inside Santiago. (c) In the case of London, the figure corresponds to the 
number of companies instead of lines. (d) S-Bahn 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the network length of the metro, tram and suburban rail in the four 
metropolitan areas. 
 
Figure 6.6: Network Length of the Rail Modes (km) 
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Note: Rail supply in Santiago (Metrotrén) is mainly interurban. 
Source: own elaboration 
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In table 6.11 and figure 6.7 the metro, tram and suburban rail supplies per inhabitant are 
shown, in terms of kilometres of network per million inhabitants. London and Berlin present 
figures of 163 and 194 km/million-inhab respectively, while Madrid has 95 km/million-inhab. 
Santiago has a much lower amount, with 14 km/million-inhab (without taking into account the 
Metrotrén, as it is mainly an interurban service). Even with the doubling of the metro network 
in Santiago between 2003 and 2006, the rail supply per inhabitant remains below the 
supplies of the three European metropolitan areas. 
 
Table 6.11: Metro, Tram and Suburban Rail Supplies per Inhabitant (a) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Population 
(million) 
Metro 
network 
(km/million-
inhab) 
Tram 
network 
(km/million-
inhab) 
Rail 
network 
(km/million-
inhab) 
TOTAL 
network 
(km/million-
inhab) 
Santiago 5.9 14 -  24 (b)  14 (c) 
Greater London 7.5 54 4  105  163 
Berlin 3.4 42 55  97  194 
Madrid Region 6.0 38 -  57  95 
(a)
 Data corresponds to year 2006. (b) Metrotrén is mainly an interurban service. (c) Metrotrén not 
included 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Figure 6.7: Rail Modes Supply per Inhabitant (km/million-inhab) 
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Note: Rail not included in Santiago (mainly an interurban service) 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
6.4 Bus Supply Comparison 
 
In table 6.12 the main characteristics of the bus supply in 2005 are compared. In the case of 
Santiago, the characteristics of the new bus system that should be implemented by the 
beginning of 2007 are also included. In the case of Madrid, the bus system is divided into the 
urban buses that operate in Madrid City and the suburban buses that operate in the rest of 
the Region. The highest commercial speed is found in Berlin with 20 km/h, while the lowest is 
in Madrid City (14 km/h). Bus operators in Berlin and Madrid City are publicly owned 
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monopolies, while Santiago, London and Madrid Region have many private bus operators. 
The new bus system in Santiago will drastically reduce the number of operators from 4,000 
to 10. 
 
Table 6.12: Bus Supply Comparison (a) 
Metropolitan area Number of 
lines 
Number of 
operators 
Network 
length 
(km) 
Number of 
vehicles 
Average 
commercial 
speed (km/h) 
Santiago 380  4,000 N/A 8,000 N/A 
Santiago (b) 160  10 N/A 5,000 N/A 
Greater London 700  30 3,730 6,800 17 
Berlin 151  1 1,662 1,328 20 
Madrid City (c) 194  1 1,547 1,958 14 
Madrid Region (d) 389  33 3,396 1,749 N/A 
(a)
 Data corresponds to year 2005. (b) Estimated data for the new bus system of Santiago that should begin 
operation in 2007. (c) Urban buses. (d) Only suburban buses are considered 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the number of buses in each metropolitan area. Santiago and London have 
the highest amount of buses, and Berlin the lowest. 
 
Figure 6.8: Number of Buses in Each Metropolitan Area 
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Data corresponds to year 2005 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 6.13 and figure 6.9 show the buses per million inhabitants in the four metropolitan 
areas. Currently, Santiago has a clearly higher amount in comparison with London, Berlin 
and Madrid. However the new bus system to be implemented by the beginning of 2007 will 
imply a reduction in the total bus fleet yielding a reduction to 833 buses per million 
inhabitants. The new figure will be comparable to the amounts found in the European capital 
cities. It will be higher than Berlin (391) and Madrid (618), but lower than London (907). 
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Table 6.13: Bus Supply per Inhabitant 
Metropolitan area Population (million) 
Buses per million 
inhabitants 
Santiago 5.9 1,356 
Santiago (b) 6.0 833 
Greater London 7.5 907 
Berlin 3.4 391 
Madrid Region 6.0 618 
(a)
 Data corresponds to year 2005. (b) Estimated data for the new bus 
system of Santiago that should begin operation in 2007 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
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Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
6.5 A Final Comment on the Comparison of the Metropolitan Areas 
 
In chapters 2 to 5 socio-economic and transport data for Santiago de Chile, London, Berlin 
and Madrid was presented. In the present chapter this information was summarised in a 
comparative analysis of the four metropolitan areas. 
 
During all the work that was made so far, both for the data collection and the analysis of the 
information, the main aim of this research was kept in mind, namely the identification of 
aspects in which the public transport system of Santiago could be improved, basing in 
positive experiences provided by the three European metropolitan areas investigated. 
 
Four main areas were identified, in which further analysis and recommendations could be 
made: 
 
• Institutional organisation of public transport: public transport authority, incentives 
for the operators. 
• Operational issues: priority measures for public transport, frequencies and 
schedules design and optimisation, lines density analysis, users’ information. 
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• Financial and fare aspects: fare structure, fare level comparison, subsidies, 
travelcards. 
• Physical design: bus-stops design, interchange-stations design. 
 
Taking into account both the time constraints of the research and the length restrictions of 
the dissertation, it was decided that two topics should be selected for further analysis. 
 
The first selected topic was the analysis of the public transport authorities, i.e. the 
institutional organisation of the public transport systems. The existence of public transport 
authorities in the European study cases strongly contrasts with the absence of such an 
authority in Santiago: in fact, there is no authority comprehensively responsible for the public 
transport in Santiago. On the contrary, there are several authorities responsible for different 
aspects of the public transport system. This causes a complicated and often missing 
coordination. The author thinks that this is a highly relevant issue for Santiago, which should 
be solved urgently. The absence of a sound public transport authority makes any 
optimisation of the public transport system difficult and slow, and decreases the probability of 
success of any measure designed to improve it. The development of a proposition for the 
creation of a public transport authority in Santiago is the aim of the analysis presented in 
chapter 7. 
 
A rather limited knowledge and experience of the author in physical-design topics quickly 
suggested that this issue should be discarded. Therefore, operational issues and financial 
aspects were the candidates to be the last topic investigated in this research. Both had been 
previously analysed by the author from a theoretical microeconomic viewpoint (see 
Gschwender, 2000; Jara-Díaz and Gschwender 2003a, 2003b, 2005) and were therefore 
well-suited for a more practical orientated research now. 
 
After considering the empirical and theoretical information available, the financial and fare 
aspects were selected for further analysis. Especially interesting was the finding of a 
generalised use of travelcards in European metropolitan areas (together with some evidence 
of patronage increases attributable to the travelcards), again contrasting with Santiago where 
this kind of period tickets are not used. A recommendation in this direction, together with 
analysis and recommendations regarding fare integration, fares reductions in specific periods 
or areas, the relation between fare and trip-distance, subsidies and average fare levels are 
presented in chapter 8. 
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7. Transport Authority: European Experiences and 
Recommendations for Santiago 
 
It has been detected that the institutional organisation of the public transport system is a key 
aspect in which important differences exist between the analysed metropolitan areas, 
especially between Santiago and the European capital cities. In this chapter these different 
forms of organisation are investigated, with the aim of drawing recommendations for 
Santiago. The author sees that there is scope for an important improvement of the 
institutions behind the public transport in Santiago, and the aim of this chapter is to show 
how it can be improved, based on the comparative experiences of London, Berlin and 
Madrid. 
 
The authorities responsible for the transport system in Santiago have much less influence on 
the public transport system than in most European countries. Indeed, there is no authority 
comprehensively responsible for public transport in Santiago. On the contrary, there are 
several agencies responsible for different aspects of the public transport system. Thus, the 
responsibilities for the regulation, planning, metro construction and operation, road safety, 
traffic light coordination, road maintenance, etc. are distributed among different ministries, 
municipalities (34, with self-elected political authorities) and technical offices. This causes a 
complicated and often missing coordination. 
 
A different reality is found in the three selected large European metropolitan areas (London, 
Berlin and Madrid) where there are public transport authorities, being responsible for the 
different issues of the public transport system. A more comprehensive view is needed to 
understand the different forms of organisation in the three study areas. 
 
The institutional organisation of the transport system in Santiago is presented next, followed 
by an analysis of the public transport authorities in London, Berlin and Madrid. Then, the 
organisation of the public transport authorities in the four metropolitan areas is compared 
and discussed, and finally a recommendation for Santiago based in the European cases is 
described. 
 
 
 
7.1 The Public Transport Institutional Organisation in Santiago 
 
Ken Gwilliam, transport economist of the World Bank specialised in the design of regulatory 
systems, has been researching the organisation of the urban transport systems in different 
large metropolitan areas in developing countries around the world (especially Latin-America 
and Asia). One of his conclusions is that: 
 
“A critical failure of most developing country cities is the absence of adequate 
mechanisms for achieving spatial coordination. This is often associated with the 
traditional rights of independent municipalities, and often political conflict between 
central, state and municipal governments, all of which have some responsibility” [in the 
transport system] (Gwilliam, 1999 p13). 
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This diagnosis fits well into the problems that Santiago de Chile suffers. But let us analyse in 
detail Santiago’s transport institutional organisation. 
 
 
7.1.1 Municipalities and the regional government 
 
Chile is administratively divided into 13 regions. The president and ministries have 
country-wide responsibilities and the ministries usually have a regional office for each one of 
the 13 regions. 
 
The conurbation called Gran Santiago is formed by 34 municipalities, each one of which has 
a mayor directly elected by the inhabitants. The transportation responsibilities of the 
municipalities are mainly administrative: maintenance of the local road network (smallest 
streets), installation and maintenance of the street furniture at the bus stops and permissions 
for the installation of bus depots in specific places. 
 
There is a regional government that is responsible for the whole Metropolitan Region. As can 
be seen in figure 7.1 the Metropolitan Region is larger than the urban area of Santiago. Even 
so it has almost no responsibility in transport issues. The head of the regional government is 
called “intendente” and is appointed by the president of the country. So, the intendente is a 
regional representative of the president, and not a direct representative of the inhabitants of 
the region. 
 
Figure 7.1: Metropolitan Region of Santiago 
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7.1.2 Transport and telecommunications ministry 
 
The body officially responsible for urban public transport policies is the transport and 
telecommunications ministry (ministerio de transporte y telecomunicaciones, MTT), 
especially through its regional secretaries. In Santiago and the other large conurbations of 
Chile (Gran Concepción and Gran Valparaíso) the national authorities of the ministry are 
usually directly concerned with the transport issues of the metropolitan areas. 
 
The main tasks of the transport ministry are the formulation of policies for the transport 
sector, and its enforcement. In terms of urban public transport, a law approved at the 
beginning of the 1990s allows the transport ministry to regulate the public transport operation 
in areas where high levels of congestion, pollution or accidents are found and can be 
ascribed to the public transport system. This law was designed to introduce regulation into 
the fully deregulated bus system that existed in Santiago by the end of the 1980s. 
 
According to the Chilean constitution, no public agency is allowed to commercially participate 
in any industry if the private sector already exploits that business. In the case of the urban 
public transport, this implies that only private operators are allowed. The only exceptions are 
rail-based modes (e.g. Metro), which are allowed by special laws to operate in public hands. 
So, the only participation that the state can have in the urban public transport system is the 
operation of electrical rail modes and the regulation and tendering of the bus system. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, an agency called Traffic Control Operative Unit (Unidad Operativa 
de Control de Tránsito, UOCT) was created, taking over the control of all the traffic signals of 
Santiago. The UOCT is part of the transport ministry, although it only has responsibilities in 
Santiago. 
 
It is interesting to note how national and local responsibilities are mixed inside the transport 
ministry. Also remarkable is that previously both the transport ministry and the municipalities 
were responsible for the management of the traffic lights, the latter being in charge of the 
traffic signs in minor streets. So the UOCT took over that responsibility from the 
municipalities. 
 
 
7.1.3 Other ministries involved in the transport system 
 
There are also other agencies with important transportation responsibilities outside the 
transport ministry. New road infrastructure is financed (and decided) by two other ministries: 
the public works ministry and the housing and urban planning ministry. 
 
At a national level the public works ministry is responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of interurban roads. This also applies for the sections of those roads that are 
inside Santiago. After a successful expansion and improvement of the main interurban roads 
of the country through a public-private partnership (PPP) system of concessions, the public 
works ministry designed a network of urban highways for Santiago that was also constructed 
through a PPP system. Some new highways are being considered by the public works 
ministry in order to extend this network. Although an attempt to merge the transport and 
public works ministries was made in 2000 by appointing a single minister for both 
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secretaries, the structures of the ministries remained unaltered. Moreover, separate 
ministers were appointed again in 2006. 
 
The housing and urban planning ministry (ministerio de vivienda y urbanismo, MINVU) is 
responsible for maintenance of the majority of the urban roads4. Included is also for instance 
the construction of busways or the redesign of bus stops. This has shown to be a problem in 
the practice. In fact, in the past MINVU has not been very interested in building facilities to 
improve the public transport system. Although the ministry sometimes includes the 
construction of public transport facilities in its budget, these are the first to be cancelled 
when the budget needs to be revised later. It should not be forgotten that the housing and 
urban planning ministry (and its minister) is mainly evaluated for its successes in diminishing 
the housing deficit. 
 
Together with the municipalities, MINVU is also responsible for the land-use planning: the 
municipalities at the local level, and the housing and urban planning ministry at metropolitan 
and regional levels. 
 
 
7.1.4 Publicly owned operators 
 
There are two independent operators that are publicly owned: the Metro and the Metrotrén 
suburban train. They have no direct relation with the transport ministry. The most important 
is the metro, whose director is appointed by the president of Chile. Thus the company is not 
accountable to any local authority, but to the president of the country. Although the main task 
of the company is the operation of the metro system, it sometimes also develops plans for 
extensions of the network and construction of new lines which are decided by the president 
of Chile.  
 
The other is the suburban train called Metrotrén. It is run by the state railways company 
(empresa de ferrocarriles del estado, EFE), also a publicly owned company. Again, the 
director of EFE is appointed by the president of Chile. Nevertheless, Metrotrén has only little 
importance in terms of the proportion of the urban trips that are made in it. 
 
 
7.1.5 Coordinating commissions 
 
From time to time, the absence of a sound authority responsible for transport affairs in 
Santiago becomes evident, because a problem develops where nobody feels responsible. 
So far, the typical response has been the creation of an inter-ministerial commission to solve 
the particular difficulty. 
 
By the beginning of the 1980s congestion was becoming a problem in Santiago. The 
absence of an authority responsible for that problem yielded the creation in 1981 of a 
commission of ministers that included, among others, the minister for transport and 
telecommunications, the minister for public works and the minister for housing and urban 
planning. The initial aim of the commission was the creation of an infrastructure plan to solve 
                                            
4 
 With the exception of those roads that are a responsibility of the municipalities or the public works ministry. 
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the congestion problems of the capital. The commission created an executive secretary 
called SECTRA, which developed modelling tools, projects and plans. Over the years, 
SECTRA became a national scope office, collecting data and developing models, projects 
and transportation plans for all large and medium size cities in the country, as well as for the 
interurban transport system. SECTRA even survived the ministries commission that created 
it, which last met in the middle of the 1990s. But the original aim of coordinating public 
agencies became very difficult after the ministers commission disappeared. In fact, SECTRA 
has no responsibility in the actual implementation of what it plans, i.e. it does not manage 
any budget for the construction of transport projects. So it is not unusual that projects 
recommended by SECTRA never get built, while projects planned by other agencies do get 
constructed. Nevertheless, SECTRA is still the main transportation planning office in 
Santiago and in the country. The two most relevant projects for the management and 
improvement of Santiago’s transport system in the last decades were planned there: the 
UOCT (coordination of traffic lights), and the new integrated bus and metro system called 
Transantiago. 
 
In 1993, another commission of ministers was created with the aim of analysing the security 
problems of the transportation system (comisión nacional de seguridad de tránsito, 
CONASET). The commission is formed by 9 ministers (including the minister for transport 
and telecommunications, the minister for public works and the minister for housing and 
urban planning) and the police director, and it also has an executive secretary. The main 
task of its executive secretary is the proposition of projects, plans and policies to reduce 
traffic accidents. 
 
In 1994, a commission indirectly related with transport policies was created. It is called 
comisión nacional del medio ambiente (CONAMA) and its objective is the coordination of the 
different agencies in environmental issues. It is formed by 14 ministers, including transport 
and telecommunications, public works and housing and urban planning. 
 
In 1996, a ministers committee of land-use and urban development (comité de ministros de 
desarrollo urbano y ordenamiento territorial) was created. It is formed by 5 ministries, 
including the minister for transport and telecommunications, the minister for public works and 
the minister for housing and urban planning. The main objective of this committee is the 
analysis of land-use and urban development policies and plans. 
 
But the most relevant commission for the public transport system of Santiago was created in 
2003 in order to implement Transantiago, the new integrated bus and metro system. It is 
formed by the ministry of transport and telecommunications, the ministry of public works, the 
ministry of housing and urban development, the ministry of finance, the regional government, 
SECTRA and CONAMA. The executive secretary is called after the name of the plan 
(Transantiago) and has the responsibility of coordinating the plan and tendering its different 
contracts to the private sector. 
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7.1.6 Role of the president of Chile 
 
The most important public agencies responsible for the implementation of transport policies, 
plans and projects are three ministries (transport and telecommunications (including the 
UOCT), public works and housing and urban development), one state owned operator 
(metro) and three coordinating agencies (Transantiago, SECTRA and CONASET). None of 
these bodies is accountable to any local government (municipalities or regional government). 
On the contrary, all of them are only accountable to the president of Chile. Therefore, the 
president of the country is primarily responsible for the transport policy of Santiago. 
 
In the last years the president had to solve effectively key coordination problems between 
different agencies. For instance, there was a problem between the Metro and the transport 
minister regarding the inclusion of the Metro to an integrated fare system that will be 
implemented as part of the new bus (and metro) system Transantiago. Metro did not concur 
with the financial guarantees of the system and, as the conflict finally threatened the 
successful implementation of the project, the president of Chile had to intervene. After a 
week of daily meetings, he ordered Metro to enter the new system (Las Últimas Noticias, 
2005; El Mostrador, 2005). 
 
Given that the president of the country obviously has mostly national responsibilities, it does 
not seem to be the ideal authority to rule the transport issues of a particular metropolitan 
area. In addition, it has to be taken into account that Santiago, although being the largest 
metropolitan area of the country, is not the only conurbation were similar problems of 
coordination of the transportation agencies can be found. Finally, the experience has shown 
that this institutional organisation is not adequate to solve the transport problems. 
 
Two examples help to illustrate the effects of the bad institutional organisation. Santiago is 
probably the only metropolitan area in the world were efforts have been duplicated by the 
development of transportation models. Both SECTRA and the public works ministry have 
independently built four-steps transportation models (generation, distribution, modal split and 
assignment) for Santiago (ESTRAUS and STGO). And they have also separately developed 
land-use/transportation models for the metropolitan area (MUSSA and MEPLAN). On the 
other hand, a new metro line to the western municipality of Maipú was decided only months 
after a new busway had been constructed linking the same municipality with the centre of the 
city. To avoid building the metro line just under the recent inaugurated road, the metro line 
was not designed through the shortest path, but using other streets over a longer route.  
 
A comprehensive list of problems caused by the bad institutional organisation in the 
transport system (and especially the public transport system) of Santiago would be long. It 
can be concluded that a new institutional organisation is needed for the transport affairs in 
Santiago. Better experiences can be found in other metropolitan areas of the world, as will 
be seen in the next section. 
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7.2 Public Transport Authorities in Selected European Metropolitan 
Areas 
 
The public transport institutional organisation in three European metropolitan areas was 
examined here (London, Berlin and Madrid), seeking recommendations for the improvement 
of the situation in Santiago. 
 
 
7.2.1 Greater London 
 
The public transport system of Greater London is a responsibility of a local transport 
authority called Transport for London (TfL), created in 2000. TfL is accountable for both the 
planning and delivery of transport facilities (TfL 2004b). It is responsible for London's buses, 
the underground, the Docklands Light Railway and the management of Croydon Tramlink 
and London River Services (TfL, 2005a), i.e. almost all public transport services of the 
capital city. The main exceptions are the 10 private rail companies that operate the national 
rail lines in Greater London. Although TfL is not directly responsible for national rail services, 
a partnership has been established with the Strategic Rail Authority to develop national rail’s 
contribution to an integrated public transport system in Greater London (EMTA 2004a p62). 
In addition, the responsibility for the management of the rail services collectively known as 
the North London Railway will be transferred to TfL by 2007. TfL will manage the concession 
which will be run under the name “Overground” by a train operator to standards specified by 
TfL. London Overground services will also run on the East London Railway when it opens in 
2010 (TfL, 2006e, 2006f). TfL is also responsible for a 580km network of main roads (called 
Transport for London Road Network) and all of London's 4,600 traffic lights. In addition, TfL 
manages the central London Congestion Charging scheme and regulates the city's taxis and 
private hire trade. Therefore, TfL is not only responsible for the public transport system, but 
also has responsibilities in the private transport sector. In addition, TfL promotes walking and 
cycling initiatives and coordinates schemes for transport users with impaired mobility. So it 
can be said that Transport for London is a local authority responsible for the majority of 
Greater London’s transport system. With 17,000 employees, it operates through several 
subsidiary companies. 
 
TfL manages the bus services, planning routes, specifying service levels, monitoring service 
quality and being responsible for bus stops (EMTA, 2004a p63). The bus services are run by 
private operators working under contract to TfL, through a route tendering system. Contracts 
are awarded for five years with an option for a two-year extension. Around twenty per cent of 
the market comes up for re-tender in a year. Quality incentive contracts for London's bus 
services were introduced in October 2001. Operators are given incentives and deductions 
relating to delivering quality and reliability according to set targets. The performance of each 
route is monitored by London Buses and action can be taken at any time if the route is not 
up to standard (TfL 2004k).  
 
The responsibility for the Underground was transferred to TfL in 2003, and London 
Underground was merged with TfL (EMTA, 2004a p63). London Underground had more 
than 12,000 staff in 2005 (TfL, 2005b), i.e. 70 % of the total employees of TfL. London 
Underground is responsible for running the London Underground rail network including 
stations, train operations and signalling. Two private sector partners, Metronet and Tube 
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Lines, are responsible for maintaining and upgrading London Underground’s infrastructure. 
Responsibility for safety remains with London Underground (TfL, 2005c). Docklands Light 
Railway, a subsidiary of TfL, owns the infrastructure of this line and franchises its operation 
to private companies (EMTA, 2004a p63). A concessionaire, Tramtrack Croydon Ltd, 
operates the Croydon Tramlink on behalf of Transport for London (TfL, 2004f). 
 
TfL is a functional body of the Greater London Authority (GLA). GLA administers the area of 
Greater London, covering the 32 London Boroughs and the City of London. The authority 
consists of an elected Mayor and a 25-member Assembly (GLA, 2004 p vii; ONS, 2005). 
Therefore, TfL is accountable to the Mayor of London and is responsible for delivering the 
Mayor's transport strategy. It is directed by a management board whose members are 
appointed by the Mayor, who also chairs the board (TfL, 2004b). 
 
Since the creation of Greater London as an administrative unit in 1965, the Greater London 
Council was responsible for running services such as public transport (through London 
Transport), the fire service, emergency planning and flood prevention throughout Greater 
London. After the abolishment of the Greater London Council in 1986, London Transport 
was taken over by the central government. London was so left without a central 
administrative body. Critics argued that this situation was chaotic and a new London-wide 
body was needed to coordinate the whole metropolitan area. In 2000, the new Greater 
London Authority was established. The mayor is now directly elected, instead of being 
elected by the boroughs’ representatives, as was the case in the former Greater London 
Council (ONS, 2005). The GLA has responsibility for London’s transport system via TfL and 
also, among other functions, for coordinating land-use and urban planning across the whole 
of Greater London. The individual London Borough Councils are legally bound to comply 
with the strategic land-use plan produced by the Mayor. He has the power to override 
planning decisions made by the Boroughs if it is believed that they were against the interests 
of London as a whole (Communities and Local Government, 2006 p15). Figure 7.2 
summarises the main responsibilities of the Greater London Authority related with the 
transportation system. 
 
Figure 7.2: Spatial Coverage and Transportation-Related Responsibilities of the Greater 
London Authority 
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TfL is funded by three sources of income. It receives revenue from its transport services 
(primarily bus and Tube fares) and grants from both Central Government and the Greater 
London Authority. TfL’s total budget at the start of 2003/04 was £ 4,354 million (€ 6,700 
million) of which revenue was 51 %, Government grants 48 % and the Greater London 
Authority grant 1 % (TfL, 2004b). 
 
An interesting example that illustrates a coordinated transport policy in Greater London is the 
relation between the congestion charging scheme and the public transport improvements. 
The congestion charging scheme was designed to diminish congestion in the centre of the 
city (through a mandatory payment if a car enters the charging zone). But its design also 
considered the use of the incomes of the scheme to finance improvements in the public 
transport system, in order to give a better alternative to the persons who decide not to use 
the car because of the charge. 
 
 
7.2.2 Berlin 
 
The two main public transport operators in Berlin are the Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) 
and the S-Bahn Berlin GmbH (S-Bahn). The BVG, a public company owned by the city of 
Berlin, operates all buses, metro and tram lines of the metropolitan area, together with some 
ferry services (BVG, 2004b), having more than 12,000 employees by the end of 2005 (BVG, 
2005a). The S-Bahn is a private company totally owned by the DB Regio AG, part of the 
Deutsche Bahn AG, the former German public train operator which began a long 
privatisation process in 1994. It operated 16 suburban rail lines and had 3,800 employees in 
2004 (SBB, 2005). 
 
After the fall of the Wall, Berlin and the surrounding federal state (Bundesland) of 
Brandenburg were interested in coordinating public transport, in order to reconnect Berlin 
with its hinterland. In 1996 the Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (VBB) was founded. 
The VBB is a private company run by the Federal States of Berlin and Brandenburg, the 14 
municipal districts (Landkreise) and 4 towns (kreisfreie Städte) of Brandenburg (EMTA, 
2004a p102; VBB, 2004a). The VBB serves an area of 30,370 km2 with more than 6 million 
inhabitants, i.e. much more than just the 892 km2 and 3.4 million inhabitants of Berlin. 
 
The Verkehrsverbund is a typical form of public transport authority used in the German 
speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland), which seeks coordination between 
public transport services under different political and administrative responsible bodies, for 
instance a metropolitan area and its surrounding towns, or several nearby cities. A 
Verkehrsverbund coordinates but does not own the public transport operations of their 
members. The first Verkehrsverbund was formed in Hamburg in 1965, and followed by 
Hannover (1970), Munich (1972), Frankfurt (1974), Stuttgart (1978), the Rhein-Ruhr region 
(including Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Essen, Wuppertal and Duisburg, 1980), Vienna (1985) and 
Zurich (1990), among many others (Pucher and Kurth, 1996 pp280-281). By 1997 there 
were 28 Verkehrsverbünde in Germany covering more than half of the population of the 
country (Hass-Klau et al., 1998 p31). These figures increased to nearly 60 
Verkehrsverbünde covering 2/3 of the area and 80 % of the population of Germany by 2006 
(Knieps, 2006 p41). The VBB is the largest German Verkehrsverbund in terms of area, but 
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the second largest in terms of population after the Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr, which had 
7.2 million people in 2004 (VRR, 2006). 
 
The main characteristics of a Verkehrsverbund are a unified fare structure, plus the 
coordination of timetables and services (Hass-Klau et al., 1998 p31), according to the 
maxim: one service-schedule, one fare, one ticket (Knieps, 2006 p40). Typically, a 
Verkehrsverbund is responsible for the introduction and development of an integrated fare 
system, the distribution of the fare incomes between the operators, the definition of general 
guidelines for the operation, the coordination of services, market research studies, users’ 
information and advertising and public relations functions (Knieps, 2006 p42). On the other 
hand, the operators that are associated to a Verkehrsverbund are responsible for providing 
the services, controlling the specific details of how the services are provided: the types of 
vehicles, personnel, work schedules and maintenance.  
 
Until the 1990s all the Verkehrsverbünde were organised as a union of operators, but many 
of them changed into other organisational forms later (Knieps, 2006 p42), after the political 
responsibility for the regional rail services was transferred to the regions. So three different 
forms of organisation can be currently recognised in the Verkehrsverbünde (Knieps, 2006 
p41): 
 
• A union of operators 
• A union of responsible authorities 
• A union of operators and responsible authorities (mixed systems) 
 
Nevertheless, the user will not notice the distinct internal organisations of the 
Verkehrsverbünde, because it does not make any important difference in the operation of 
public transport. 
 
A Verkehrsverbund allows a clear separation of the political and entrepreneurial functions in 
the public transport system. The former are a responsibility of the federal states, municipal 
districts and towns that run the Verkehrsverbund, while the latter are a responsibility of the 
private and public companies that operate the services. The Verkehrsverbund undertakes 
the interface between them. Hence the political decisions become independent of the 
transport companies. This is known as the three-level-model, i.e. separated political, 
management and operating levels. 
 
However, the VBB has important particularities that make it different to a typical 
Verkehrsverbund. Firstly, it has to be considered that during the cold war, West Berlin was 
completely isolated from West Germany, making suburbanisation impossible. On the other 
hand, East Berlin did not have a suburbanisation process either, because of a very strong 
political control of the housing locations by the East German government. Therefore, even 
several years after unification, the travel demand between Berlin and the Brandenburg 
region remained relatively low. Most of the trips in the VBB area are still inside Berlin or 
between Berlin and its immediate surroundings. Secondly, Berlin is not only by far the largest 
city in the VBB zone, but also the largest metropolitan area in the German speaking 
countries. It has therefore very special public transport needs. These special characteristics 
have as a consequence that the operators undertake some of the tasks that in other areas 
are undertaken by the Verkehrsverbünde, as explained below. 
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According to some sources (EMTA, 2004a p103; VBB, 2004a) the main tasks of the VBB 
are: 
• the coordination of the services run by the 45 public and private public transport 
companies and the improvement of the connections between them,  
• the introduction and development of a common fare system for all companies in the 
VBB area, 
• the improvement, standardisation and quality control of public transport services, 
• users’ information and 
• assistance to the authorities in charge of public transport, for example, planning and 
ordering of regional railway services. 
 
Nevertheless, all public transport services inside Berlin are directly planned and coordinated 
by the BVG and the S-Bahn, in concordance with the strategic transport plan developed by 
the city administration. Marketing and users’ information tasks inside Berlin are also directly 
executed by the BVG and the S-Bahn, as well as the quality control of the services. The 
distribution of the fare revenues between the BVG and the S-Bahn is also defined by 
themselves through a contract. The VBB plays an important role in these tasks outside 
Berlin, in the Brandenburg Region, where it has to coordinate 43 public and private owned 
public transport companies (VBB, 2006a). In addition, the VBB is a key actor in the definition 
of the fare system and in the coordination of regional railway services in Brandenburg and 
Berlin. Compared with other Verkehrsverbünde, it can be said that the VBB is a weak 
Verkehrsverbund, especially inside Berlin. A similar situation is found in other 
Verkehrsverbünde for instance the Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr (VRR). 
 
Berlin is administratively divided into 12 Boroughs and governed by the Senate of Berlin 
(Senat von Berlin) which consists of the governing mayor (Regierender Bürgermeister) and 
up to eight senators holding ministerial portfolios. The governing mayor is elected by the 
house of representatives (Abgeordnetenhaus) whose at least 130 members are directly 
elected by the inhabitants of Berlin. The governing mayor appoints the senators for Berlin. 
The mayors of each of the 12 Boroughs are subject to the supervision of the governing 
mayor (Berlin, 1995). The City Development Department (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung) of the Senate of Berlin is responsible for all transport forms (public and 
private transport, non-motorised transport) and also urban planning and land-use. Together 
with the BVG and the S-Bahn, it develops the strategic transport plan which is the framework 
that delimits the actions of both public transport operators in Berlin. 
 
An interesting example of the results of the Verkehrsverbund system in Berlin, as well as in 
other German speaking metropolitan areas, is the impressive fare integration. There are no 
modal-specific fares. On the contrary, the fare only depends on the origin and destination of 
the trip, without any restriction on public transport mode used or number of transfers made. 
In some regions the integrated fare system is even being expanded throughout different 
Verkehrsverbünde, in order to reach regional-wide fare integration, e.g. the NRW-Tarif in the 
Nordrhein-Westfalen region (NRW, 2006). Furthermore, there is an integrated fare scheme 
between long-distance trains and urban public transport that allows travelling on all public 
transport modes inside the destination urban area using the same long-distance train ticket 
(DB, 2006), if the passengers has a train-frequent-traveller card (Bahncard 25/50). Although 
not massively used, there is even a national-wide integrated fare in Germany through a 
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travelcard (BahnCard 100) that allows unlimited use of all trains (including long distance 
intercity trains) and also unlimited use of urban public transport in all major metropolitan 
areas (DB, 2006). A similar national-wide integrated travelcard called General-Abo exists in 
Switzerland (SBB-CFF-FFS, 2006). 
 
 
7.2.3 Madrid 
 
Madrid is the name of both the capital city of Spain and its region. Madrid Region 
(Comunidad de Madrid) is formed by 179 municipalities, one of which is Madrid City. During 
the 1970s and 80s national, regional and municipal authorities had partial responsibilities of 
the public transport system, which was operated both by public and private concessionaire 
companies. As a result there was a lack of coordination in the infrastructure, route, 
frequency and schedule design of the public transport services (CRTM, 1990 pp4-5). 
 
In order to solve these coordination problems, a public transport authority called Consorcio 
Regional de Transportes de Madrid (CRTM) was created in 1985. CRTM is an autonomous 
agency of the regional government that includes the public transport responsibilities of the 
region and the joined municipalities. A regional subsidy has worked as an incentive to join 
CRTM for the municipalities of the region5 which have been joining the authority throughout 
the years (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2005). 175 of the 179 municipalities of the region had adhered to 
CRTM at the end of 2002 (CRTM, 2004a). CRTM regulates and coordinates the services, 
but both public and private companies keep their independent management (CRTM, 1990 
p7). The main functions of CRTM are (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002): 
• the planning of transport services and definition of coordinate operating programmes 
for all public transport modes, 
• the establishment of an integrated fare system for all the public transport system, 
• the planning of public transport infrastructures and 
• the creation of an overall image for the public transport system, being CRTM who 
holds the external relation with the users. 
 
The similarity in functions between a typical Verkehrsverbund and CRTM is striking. 
 
The public transport system of Madrid Region is mainly based on four transport modes: two 
urban modes (metro and urban buses) and two suburban modes (buses and rail). In 2002, 
there were 36 public transport operators: Metro de Madrid, which operates the underground 
system, is a public company owned by the Madrid Municipality (75 %) and Madrid Region 
(25 %); Empresa Municipal de Transportes de Madrid (EMT), which operates bus services in 
Madrid City, is wholly owned by the Madrid Municipality; Cercanías-Renfe, a public company 
dependent on the Spanish public works ministry, operates suburban rail services; and 33 
private companies operate the suburban bus services (CRTM, 2005 p5). 
 
CRTM has authority over the metro, urban bus and suburban bus operators, because their 
respective responsible bodies (Municipalities and Madrid Region) are part of CRTM. On the 
                                            
5
 CRTM negotiates and comes to agreements with various administrative bodies to obtain the subsidies that 
supplement fare revenues in financing the system (CRTM, 2005 p7). In 2003 the operational subsidy was mainly 
financed by the regional government of Madrid (62 %) and the national government (21 %). The access to these 
funds has acted as an incentive for the municipalities to join CRTM. 
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other hand, although CRTM has no authority over the commuter rail operator 
Cercanías-Renfe, both parties have a fare integration agreement that regulates the use of 
an intermodal travelcard (CRTM, 2005 p1). 
 
CRTM manages the major part of the fare incomes. However single tickets revenues go 
directly to Metro de Madrid and EMT respectively, and the revenue of both single tickets and 
multiple trips coupons goes directly to the suburban modes (EMTA, 2004a p67). 
 
CRTM’s management board is formed by representatives of (CRTM, 2005 p1): 
• the regional government (5) 
• the municipality of Madrid City (5), 
• other associated municipalities (8), 
• the Spanish government (2), 
• the transport operators (2), 
• trade unions (2) and 
• users and consumers associations (1). 
 
The president of the management board and CRTM is one of the delegates of the regional 
government, while the vice president is one of the representatives of the municipalities 
(CRTM, 1990 p13). CRTM had some 120 staff members in 2002 (EMTA, 2004a p65). 
 
Three decision-making levels (national, regional and municipal) can be clearly recognised in 
Spain. At the lower level, the municipality of Madrid has a directly elected house of 
representatives and a mayor. The first representative of each list may be elected mayor by 
the house of representatives, but if no one has more than 50 % of the representatives’ votes, 
then the first representative of the list that received more votes from the people is elected 
mayor (Spain, 1985). The regional government (Comunidad de Madrid) also has a directly 
elected house of representatives that elects the president of the region (MAP, 2006), who 
appoints 13 regional ministers. Both the region and the municipalities have public transport 
responsibilities, which have been transferred to CRTM. Nevertheless, the final political 
responsibility on public transport is still divided among the president of the region and the 
mayors of the municipalities. The coordination problems that the absence of a metropolitan 
political authority causes in the public transport system are interestingly solved through 
CRTM. On the other hand, the private transport (roads) responsibilities remain in different 
authorities (central government, regional government and municipalities), as is the case with 
the land-use definitions which are a responsibility of the regional and municipal governments 
(MAP, 2006). In fact, private transport and land-use responsibilities were not transferred to 
CRTM. This may cause coordination difficulties in those areas. 
 
Two examples of the success of the system in Madrid are presented next: 
1. Firstly, one of the most interesting examples of the integrated public transport policy 
of CRTM is the introduction of a travelcard called “abono de transportes“, which 
allows unlimited use of all the public transport modes. 33 % of all the public transport 
trips were made using this travelcard in 1989. In 2003, this amount had increased to 
64.5 % (CRTM, 2004f p48). 
 
2. Highly impressive is the drastic change in the demand tendency after the creation of 
CRTM in 1985. Between 1974 and 1986, the yearly public transport patronage in 
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Madrid Region dropped more than 50 % from 1,184 to 950 million trips. Between 
1986 and 2003, the demand had increased more than 60 % to 1,544 million trips 
(CRTM, 2005 p1). The coordinating efforts of CRTM are one of the main 
explanations for this success. 
 
 
 
7.3 Comparison and Discussion of the Public Transport Authorities of 
London, Berlin, Madrid and Santiago 
 
The following figures summarise the main characteristics of the public transport authorities in 
the four reviewed capital cities. Figure 7.3 shows the single political authority responsible for 
the public transport, whereas figure 7.4 presents the public transport authority of every 
European metropolitan area and their responsibilities. 
 
The public transport institutional organisation in Santiago de Chile has been changing over 
the time, as the general institutional organisation of the capital city and the country changed. 
But a specific organisation that directly responds to the problems of the public transport 
system has not been designed yet. On the contrary, as the absence of coordinated policies 
has become evident, the response has been to create new bodies (SECTRA, Transantiago) 
with the aim of coordinating the existing agencies. Nevertheless, the actual responsibilities 
and budgetary control have remained in the former institutions, so that the coordination 
becomes very difficult in the medium and long term. 
 
Figure 7.3: Single Political Authority Responsible for Public Transport in the Metropolitan Areas 
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Figure 7.4: Main Distinctive Characteristics of the Technical Transport Authorities in London, 
Berlin and Madrid 
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coordination, etc. of the public transport system is directly made by the two operators (BVG and S-Bahn).  
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area-wide transport agency is necessary to achieve the objectives of fare integration and 
coordination of public transport modes and infrastructure. 
 
London has a more than 100-year-old history of elected citywide authorities, with an 
interruption between 1986 and 2000. On the contrary, Santiago has never had a citywide 
authority, but a regional authority (intendente) accounted by the president of the country and 
elected mayors in every one of the more than 30 municipalities in which the metropolitan 
area is divided. The creation of a citywide (metropolitan) authority has been proposed 
elsewhere, but has never been seriously considered by the decision-makers so far. 
 
Two aspects of the Greater London Authority are especially interesting for a transportation 
analysis. Firstly, the mayor is accountable for both the planning and delivery of transport 
facilities. And secondly, beside the public transport responsibility, the mayor is also 
accountable for the road system (private transport) and the urban planning. The latter is very 
important because changes in the road capacity used by private cars affect the public 
transport demand (see Appendix A). Moreover, the interactions between transport system 
and land-use and the importance of a joint transportation and urban planning are well-known 
(see for example EMTA, 2000 p5). 
 
Unlike London, Madrid created a public transport authority (Consorcio Regional de 
Transportes de Madrid, CRTM) without any other political powers. CRTM only has 
responsibilities related with the public transport system, which are transferred to it from the 
regional and municipal authorities that join CRTM, and is managed by a board formed by 
representatives of the regional government, municipalities and operators, among others. 
This institutional design is a response to the disseminated responsibilities in public transport, 
which are spread out between the regional and municipal authorities. It also recognises that 
the relevant area for the urban public transport organisation is in this case wider than just the 
municipality of Madrid. For this model to succeed, it is necessary that many local 
governments voluntarily join CRTM. The regional subsidies for the public transport system 
have act as an incentive for the municipalities to join CRTM. 
 
The scheme used in Madrid is probably inspired in the public transport authority typically 
found in the German speaking countries, the Verkehrsverbund. Also being responsible for 
the public transport coordination in areas with different local or regional authorities, the 
Verkehrsverbund can be organised as a union of responsible authorities, a union of 
operators or a union of both responsible authorities and operators. In the case of the 
Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (VBB), it corresponds to a union of responsible 
authorities: those 2 federal states and all the municipal districts and towns of the 
Brandenburg region. 
 
The VBB, being a private company, is actually owned by the regional and local governments. 
This is the difference to CRTM, which is managed by a board that, beside regional and local 
representatives, also includes representatives from the national government and from the 
operators, trade unions and consumer associations. 
 
Another important difference is that only the regional government and the municipality of 
Madrid initially formed CRTM. The idea was that other municipalities joined CRTM 
afterwards, which effectively occurred. So, CRTM has been growing, in terms of the number 
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of municipalities adhered. On the contrary, VBB and the Verkehrsverbünde in German 
speaking countries in general, are designed from the beginning with their definitive spatial 
shape. 
 
But the most important difference between CRTM and VBB is that CRTM has a much 
stronger power in the definition of public transport services than the VBB. In Berlin, the two 
public operators (BVG and S-Bahn) directly plan and coordinate their services, in 
concordance with the strategic transport plan of Berlin. They are also directly responsible for 
marketing and users’ information. The VBB assumes these tasks mainly outside Berlin in the 
Brandenburg region. On the contrary, CRTM is the main agent for planning and coordinating 
public transport services inside Madrid City, and also in the rest of the region. Marketing and 
users’ information tasks are also a direct responsibility of CRTM and not of the operators. 
 
Particularly interesting is that, in spite of having different institutional organisations and 
powers, the distinct public transport authorities (in Berlin and especially in London, and 
Madrid) have common responsibilities regarding the public transport system. The most 
important of them are (figure 7.5): 
 
• Coordination of public transport services: the design of coordinated routes and 
timetables, together with the planning of new infrastructures. 
• Integrated fare system: the development and introduction of integrated payment 
systems (e.g. travelcards) and fare structures (fare zones, etc.), and the distribution 
of fare incomes and subsidies between the operators. 
• Users’ information: publication of maps, timetables, fare information, etc. 
Development and implementation of tools to facilitate the use of public transport. 
• Unified image and marketing of the public transport system: the creation and 
management of a unified image for the entire public transport system, regardless of 
how many different operators there are, and marketing and promotion of the public 
transport. 
 
The new integrated public transport system that is being implemented in Santiago 
(Transantiago) has been designed considering all the major objectives regarding public 
transport that are common to the public transport authorities in London, Berlin and Madrid. In 
fact, instead of the previous competing routes, complementary bus routes were designed in 
order to have coordination between bus lines and metro. Moreover, an integrated fare 
system was designed together with a users’ information system that was tendered to a 
private company during 2006.  
 
However, the public agency that was specially created to coordinate the implementation of 
the plan (Transantiago) as the executive body of an inter-ministerial commission will 
probably be transformed into an agency of the ministry for transport and telecommunications 
(MTT), after the system is fully implemented by the beginning of 2007. Its main tasks will be 
the management and control of the contracts with the private companies responsible for the 
operation of the system (bus operation and finance and information management). This 
implies that no relevant change will be made in the institutional organisation, and that this 
agency will not have any new attributes, but only the responsibilities that the MTT already 
had. Budgetary control (e.g. for new public transport infrastructures) will remain spread out 
between different governmental agencies. It is questionable whether this form of 
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organisation will be capable of further improving the public transport system of Santiago. But 
at least there will be a special agency with specific dedication to the public transport system, 
something that did not exist before. 
 
Figure 7.5: Main Responsibilities of a Public Transport Authority 
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is that the spatial coverage of the public transport authority was expanded through the years. 
A negative characteristic in the case of Madrid is a more difficult coordination between public 
transport and private transport policies due to the specialisation of CRTM in public transport 
issues. A summary of the main distinctive characteristics of the three European authorities 
was presented in figure 7.4. 
 
Although the public transport authorities of Berlin and especially Madrid are regarded as 
positive experiences, the transport authority of Greater London seems to have a more 
interesting institutional organisation, mainly because of the wider scope of the authority (e.g. 
private and non-motorised transport). But the implementation of a London-like transport 
authority in Santiago would imply an important institutional change, as already explained, 
which would be difficult to implement and would probably take a long time to be achieved. 
Therefore, a two-step institutional change for Santiago seems to be the logical proposition at 
this point: as a first-step, a public transport authority (like in Madrid), and in the medium and 
long-term a transport (metropolitan) authority. However, as we will discuss below, the 
first-step public transport authority is not really an interesting solution for Santiago. 
 
 
7.4.1 About a public transport authority for Santiago, similar to the solutions in 
Madrid and Berlin 
 
In Madrid and Berlin a new body was formed to coordinate public transport issues between 
the existing actors. But unlike the analysed cases of Madrid and Berlin, the local 
municipalities in Santiago have almost no responsibilities in public transportation. There are 
no municipal public transport companies (metro is owned by the national state and bus 
companies are private), and the concession of the bus services are not given by the 
municipalities, but by the central government. The coordination of public transport services 
for which different local authorities are responsible is one of the main tasks of the public 
transport authorities in Berlin and Madrid. But in Santiago these responsibilities are not 
spread over different local authorities, but over different central government agencies! 
 
Therefore, trying to follow the objectives of the public transport authorities of Madrid and 
Berlin, the logical recommendation for Santiago would be that the central government should 
form an agency specialised in public transport themes for Santiago, and that all other 
agencies should transfer their public transport responsibilities to this agency. Which 
are the main tasks that this agency should face? Those described in figure 7.5, which are 
the common public transport responsibilities not only of the public transport authorities in 
Madrid and Berlin, but also of the transport authority of London: coordination of frequencies, 
routes and infrastructure development for all public transport modes, the implementation of 
an integrated fare, providing users’ information and being responsible for a unified image 
and marketing for the public transport system. 
 
The coordinating agency Transantiago, as explained above, introduced a public transport 
plan that considers all those major objectives. Though, after the implementation of the plan, 
the agency will not receive any public transport responsibilities from other agencies, 
implying that the coordination difficulties between central government bodies will surely 
continue. What can be done in order to improve that coordination in the absence of a wider 
transport authority? Indeed, only huge coordination efforts can help. Coordination has to be 
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sought with planning bodies (e.g. SECTRA), the authorities responsible for the infrastructure 
construction (ministries for public works and for housing and urban planning) and metro. 
 
But this seems to be not enough to assure an adequate future development of the public 
transport system in Santiago. Coordination between different institutions has shown to be 
particularly difficult in the case of the public transport system of Santiago. Therefore, a better 
solution for Santiago is needed. 
 
 
7.4.2 A regional transport authority for Santiago’s metropolitan region 
 
Though implying a difficult institutional change that would take several years to be 
completed, the most suitable solution for the institutional design that is needed for the public 
transport system and the transport system in general in Santiago seems to be the creation of 
a regional transport authority, as will be explained next. 
 
The term “transport authority” can refer to two related concepts, which have to be 
distinguished: firstly, the political authority that is responsible for transport issues, and 
secondly its technical and administrative office, which is in charge of implementing the 
policies and plans defined by the political authority and assists it in the creation of these 
plans. In what follows, a proposition for a new political transport authority for Santiago is 
described. 
 
A political citywide transport authority for Santiago should have all the responsibilities related 
with the public transport system, and should also be responsible for the private transport 
system and urban planning. In addition, it should be responsible for both the planning and 
implementation of those policies, plans and projects. Given that this authority should have 
important decision-making powers and control over an important budget, it is recommended 
to be a directly elected authority, so that it can regularly be approved/disapproved by the 
community. In order to establish this authority, a comprehensive reform of the local 
government organisation is needed. 
 
Spatial coverage 
 
As in London, this authority could have a spatial coverage corresponding to the complete city 
(Greater London). In the case of Santiago, this could be the urban limit, which is called Gran 
Santiago. However, this limit changes from time to time as the metropolitan area grows. It 
has to be taken into account that Santiago has been growing faster than Greater London in 
terms of population in the last decades (see figure 6.1). In addition, although most of the 
trips are made inside those boundaries, there are commuter trips that cross those 
boundaries to other cities or towns of the region. Finally, and probably the most important 
fact, there are no institutional bodies corresponding to that urban limit. This would make 
such an institutional change especially difficult and slow. On the contrary, a regional 
authority already exists and this institution could be used as a starting point for the creation 
of the transport authority proposed here (although in practice the regional government has 
no influence in transportation issues). 
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In comparison with a metropolitan citywide transport authority, the proposition of a regional 
transport authority has two advantages. Firstly, given the fact that Santiago is a spatial 
growing metropolitan area, the region is wide enough to include all the area that is currently 
relevant for urban transportation, and also the areas that are expected to become relevant in 
the future, i.e. that are expected to be part of Gran Santiago. In addition, it also covers most 
of the relevant towns and cities in terms of suburban trips to/from Santiago (e.g. Talagante, 
Colina, Melipilla, Buin). The regional area is shown in figure 7.1, where the area covered by 
Gran Santiago is marked with a circle. Although the region has a much larger area 
(15,100 km2) than Gran Santiago (648 km2), the population of the region outside Gran 
Santiago is just about 500,000 inhabitants, i.e. less than 10 % of the population of Gran 
Santiago. In comparison, the regions of Berlin and Brandenburg have an area of more than 
30,000 km2 with approximately 45 % of the population living outside Berlin, and Madrid 
Region has 8,000 km2 and also 45 % of the inhabitants live outside Madrid City (table 6.1). 
 
Responsibilities and organisation 
 
All public transport responsibilities should be transferred from the ministry for transport and 
telecommunications (MTT) to the regional authority. These responsibilities are mainly in the 
regional secretaries of the MTT, so that they are already separated by region. By doing so, 
the new authority responsible for public transport issues in the region would be the 
intendente instead of the ministry (and through it the president of the country) as it is today. 
 
The Traffic Control Operative Unit (UOCT) described at the beginning of this chapter 
(section 7.1.2) should be transferred from the transportation ministry to the regional transport 
authority. This would be no problem, as it has only responsibilities inside Santiago. However, 
it should maintain professional contact with other traffic control units in other Chilean areas 
(currently also depending on the transport ministry), something that would naturally happen 
due to the similarity of their functions. 
 
In addition, private transport (roads) responsibilities mainly from the ministry for public works 
should also been transferred to the regional government, and the same should occur with 
urban planning responsibilities from the ministry for housing and urban planning. Again, for 
the most part these responsibilities are already in the regional secretaries of these ministries. 
But there is one important exception: the responsibility for the urban highways that were 
constructed through a public-private partnership (PPP) in the last years and the (eventual) 
planning of further urban highways. The design of these projects and the concession to the 
private sector were managed by a special unit of the ministry for public works, called 
“Coordinación de Concesiones”. This body was firstly created to implement interurban 
highways along Chile through PPPs, and therefore it has a national scope. Later it also 
implemented the urban highways inside Santiago6 shown in figure 2.5. Both the design of 
new infrastructure for the private car and the management of the contracts with the private 
companies that operate the already existing concessions have to be transferred to the new 
regional transport authority. To do that, Coordinación de Concesiones would need to be split, 
at least in terms of its planning groups. This is a very important aspect, because in the past 
the planning, the design and the decision of building those urban highways were made in 
absence of a wider view of the complete transport system of the metropolitan area. This has 
                                            
6
 Currently, in addition to the implementation of transport infrastructure it is also in charge of the construction of 
prisons in different regions of Chile, among other projects (always through PPPs). 
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been a deep problem and represents one of the best examples showing the necessity of a 
unified transport authority for Santiago. These decisions have to be transferred to the 
regional transport authority in order to assure a coordinated planning of all the transport 
system. 
 
Other responsibilities related with non-transport issues could also been transferred to the 
regional government, but that is beyond the scope of this research (see SUBDERE, 2000 
p20). 
 
There are other national-wide transportation-related agencies that would need to be 
incorporated to the regional transport authority. This is the case of the two technical offices 
SECTRA and CONASET (described in section 7.1.5). But these bodies do not have any 
responsibility in deciding about the final implementation of the projects they help to plan. In 
the author’s opinion, there would not be any problem for a coordinated work between them 
and the regional transport authority, even if they remain concentrated at a national level 
depending on the central government. There should be some form of association between 
the regional transport authority and these agencies stating the terms of their cooperation 
with the regional authority. Moreover, the high specialisation of these bodies makes it better 
to maintain them as a national-wide body. The creation of separate agencies for every 
metropolitan area in Chile would imply an unnecessary duplication of offices needing the 
same very specific know-how (transportation modelling, transportation surveys, etc.). 
 
The municipalities would continue existing as they are, and actually no relevant changes in 
their institutional organisation or their functions seem to be needed, at least in terms of 
public transport issues, as they do not have important responsibilities in that field. Of course, 
their decisions would have to be coherent with the citywide and regional decisions of the 
regional authority, but this is already so (e.g. urban planning and land-use). 
 
Figure 7.6 summarises the transportation responsibilities of the proposed regional authority. 
Like the authority of Greater London, it is accountable for the planning and delivery of public, 
private and non-motorised transport, together with land-use and urban planning. But unlike 
the Greater London Authority and similar to the public transport authorities in Berlin and 
Madrid, it has a wider spatial coverage, including not only Gran Santiago but the complete 
region. 
 
Figure 7.6: Spatial Coverage and Transportation Related Responsibilities of the Proposed 
Regional Authority for Santiago 
 
 Santiago’s 
Metropolitan-Region-wide 
Planning of transport facilities for 
Public 
transport 
Private 
transport 
Non-
motorised 
transport 
… and their delivery 
Land-use 
and 
urban 
planning 
Spatial 
coverage 
Responsi-
bilities 
Chapter 7 Transport Authority: European Experiences and Recommendations for Santiago 107 
 
 
Visual representations of the current and proposed institutional organisation of the transport 
system in Santiago are presented in figure 7.7 and figure 7.8. These are simplified and 
non-exhaustive representations that show the main actors of the decision-making process in 
transportation issues and allow a visual comparison of the current and proposed 
organisations. 
 
Election of the political authority 
 
Currently, the regional authority consists of a regional intendente and a set of delegates. 
None of them are directly elected: the intendente is appointed by the president of the 
country, and the delegates are elected by the communal representatives elected by the 
population. In the author’s opinion, the regional government should not be appointed by the 
president of the country, but elected by the inhabitants of the region. It has to be taken into 
account that he would have control over an important budget and a much more important 
decision-making power than today. 
 
 A first attempt in this direction was being discussed in the national parliament, in order to 
directly elect the representatives of the regional government (El Mostrador, 2004). This 
would be a positive change in the direction of a regional transport authority. After that, the 
appointment of the intendente should be improved, being elected either by the 
representatives or directly by the population. Through these modifications, the intendente 
would not be a regional representative of the president anymore and the regional 
government would become a representative authority of the region. 
 
Further discussion 
 
The fact that a regional government already exists makes the necessary institutional 
changes much easier than they would be in the case of the creation of a completely new 
metropolitan citywide transport authority. However, important institutional changes are still 
needed to convert the current regional authority into a transport authority. This process is 
expected to be difficult and slow. It would be a major change in the general institutional and 
political organisation of the metropolitan area. An agreement of the political forces of the 
country would be needed, as a modification of the law would be necessary for its 
implementation. An elected regional authority for Santiago would certainly become the 
second most important political figure of the country, after the president. This would imply a 
change in the whole political scheme of Chile, and probably not all political forces will concur 
with the idea of creating such an important political post. Short-term political interests may 
be contrary to it. 
 
An important advantage is that there are elsewhere propositions to improve the regional 
government in terms of both its appointment procedure and the transferring to it of regional 
tasks that are currently responsibilities of the national government (SUBDERE, 2000 p20). 
Although these proposals are mainly focussed on issues other than the transport system, 
they are perfectly complementary to the transportation analysis made here. But this is by far 
not enough to assure that those changes will effectively happen. 
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Although most of the transportation experts concur with the necessity of a transport authority 
for Santiago, this has neither been a relevant issue for the public opinion nor for the 
politicians in the last decades. Therefore, this problem needs to be transformed into a 
relevant issue in Santiago first. As an example, in the presidential election of 1999 both most 
voted candidates included in their programmes the creation of a transport authority for 
Santiago. However, this was surely a recommendation of their transportation experts that 
was not politically interesting for them. In fact, the elected government did not make any 
attempt to introduce a change in that direction during the presidential period, and the 
opposition did not make any complain because of the not fulfilled (shared) campaign 
promise. 
 
But there is currently one punctual event that may help converting the necessity of a 
transport authority (or at least a public transport authority) into a relevant political issue. With 
the start of Transantiago, the authority will have to take care of many new tasks in terms of 
management of the public transport. Although the operation is still in private hands, the new 
organisation of the system needs a more active role of the authority in supervising the 
fulfilment of conditions defined in the contracts, optimising routes and frequencies, creating 
new services in the future, among others7. For example, an interestingly aspect is that the 
contracts consider guarantees for the bus operators if the travelling speed of their buses 
decreases because of bad traffic conditions. Thus the authority will have to monitor these 
conditions and will have to design and implement measures to avoid buses to be affected by 
congestion. This fact seems to have been recognised by the transport ministry, who has 
mention (in the press) an eventual interest in creating a public transport authority several 
times in the last months previous to the start of Transantiago. 
 
Probably the most difficult aspect of the here-proposed regional transport authority would be 
the change in the election system of the authority. As discussed above, there can be no 
certainty about the existence of the necessary political consensus to create such a strong 
new political figure. It could take many years for this agreement to occur. But it is not 
possible to wait indefinitely to improve the institutional organisation of the transport system in 
Santiago. Therefore, if there is really a political interest in generating a (public) transport 
authority, this should be done following the characteristics of the here-proposed authority, 
even if no change in the appointment of the regional authorities is expected to happen. But it 
has to be taken into account that a regional authority appointed by the president will never 
have a comparable political weight to the one of an elected authority. There are at least two 
relevant aspects that make an appointed regional authority weaker than an elected one: 
firstly, the president can remove him at any time, and secondly, he will not have more 
political weight than the ministers, which are also appointed by the president. Therefore, if an 
appointed regional transport authority exists, it cannot be discarded that in case of future 
disagreements between him and some ministers, the president would have to enter the 
discussion and decide, perhaps against the position of the regional authority. So the 
president would still be the final political transport authority. This could not happen if the 
regional authority were elected by the inhabitants of the region. 
 
                                            
7
 All this drastically contrasts with the previous practical responsibilities of the authority in the bus system, which 
were no further than tendering the operation and making some very basic enforcement of operational conditions 
(for instance frequencies were not controlled in practice). 
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One negative aspect of the proposed democratically elected regional transport authority 
would be the predictable accentuation of the use of new transportation projects (e.g. new 
metro lines and urban highways) as campaign promises. This would make it even more 
difficult to include technical considerations in those decisions. Currently, transportation 
projects are secondary topics in presidential campaigns, because they are rather local given 
the national character of the election. 
 
The institutional problems discussed in this chapter for the case of Santiago are also present 
(in a somewhat lower extent) in the other large Chilean conurbations Gran Concepción and 
Gran Valparaíso. Therefore, if a regional transport authority is created for Santiago, there 
will be an interest in simultaneously creating similar authorities for the other conurbations. 
This could make the change a little more complicated because of the different characteristics 
and needs of a large metropolis like Santiago (with almost 6 million inhabitants) and the 
other much smaller conurbations (with something more than a half million inhabitants). 
 
Finally, a democratically elected regional authority would have other responsibilities outside 
the transport system. This would make the new institutional design more complicated, 
because the responsibilities in other fields would also have to be analysed and incorporated. 
Being beyond the scope of this research, fortunately there are proposals elsewhere for the 
transfer of responsibilities in other areas to the regional government, as discussed above. 
 
 
7.4.3 Conclusions 
 
The absence of a public transport authority in Santiago was detected to be a key problem. 
Based on the analysis of the European experiences in this field a recommendation for 
Santiago was drawn. 
 
The three European metropolitan areas analysed present different institutional solutions for 
the organisation of its transport system. Transport for London (TfL) is the local authority 
responsible for nearly all issues of transportation in Greater London. Interestingly, TfL is 
responsible not only for public transport issues, but also for many aspects of the private 
transport system and non-motorised modes. TfL manages all public transport modes inside 
Greater London, except national rail services8. In addition, TfL manages the main roads and 
all traffic lights in Greater London, runs the central London congestion-charging scheme and 
regulates taxis. TfL also undertakes works in order to improve conditions for walkers and 
cyclists. TfL is accountable to the Mayor of London who is not only responsible for 
transportation issues but also for urban planning and land-use definitions. 
 
Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid (CRTM) is the local authority responsible for 
the public transport system not only in Madrid City but also in the rest of Madrid Region. 
CRTM is responsible for the planning and coordination of all public transport modes, but it 
has no responsibilities related with private transport and non-motorised modes. CRTM is an 
autonomous agency of the Regional Government (Comunidad de Madrid). At the end of 
2004, 176 of the 179 Municipalities of Madrid Region, representing practically the entire 
population of the region, belonged to CRTM. 
                                            
8
 TfL established a partnership with the Strategic Rail Authority. Moreover, the responsibility for the management 
of the North London Railway will be transferred to TfL by 2007. 
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A public transport authority called Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (VBB) exists in 
Berlin and the surrounding region of Brandenburg. As the CRTM in Madrid, the VBB is 
responsible for public transport issues without having any responsibility on private transport 
and non-motorised modes. But unlike the powerful CRTM, the VBB has only a secondary 
role inside Berlin, where the planning and coordination tasks are handled by the two 
operators themselves, in direct coordination with the city administration. The two main 
operators in the public transport system of Berlin are the Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) 
and the S-Bahn Berlin GmbH (S-Bahn). The BVG operates buses, underground, trams and 
ferry services, whereas the S-Bahn operates the suburban rail. 
 
Currently, the president of Chile is the political transport authority in Santiago as he is the 
only elected authority accountable for the complete metropolitan area. No technical body 
widely responsible for all public transport issues exists. However, having studied some 
examples of international experiences, a citywide or metropolitan authority seems to be more 
suitable than a countrywide authority to handle the transportation issues in a large 
metropolitan area. In addition, a technical transport authority is needed in Santiago. 
 
In terms of public transport the transport authority in Santiago should be responsible for the 
following tasks which are common to all analysed European public transport authorities: 
  
1. The planning and coordination of public transport services. 
2. The development of a common fare system for all public transport services and the 
distribution of its revenues between the operators. 
3. The provision of users’ information. 
4. The creation of a unified image for the complete public transport system and its 
marketing. 
 
Taking into account the particular administrative structures in Santiago, the most suitable 
solution for the institutional design that is needed for its public transport and its transport 
system in general is the creation of a regional transport authority. In terms of the transport 
system, this authority should be responsible for the planning and implementation of both 
public and private transport policies, plans and projects. It should also be responsible for the 
non-motorised modes and for urban planning and land-use definitions at the regional level. 
The different central government agencies that have urban transport responsibilities should 
transfer them to this regional authority. Also responsibilities from other areas different to the 
transportation could be transferred to the regional authority, as long as they have a regional 
scope, but that is beyond the analyses of this research. The regional government should 
change its appointment system in the direction of directly elected head and representatives. 
 
It is worth mentioning that this proposal takes into account the four aspects that the 
Association of European Metropolitan Transport Authorities recommends, including fields 
outside the sphere of public transport (EMTA, 2000 p5), in order to be able to offer travellers 
an integrated transport system: (1) a relevant territory has to be considered, encompassing 
all the trips of people in the metropolitan area, (2) an integrated public transport system has 
to be provided offering travellers a real network, (3) an integrated approach for public 
transport and other modes is necessary, especially in relationship with private car policies 
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and (4) an integrated approach for transport issues and urban planning is necessary, taking 
into account the impact on mobility and on transport modal shift of new urban developments. 
 
Several difficulties for the full implementation of a democratically elected regional transport 
authority were detected. The most important is the absence of political interest in the 
problem. However, the new challenges for the authority that appeared with the operation of 
Transantiago seem to have helped sensitising some political actors (e.g. the transport 
ministry) to the issue. Particularly difficult seems to be the change from an appointed 
regional authority to an elected regional government. Therefore, the creation of a regional 
transport authority with all the responsibilities defined in the proposal but still appointed by 
the president should be accepted as a temporary second best solution. 
 
Figure 7.7: Current Institutional Organisation of the Transport System in Santiago 
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Figure 7.8: Proposed Institutional Organisation for Santiago’s Transport System 
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8. Fares’ Structure in the Public Transport: European 
Experiences and Recommendations for Santiago 
 
In this chapter we will analyse the fare structure in the public transport systems of the case 
study areas, because we are searching for recommendations for the improvement of the 
fare system in the public transport of Santiago. 
 
This chapter starts with a description of the fare systems of the four metropolitan areas 
(Santiago, London, Berlin and Madrid), followed by a comparison and discussion of these 
fare systems. The main aspects that are analysed here are the integration level of the fare 
structures, the existence and convenience of travelcards, the relation between fares and trip 
length, the existence and convenience of reduced fares in specific periods or areas, the 
average level of the fares in the different metropolitan areas, the existence and convenience 
of subsidies and the financial equilibrium of the systems. Finally, a summary or 
recommendations for Santiago and conclusions are presented. 
 
 
 
8.1 Fares in the Public Transport of Santiago 
 
The public transport system of Santiago is undergoing a major change. This transformation 
will affect the fare system both in terms of the structure of the fares and the payment 
system. 
 
Until 2006, the public transport system of Santiago had a non-integrated fare system, i.e. 
users had to pay a fare every time they boarded a bus, a shared-taxi, or when they entered 
the metro network. Only the metro had network-wide fares, implying that passengers could 
change without further payment between metro lines. In all other cases a transfer yielded a 
new full payment of the fare, making bus-metro trips and bus-bus trips very expensive. 
 
In buses and metro the fare was independent of the travelled distance. Only the shared-taxis 
sometimes had distance-related fares, which could vary between approximately one and 
three times the normal bus fare. 
  
In the case of the buses the full fare was circa € 0.45 in 2003. Metro had a differentiated fare 
of € 0.50 in the peak hours (weekdays 7:15 to 9:00 and 18:00 to 19:30) and € 0.40 in the 
off-peak periods, in order to give an incentive to those who can change their travel time to 
travel in off-peak times. This fare-differentiation policy was implemented as a way to delay 
the need to buy more trains to supply the highest demands of the peak hours. Both buses 
and metro had a reduced students’ fare of € 0.15. Elderly could also pay this reduced fare in 
the metro between 9:00 and 18:00. From time to time Metro made special agreements with a 
few bus lines in order to provide a special integrated fare, lower than the addition of the 
metro and bus fares. But the reductions were always small and the scheme had little impact. 
 
Neither bus operators nor the metro received operational subsidies. Therefore, operational 
costs had to be covered by the fare incomes and other minor earnings (e.g. publicity). Bus 
fares were determined in the tender of the services and revised every month through a 
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mathematical formula established in the contracts that changed the fare according to the 
impact that the prices of fuel and other inputs had on the costs of the bus operators. In the 
case of the metro, the fare was fixed by the government and normally changed once a year. 
Since 2000 the metro fares have been calculated with the aim of not only covering 
operational costs, but also paying a part of the investment of new metro infrastructure. 
 
Regarding the paying method, in buses and shared-taxis the payment was directly made to 
the driver, whereas metro users had to buy in advance a single magnetic ticket or a 
rechargeable contactless electronic card (the latter was introduced in 2003). 
 
By the beginning of 2007 the Transantiago scheme, as discussed in chapter 2, should be 
completely implemented. This will contain a new route structure together with a new fare 
system. Just to remember, the bus routes will be divided into two complementary networks: 
main bus lines that allow long trips through different zones of the metropolitan area, and 
feeder (or local) lines that allow travelling inside specific areas and interchanging with the 
main bus lines and metro network. 
 
The new fare structure will integrate both bus and metro fares, so that transfers can be 
made free or at a reduced transfer fare. The different fares9 and the number of trips made 
paying each one of them, according to demand estimations (Transantiago, 2005b), are: 
 
• 14 % of the trips will only use local or feeder services, paying a local fare of about 
€ 0.4. Transfers between local lines inside an area are free. 
• 75 % of the trips will be made using only main bus lines or the metro, at a fare of 
approximately € 0.45. Transfers between main bus lines, between metro lines, and 
between main bus lines and metro lines are also free. 
• 10 % of the trips will use local lines and main bus lines or metro. In those cases, a 
transfer fare will have to be paid, yielding a total fare of about € 0.48. 
• 1 % of the trips should use feeder lines at the start of the trip, then main bus lines or 
metro, and at the end a feeder line in another local area. Those trips will have to pay 
a transfer fare twice, and the total fare should be approximately € 0.52. 
 
The fare remains independent of the trip-length, although there is a cheaper fare for local 
trips, which are normally shorter than the average. As before, a reduced students’ fare at 
35 % of the normal fare will exist. There will be a completely flat fare allowing up to three 
free transfers between buses and metro (in a 90 minutes period) during the first six months 
of operation. 
 
The main paying method will be a contactless smartcard like the one introduced by Metro in 
2003. This card has to be charged in advance and the corresponding fare is automatically 
deduced from it, as the paying system recognises if the user is starting a new trip or just 
making a transfer in the allowed transfer time. It will also be allowed to pay in cash in 
approximately 50 % of the buses, but at a higher fare and without the possibility of the 
integrated reduced fares when transferring. 
 
                                            
9
 The values of the fares are estimative figures. According to the authorities, the new fares will be on average 
similar to the old ones. 
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As before, no operational subsidy is considered for the system, i.e. fares have to cover the 
operational cost of buses and metro. The users of the public transport system pay about 
€ 570 million in fares per year. 
 
 
 
8.2 Fares in the Public Transport of the Selected European 
Metropolitan Areas 
 
8.2.1 Greater London 
 
Greater London has a mix of mode-specific and intermodal fares. Single fares are mainly 
mode-specific, while travelcards are mostly intermodal. Buses and trams share a common 
fare and ticketing regime, and the Underground and the DLR another. The latter have a 
zone fare system charging higher prices for longer trips, while the former have a single flat 
fare all over Greater London. Superimposed on these mode-specific regimes is the 
travelcard system. It provides tickets with validities from one day to one year, which are 
accepted on the DLR, buses, railways, trams and the Underground. The Fares and Tickets 
Guide (TfL, 2006a) is published yearly by Transport for London with details on all available 
tickets. 
 
In 2004, a new multi-modal contactless smartcard called Oyster Card was introduced in 
Greater London. It can be used in prepaid mode to pay individual fares or to carry various 
travelcards and other passes. It can be recharged and users need only to swipe it near the 
card reader, instead of feeding it into a ticket machine. Therefore, the passage through the 
ticketing gates is faster. In order to encourage the use of the Oyster Card, reduced fares are 
offered when paying with it, in comparison to the cash fares. A “capping” system was 
introduced in 2005, which guarantees that an Oyster Card user will be charged no more than 
the cheapest combinations of single tickets and travelcards that cover all journeys made that 
day. Over 3 million cards had been issued by January 2006 (TfL, 2006b). 
 
Buses and trams had in 2006 a single flat fare all over Greater London of € 2.3 when 
paying in cash and € 1.5 (morning peak, i.e. weekdays between 7:00 and 9:30) or € 1.2 (off-
peak) when paying with the Oyster Card. Passengers have to pay these fares each time they 
board a vehicle, i.e. no free transfers are allowed. A bus pass allowing unlimited travel in 
buses and trams all over Greater London for one day costs € 5.3 (cash). With the Oyster 
Card “capping” system the maximal daily-accumulated bus fare is € 4.5. Bus passes can 
also be bought (cash) for a week (€ 20.3), a month (€ 77.9) or a year (€ 810). 
 
The fare system of the Underground and Dockland Light Rail (DLR) divides Greater 
London into six concentric zones (figure 8.1). Zone 1 is the most central zone and its 
boundary roughly corresponds to the route of the Underground’s Circle Line, including all of 
Greater London's principal railway termini and most of the typical tourist attractions. Zone 2 
is the next zone, still mainly inside inner London. Zone 6 is the last zone covering the 
external areas of Greater London. Figure 8.1 shows the fare zones over the boroughs of 
Greater London and figure 8.2 presents the tube map over the fare zones. Four additional 
zones are named as zones A to D, having only relevance for the eight stations of the 
Underground’s Metropolitan Line that are outside Greater London. 
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Figure 8.1: Greater London Fare Zones and the Boroughs 
 
Source: TfL (2005d p4) 
 
Figure 8.2: Greater London Fare Zones and the Underground 
 
Source: TfL 
 
Single fares for the underground and DLR for zones 1 and 2 and for all zones in Greater 
London (1 to 6) are shown in table 8.1. Single fares allow transfers between different lines. 
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Table 8.1: Example of Underground and DLR Single Fares in Greater London in 2006 
Zones Cash (€) 
Oyster Card 
peak periods (a) 
(€) 
Oyster Card 
off-peak periods (b) 
(€) 
Zones 1+2 4.5 3.0 2.3 
All zones 6.0 5.3 3.0 
(a)
 Peak periods: weekdays between 7:00 and 19:00 (b) Off-peak periods: all other times 
Source: TfL (2006a) 
 
The same zones apply for travelling with national rail services inside Greater London. 
Single fares allowing travelling in rail services, the underground and DLR are priced 
depending on the number of zones crossed. In 2006, a trip through 1 zone had a price of 
€ 4.5, through 2 zones € 5.1 and through all the 6 zones of Greater London € 9.3. 
 
Travelcards (table 8.2) allowing unlimited underground, DLR, and national rail travel within 
the zones covered by the ticket are also available. All travelcards can also be used in buses 
all over Greater London, regardless of the validity zones of the ticket for the rail services. 
There are one-day, 3-days, 7-days, monthly and annual travelcards available. 
 
Table 8.2: Example of Travelcard Costs in Greater London in 2006 
Zones 
One-day 
off-peak periods (a) 
(€) 
One-day 
weekdays  
(€) 
Monthly 
(€) 
Annual 
(€) 
Zones 1+2 7.4 9.3 128 1,332 
All zones 9.5 18.6 236 2,460 
(a)
 Off-peak periods: weekdays after 9:30 and weekends 
Source: TfL (2006a) 
 
Travelcards for different combinations of zones can be found. Travelcards not including zone 
1 are always cheaper. For example in the case of the one-day travelcard, the cheapest 
available combination is for zones 2 to 6 in the off-peak (weekdays after 9:30 and weekends) 
for € 6.5. 
 
The travelcard was introduced in London in 1983, with the aim of providing an intermodal 
ticket (Konsult, 2007). First it covered the underground and buses, and later also the railway 
lines inside Greater London. The travelcard can be bought as a paper ticket or can be 
charged onto an Oyster Card. 
 
There are special reduced fares for certain population groups. Children and young people 
under 16 have reduced fares in the Underground, DLR and rail services, and can travel free 
in buses and trams. Older and eligible disabled people who live in a London borough can 
also travel free. In these cases, the corresponding local borough council pays for the pass. 
In 2006, disabled people could travel free in the tube, buses, DLR and trams without time 
restriction, and in national rail services after the morning peak. Greater London citizens over 
60 could travel free after the morning peak in the tube, buses, DLR, trams and national rail 
services in Greater London. 
 
The public transport system of Greater London receives subsidies for its operation. 
Transport for London spent € 7,200 million in fiscal year 2003/2004. The revenue from 
Chapter 8 Fares’ Structure in the Public Transport: European Experiences and Recommendations for Santiago 118 
 
passenger fares, street management activities and other services was € 3,450 million. The 
UK government, the Greater London Authority and third parties, provided a total of € 4,200 
million (EMTA, 2005b). Consequently, TfL covered 48 % of its costs with passenger fares 
and other revenues. Table 8.3 shows the main expenses of TfL. 
 
Table 8.3: Main Expenses of Transport for London in 2003/2004 
Mode Expense (million €) 
Expense  
(%) 
Underground 3,900 57 
Buses 1,950 28 
Roads 956 14 
Rail 42 1 
Source: EMTA (2005b p70) 
 
TfL invested € 1,294 million in 2003/04: € 290 million on vehicles and equipment, € 1,000 
million on infrastructure and € 4 million on land and buildings (EMTA 2005b). 
 
 
8.2.2 Berlin 
 
Berlin and Brandenburg are organised as a Verkehrsverbund (see chapter 7) hence they 
have a fully integrated and intermodal fare system, i.e. both single tickets and travelcards 
allow free transfer between all public transport modes: buses, trams, metro (U-Bahn) and 
urban rail (S-Bahn). Fares in Berlin are based on a zone system that considers 3 concentric 
areas (figure 8.3). Zone A is the city centre, zone B the rest of Berlin and zone C a ring in 
the periphery of Berlin. Tickets can be bought for the combination of zones A+B, B+C or 
A+B+C. 
  
Figure 8.3: Berlin Fare Zones 
 
Source: Morpha.de (2006) 
 
Users can pay a single fare each time they travel, or pay for a travelcard that allows 
unlimited travel during a day/week/month/year. In all the cases the tickets are valid for all 
public transport modes and allow free transfers. Table 8.4 shows some of the fares that 
were available in Berlin in 2006. 
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Table 8.4: Example of Fares in Berlin in 2006 
Zones Single fare (€) 
One-day 
pass  
(€) 
Monthly 
pass 
(€) 
Annual 
pass 
(€) 
AB 2.1 5.8 67 650 
ABC 2.6 6.0 83 805 
 
Travelcards normally allow taking along a second adult and up to three children between 6 
and 13 years for free after 20:00 on weekdays and all the day on weekends. Children up to 6 
years can always be taken along for free. A bicycle can also be taken along with a 
travelcard, if there is enough space in the vehicle. 
 
A reduced monthly pass allowing unlimited travel weekdays after 10:00 and all day 
weekends was available at a cost of € 49.5 and € 61.0 for zones AB and ABC respectively in 
2006. There are other reduced monthly passes for students, employees of companies that 
subscribe an agreement with the transport authority and people that receive social security 
benefit. 
 
On the other hand, there is a reduced single fare of € 1.2 for very short trips (Kurzstrecke). 
In addition, there are also reduced fares for children between 6 and 13 years. 
 
A change in the boarding procedure of the buses was introduced in April 2004 in Berlin. 
Previously, all doors could be used to board and alight, and there was no need to show a 
ticket when boarding. The only ticket control was random inspections inside the vehicles. 
Now, all buses have only one allowed entrance (the first door), and the driver has to control 
the tickets. The aim of this measure is to decrease the level of payment evasion. According 
to the BVG (2004c p5), the test phase of this idea showed that passengers did not have big 
problems to accustom themselves to the new procedure. In addition, most of the times the 
buses needed less time at the stop, because passenger boarding and alighting did not meet 
at the same door. The introduction of the same boarding control procedure in several smaller 
German cities (Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, Remscheid, Bottrop, Recklinghausen, among 
others) was analysed by Ankum-Hoch (2004). According to that research, the new procedure 
helped reducing evasion by some 50 %. However, as drivers could not verify the validity of 
some tickets (e.g. electronic cards), especially some young users felt disposed to continue 
evading the payment. Negative aspects of the measure were that 
• the punctuality of the services was threatened by longer stop times when higher 
occupancy factors of the buses and a high number of boarding passengers were 
observed, 
• drivers mostly felt that their work became more difficult and 
• passengers perceived a decline in the friendliness of the drivers. 
 
There are plans to introduce an electronic ticketing system in Berlin through a 
contactless card (Tick-et-portal, 2004; Die Tageszeitung, 2005). In addition, an idea for a 
completely new fare structure was discussed in 2003 (BVG, 2004d; Berliner Zeitung, 2003; 
Berliner Morgenpost, 2003). According to this idea, fares would be proportional to the actual 
distance on an imaginary straight line between origin and destination. By doing so, the 
current zone system would be eliminated. A price differentiation between products is being 
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considered, making for example a trip in low-demand periods cheaper than the same trip in 
peak hours or differentiating the price depending on the transport mode. In addition, 
intensive users would receive higher discounts. A necessary previous condition for the 
introduction of the new fare structure is the implementation of the electronic ticketing system. 
By 2006, neither the new fare structure nor the electronic ticketing system was introduced 
yet. 
 
Public transport operational subsidy reached its peak in 1993 (table 8.5). In addition to the 
subsidies for the BVG and S-Bahn, the DB Regio, which operates regional rail services, 
received € 44 million in 2004 (SfS, 2006a). The fare income of the BVG was approximately 
€ 468 million in the same year. This income together with the operational subsidy were not 
enough to cover all BVG operating costs, yielding a deficit of € 106 million in 2004 (SfS, 
2006b p7). BVG covered 47 % of its costs with fare revenues. 
 
Table 8.5: Yearly Subsidy for the Operation of the Public Transport in Berlin 
Year BVG (a) (million €) S-Bahn (b) (million €) 
1990 521 N/i 
1993 767 N/i 
1996 485 221 
1999 471 221 
2002 420 221 
2004 420 194 
(a)
 Underground (U-Bahn), tram and bus. (b) Suburban rail. 
Sources: SfS (2004p and 2006a) 
 
In table 8.6 the investment in streets and rail modes in the last years is presented. The 
investment in rail modes has been higher than the investment in streets. 
 
Table 8.6: Yearly Investment in Streets and Rail Modes in Berlin 
Year Streets investment (million €) 
Rail modes (a) 
investment (million €) 
1991 128.1 231.6 
1995 249.2 386.2 
1999 129.7 261.4 
2002 71.8 198.1 
(a)
 Underground (U-Bahn), tram and suburban rail (S-Bahn) 
Sources: SfS (2004n and 2004o) 
 
 
8.2.3 Madrid 
 
There were mainly two types of tickets in Madrid in 2006: single tickets, which could be 
bought as 10-ticket-package or as the more expensive one-trip-ticket, and travelcards, which 
allowed unlimited travel during a month or a year. Single tickets are mode-specific, while 
travelcards allow the use of all public transport modes within its valid travel zone and period. 
In both cases a zone-fare system applied, consisting of six zones in Madrid Region and two 
additional outlying zones (E1 and E2) in the adjacent Region of Castilla – La Mancha, as 
shown in figure 8.4. Madrid City practically coincides with the smallest zone A. 
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Figure 8.4: Fare Zones in Madrid Region 
 
Source: CRTM (2004e) 
 
In 2006, the urban buses in Madrid City (zone A) had a single flat fare of € 1.0. In addition, 
a 10 trip coupon could be bought at a price of € 6.15. In both cases the fare allows to travel 
only in one bus line, i.e. a new fare has to be paid in case of a transfer to a second bus line. 
Exactly the same fares apply for the metro system, but in this case the fares allow 
transferring between lines, so that a trip between every pair of metro stations can be made 
paying only one fare, at least inside zone A, where the majority of the metro network is. 
 
Single fares for the suburban rail depended on the number of zones travelled (table 8.7). 
The suburban bus also had single fares that depended on the number of zones travelled. 
Each one of the more than 30 suburban bus companies had their own fares, in similar 
ranges to the suburban rail fares. 
 
Table 8.7: Example of Suburban Rail Fares in Madrid Region in 2006 
Zones Single fare (€) 
10-trip coupon 
(€) 
1 or 2 zones 1.1 5.7 
All zones 3.4 26.2 
 
In addition to the single fares, a travelcard (abono de transporte) can be bought allowing 
unlimited travel within its valid travel zone and period in all public transport modes, i.e. metro, 
urban and suburban buses and suburban rail (table 8.8). The zones of the travelcard are the 
same as the zones for the single fares (shown in figure 8.4). In 2006, travelcards for those 
zones could be bought for a month or a year. In addition, a “tourists” travelcard for 1, 2, 3, 5 
or 7 consecutive days was sold, but only for zones A (Madrid City) and E2 (all Madrid Region 
plus the additional outlying zones in the adjacent Region of Castilla – La Mancha). In spite of 
its commercial name, people who live in Madrid can also buy this travelcard. Finally, a 
monthly travelcard valid only in the suburban rail, but allowing just two trips per day, was also 
available for different zones. All travelcards are personal and non-transferable. 
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Table 8.8: Example of Travelcard Costs in Madrid in 2006 
Zones 
One-day 
pass  
(€) 
Monthly 
pass 
(€) 
Annual 
pass 
(€) 
Madrid City (A) 3.5 39 429 
Madrid Region (C2) - 71 781 
E2 7.0 94 - 
 
Reduced fares for young and senior citizens are provided through special travelcards. The 
monthly young travelcard had a cost of approximately 65 % of the normal travelcard in 2006, 
and was available for all the zones. Highly reduced, the senior travelcard had a price of only 
€ 9.9 (monthly card) and € 108.9 (yearly card) with spatial validity in Madrid Region (C2). 
 
In 2000, more than 1 million people used travel passes every month. 60 % of the used 
travelcards were normal passes, while about 20 % corresponded to senior cards and 
another 20 % to young cards (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002). From all the public transport trips made 
in 2002, 66 % were made using travelcards, 24 % using multiple trips coupon and 10 % 
using the single trip ticket (EMTA, 2004b p35). Since its creation in 1987, the use of the 
travelcard has been rising, reaching 33 % of the trips in 1989, 40 % in 1990, 52 % in 1992 
and more than 60 % in 1996 (CRTM, 2004f p48). 
 
CRTM (the public transport authority of Madrid) centralises the major part of the fare 
incomes. Only single tickets revenues are directly managed by Metro de Madrid and EMT 
(urban buses company), and the revenue of both single tickets and multiple trips coupons 
are directly managed by the suburban modes EMTA (2004a p67). 
 
The public transport system of Madrid receives operational subsidies. In 2003, the yearly 
operation cost of the public transport system in Madrid Region was € 1,255 million (table 
8.9). The yearly revenue from overall ticket sales was € 623 million, covering 50 % of the 
operational costs. CRTM negotiates at several political levels and comes to agreements with 
various administrative bodies to obtain the subsidies that supplement fare revenues in 
financing the system (table 8.10). 
 
Table 8.9: Main Public Transport Expenses in Madrid Region in 2003 
Mode Expense (million €) 
Expense  
(%) 
Metro 580 46 
Urban buses 288 23 
Interurban buses and trains 310 25 
CRTM 34 3 
Other 43 3 
Sources: CRTM (2005 p7) and EMTA (2005b p73) 
 
Approximately € 400 million were yearly invested in the extension of the metro network 
between 1995 and 2003 in Madrid (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2002). Infrastructure investment in the 
metro network is supported by the Regional Government, whereas suburban rail investments 
are managed by the National Government. Funds for rolling stock renewal come directly 
from the public transport operators in the case of rail modes (EMTA, 2004a p67). 
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Table 8.10: Operational Subsidy in Madrid Region in 2003 
Mode Subsidy (million €) 
Subsidy  
(%) 
National government 143 21 
Regional government 414 62 
Madrid municipality 110 17 
Sources: CRTM (2005 p7) and EMTA (2005b p73) 
 
 
 
8.3 Comparison, Discussion and Recommendations for Santiago 
 
8.3.1 Fare integration 
 
After the revision of the fare systems of the four analysed capital cities, different types of 
fares were recognised, in terms of its integration level. The following definitions will help us 
to classify the fare structures of the different metropolitan areas10:  
 
• Type A, no fare integration: a new fare has to be paid each time the passenger 
boards a vehicle. 
• Type B, mode-specific fare integration: free (or reduced) transfer inside one public 
transport mode. 
• Type C, intermodal fare integration: free (or reduced) transfer inside and between 
different public transport modes. 
• Type D, travelcard: free transfer and unlimited number of trips inside a validity 
period. 
 
The following figures show the fare integration that exists in each capital city and each public 
transport mode, in the case of single fares (figure 8.5) and travelcards (figure 8.6). 
  
Figure 8.5: Fare Integration in the Metropolitan Areas (Single Fares) 
 Trams Buses Metro Rail 
Santiago 
before TS (a) - A B A/B 
(b)
 
Santiago 
after TS (a) 
- C A/B (b) 
B (c)  London A A C 
Berlin C 
Madrid - A B B 
(a)
 TS: Transantiago. (b) There is only one urban rail line in Santiago. 
(c)
 Metro and DLR have a common fare system in London. 
 
                                            
10
 For a detailed list of types of fares found in different cities see Balcombe et al. (2004 p50) or White (1995 
pp125-127). 
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Figure 8.6: Fare Integration in the Metropolitan Areas (Travelcards) 
 Trams Buses Metro Rail 
Santiago - 
Travelcard (D)  London 
Travelcard (D) 
Berlin Travelcard (D) 
Madrid Travelcard (D) 
 
The integration level of the single fares is low in all metropolitan areas except Berlin, 
where fully integrated single fares exist. London, Madrid and Santiago (before Transantiago) 
have a similar single fare system, in which bus (and tram) fares have to be paid each time a 
vehicle is boarded, while metro and rail single fares allow free transfers inside their 
respective networks. Greater London presents an exception to this rule, providing a special 
integrated single fare for metro and rail that allow free transfers between both networks. 
Berlin, as described above, has a fully integrated single fare, allowing free transfers between 
all public transport modes. Interestingly, after the implementation of Transantiago, Santiago 
will have a more integrated single fare scheme than London and Madrid, allowing free or 
reduced transfers between buses and metro. 
 
Regarding the travelpasses, the three European capital cities have fully integrated 
travelcards that allow unlimited travel in all public transport modes of the metropolitan area. 
This is a very interesting finding in terms of recommendations for Santiago, as even under 
the new Transantiago system no travelcard or similar pass is considered for implementation. 
Therefore, advantages of a travelcard and the eventual convenience of the introduction of 
such a pass in Santiago are further analysed below. 
  
 
8.3.2 Travelcards exist in the European metropolitan areas… and in Santiago? 
 
Before discussing the convenience of implementing a travelcard in Santiago, let us give a 
precise definition of the term “travelcard”. White (1981 p17) defines it as a ticket that allows 
unlimited travel within a given period and within a network (or a substantial part of a 
network). Thus a card that gives discounts in the normal fare is not included in the concept 
of a travelcard, and a ticket allowing unlimited travel only in a specific route does also not fit 
into the travelcard concept. The concept of a travelcard is completely independent of the 
technology used for its implementation. It can be a simple piece of paper or a very 
sophisticated electronic device. 
 
The first travelcards were introduced in the 1950s both in West Germany and the United 
Kingdom (Edinburgh). However, the really rapid expansion dates from the Stockholm card 
introduced in 1971 (White, 1981 p19). Different commercial names have been given to this 
type of tickets, e.g. “Ridecard”, “Bus Pass” and also more imaginative names like 
“Environmental Protection Card”, “Ticket 2000”, “Bears Ticket” and even “Chocolate Ticket”. 
Though, probably the best-known name in English is “Travelcard”. The name was given to 
one of the first of these tickets in Edinburgh in 1957. 
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Travelcards are commonly available in European metropolitan areas, and a high proportion 
of the public transport passengers often use them. For example, 92 % of all public transport 
trips in Vienna are made using a travelcard, while there are figures of 82 % in Stockholm, 
78 % in Hamburg, over 60 % in Madrid, 54 % in Zurich and 50 % in Munich (Matas, 2004 
pp198-199). 
 
Travelcards can be personalised or transferable. If the travelcard is personalised and is lost 
or stolen, the user gets a new travelcard for free and the old one loses its validity. A 
transferable travelcard (not personalised) can be used by different people (at different 
times). In many metropolitan areas the user can choose between a personalised and a 
transferable travelcard (e.g. London, Freiburg, Zurich, Rhein-Ruhr Region, Frankfurt-Rhein-
Main Region). However there are cases in which only personalised travelcards are offered 
(Madrid, Hamburg) and also cases where only transferable travelcards can be bought 
(Berlin, Vienna, Stockholm). 
 
Impact of travelcards on public transport demand 
 
Interestingly, there is evidence in the literature about a positive impact of the introduction of 
travelcards in the public transport demand. For example, Matas (2004 p207) estimates a 
patronage increase in Madrid City between 1986 and 2001 of 7 % in the buses and 15 % in 
the metro attributable to the introduction of the travelcard (the rest of the total increase of 
24 % in the buses and 65 % in the metro is due to other factors like network expansions or 
GDP increase). Moreover, FitzRoy and Smith (1998) estimate that the introduction of 
travelcards in the German city of Freiburg yielded a 7 % to 22 % increase in the public 
transport trips per capita. In another study, FitzRoy and Smith (1999) report the following 
impact of the introduction of travelcards in the public transport patronage in four Swiss 
metropolitan areas: Geneve 16 %, Bern 14 %, Basle 5.4 % and Zurich 4.5 %. An estimation 
for London suggests an even larger impact of the introduction of a travelcard and fare 
revision in May 1983, which should have increased underground passenger-miles by 33 % 
and bus passenger-miles by 20 % from 1983 to 1991 (London Transport, 1993). In addition, 
two studies found that the introduction of travelcards in London stimulated public transport 
demand (Gilbert and Jalilian, 1991; Fowkes and Nash, 1991; both in Balcombe et al., 2004 
p62). Comparing the relative success of light rail systems in different metropolitan areas in 
Europe, North America and Australia, Hass-Klau and Crampton (2002) also found that the 
existence of a travelcard is a key issue in the systems with the highest patronage figures 
(see Appendix A). 
 
But how can a simple ticket increase the patronage of the public transport? It could be 
argued that the introduction of travelcards may reduce the average fare, and therefore 
increase the patronage not because of the ticket, but due to the overall price reduction. 
Nevertheless, the studies cited in the previous paragraph separate the effects of an eventual 
change of the average fare and the introduction of the travelcard, so that the impacts on the 
demand mentioned are only those attributable to the appearance of the new ticket: the 
travelcard. So which are the real benefits of travelcards for the users that could explain an 
increase in patronage? White (1981 p18) and Matas (2004 p198) suggest the following 
advantages: 
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1. The need to worry about the fare required (especially for “exact fare” systems) is 
virtually removed. 
2. Interchange penalties are reduced because there is no need to pay a new fare (or a 
transfer fare). 
3. Boarding and queuing time can be reduced due to an “easier” payment system. 
4. Once the pass is purchased, it permits travel at zero marginal cost. Thus extra trips, 
such as returning home to lunch from work, weekend leisure trips, etc., are “free”. 
 
A detailed enumeration of the benefits of travelcards not only for users, but also to 
operators, local authorities and employees is presented in White (1981). Some of them are 
relevant for the analysis of an eventual implementation of a travelcard in Santiago, and will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Probably the most important explanation for the patronage increases is the fact that after 
purchasing the travelcard, additional trips can be made for free11. These can imply the 
generation of new trips (e.g. returning home to lunch) or a change in the origin, destination 
or mode of an “existing” trip. From a social viewpoint, the ability of a travelcard to divert car 
trips to the public transport is especially interesting. Some authors state that the impacts of a 
travelcard include “a high probability of attracting new users” (Matas, 2004 p 198), i.e. 
passengers that previously did not use public transport. FitzRoy and Smith (1998 p169) 
report that 3,000 to 4,000 regular car drivers had switched to public transport one year after 
the introduction of the travelcard in Freiburg, Germany. However this switch is probably 
explained by other additional factors. Hass-Klau and Crampton (2002 pp38-39) argue that in 
addition to the travelcard and a superb public transport system, a wide range of sustainable 
transport policies explain the success in Freiburg: long pedestrian streets, traffic-calmed 
streets outside the historic centre, a large cycle network, one of the best examples of 
coordinated land-use and transport planning in Europe. Between 1982 and 1998 the car 
modal split in Freiburg stayed constant despite a 12 % increase in car ownership and it is 
assumed that daily 30,000 car trips have been replaced by public transport (Hass-Klau and 
Crampton, 2002 p39). 
 
Critics to travelcards 
 
The main critic to travelcards found in the literature is that they can have a negative impact 
on the financial equilibrium of the system. This negative financial impact has two causes: 
• First, that frequent users buying the travelcard will do so because this is cheaper for 
them than continue paying the cash fares, implying a reduction in the fares revenue 
of the operator (Doxsey, 1984). 
• And second, that the extra demand generated may cause additional operating costs, 
if the new patronage occurs where the public transport did not have spare capacity. 
 
Regarding the first problem, Doxsey (1984) builds a model that predicts losses in revenue 
as a consequence of introducing travelcards. Nevertheless, as stated by FitzRoy and Smith 
(1998 p169), his model overlooks the passenger generation effect of travelcards, because it 
only considers the choice faced by existing public transport users between purchasing a 
                                            
11
 This is a very important difference with a multiple-trip coupon. With the latter, the passenger pays in advance a 
more convenient fare for a fixed number of trips. In the case of a travelcard, the user pays in advance for an 
unlimited number of trips over a fixed time period. 
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travelcard and paying cash fares. Matas (2004 p207) states that the revision of the related 
literature leads to the conclusion that the implementation of travelcards does not necessarily 
reduce fares revenue. 
 
An important aspect that has to be taken into account here is the difference between the 
price-elasticity of the single tickets and the travelcards (see Appendix A). The evidence 
found in the literature (for instance, reviews by White, 1981 and Matas, 2004 pp210-211) 
shows that travelcards have a lower (in absolute value) price-elasticity than single fares, i.e. 
that the decrease in travelcards sales produced by a growth in their price is lower than the 
sales decrease in single fares generated by an increase in the single fares. Some authors 
even report price-elasticities close to zero for the travelcard. Therefore, White recommends 
the following strategy to reach a high market penetration with the travelcards and avoid a 
long term decrease in the fare revenues: to start introducing the travelcards at low initial 
prices together with higher single fares and then, given the low price-elasticity of the 
travelcard, to rise its price (and eventually also the single fares). This may yield a high 
proportion of trips being made with travelcards without a drop in total fare revenues. Several 
reports of cases where the introduction of travelcards did not affect fare revenues can be 
found in the literature: Freiburg (FitzRoy and Smith, 1998; Hass-Klau and Crampton, 2002), 
London (London Transport, 1993), Edinburgh and West Midlands (White, 1981), as well as 
others where it actually reduced them: Madrid (Matas, 2004), some German speaking 
metropolitan areas analysed by Pucher and Kurth (1996). 
 
In relation to the second problem (the eventual increase in operating costs due to the 
higher demand), it has to be emphasised that public transport usually has spare capacity at 
least in off-peak periods, implying that extra passengers can be carried in the already 
provided supply at almost no extra costs for the operators. In addition, a frequency increase 
in the off-peak period can be made at much lower cost than in the peak period due to the 
unused vehicles available in the off-peak, as discussed later in this chapter. However, if the 
additional patronage occurs where the system does not have excess capacity (peak hours, 
peak direction and section of the route with the highest load), an expansion of the service 
(e.g. higher frequency) may be necessary yielding important cost increases because new 
vehicles and drivers would be necessary. 
 
Travelcards function like club entrance fees that allow free use of services for members 
(Sherman, 1967). A similar pricing strategy can be found in other industries, for instance the 
newspapers, which offer subscriptions at lower prices than the total price that the purchaser 
would pay if buying the newspaper every day. But given the very low marginal cost of the 
production of one exemplar, the newspapers prefer “loyal” clients with subscriptions. The key 
aspect here is the low marginal cost of producing an extra exemplar of the newspaper. 
 
Finally, there is also theoretical support about the convenience of travelcards, both for 
users and operators. Carbajo (1988 pp154-156) shows in a simple microeconomic 
diagrammatic example that the introduction of a travelcard at an appropriate price can make 
all users and the firm better off than under a uniform single-price regime. In his example, 
after introducing the travelcard, users increase their number of trips and the operator 
increases its profit in spite of facing higher costs. He also argues that these overall benefits 
of an appropriately designed non-uniform price are a well-known finding in the non-uniform 
pricing literature, citing Brown and Sibley (1986). 
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About reduced fares for frequent users 
 
Some of the users’ benefits of travelcards listed above will be reached, at least partially, 
with the new pricing system of Transantiago. In fact, 
• passengers will not need to worry about the exact fare required (the correct amount 
will be deduced automatically from the smartcard), although different fares will exist, 
which will make passengers still interested in knowing the exact fare they have to 
pay; 
• interchange penalties will be reduced, as some transfers will be free and others will 
have low transfer-fares; 
• reductions in boarding times should be achieved because payment with the 
smartcard is notably faster than cash payment. 
 
However, the “zero marginal cost” for extra trips is not provided in the new fare system of 
Transantiago. These free extra trips can be seen as a “reward” for frequent users, as is 
common in other industries. As discussed above, these extra trips do not have a relevant 
financial impact for the operators, as long as they are done using spare capacity (e.g. in 
off-peaks). Therefore, a possible improvement of the fare system of Transantiago would be 
the introduction of reduced fares for frequent users, as was suggested in Berlin in the 
context of a new fare scheme (BVG, 2004d). This could be done thanks to the technology of 
the smartcard that will be used in Transantiago which is able to register and count the 
number of trips made by the user. For example, a reduced fare could apply after reaching a 
certain amount of trips in one month. This would imply a non-uniform pricing scheme that, as 
stated by Carbajo (1988), can be positive both for users and operators if prices are 
adequately defined. This scheme could be used to promote off-peak trips if the reduced fare 
only applies in off-peak periods and weekends. 
 
However, this scheme would imply some difficulties for the users: 
 
• The fare structure would become more complicated. It has to be considered that the 
fare structure of the public transport in Santiago has been always very simple: a 
single flat fare for all buses and another flat fare for the metro, with only few 
exceptions to this simple rule. 
• The passenger would not exactly know how much the next trip would cost because 
the fare would depend on his accumulated number of trips. It can be argued that the 
card reader will provide the relevant information about the cost of following trips each 
time the passenger pays. But this is still a difficulty for the user because he has to 
remember this information. Even if the information was printed and given in a ticket, 
the user would still need to make some effort in order to store only the last receipt 
and discard the old ones. In addition, the card readers used in Santiago are not 
designed to give printed receipts, and the implementation of a printer-module in more 
than 5.000 buses and more than 80 metro stations would imply a relevant cost. 
 
A careful analysis of the impact of this proposition on demand, loadings and financial 
equilibrium should be made if there is future interest in their implementation12. However, the 
                                            
12
 The modelling tools available in Santiago (e.g. the ESTRAUS four stages equilibrium model) would provide the 
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author thinks that the expected benefits of this proposal are rather limited because it does 
not make a relevant change in the costs perceptions of the users. The introduction of 
travelcards seems to be much more interesting and will therefore be further analysed in what 
follows. 
 
A travelcard for Santiago 
 
There is an important “social benefit” of travelcards that is not achieved by the Transantiago 
fare system and would not be achieved with the reduced fares for frequent users explained 
above. White (1981 p18) states that travelcards… 
 
“…changed relative perceptions of costs. Cost perception for public transport is placed 
on a similar footing to that of a private car, and is made less direct, as the cost is 
incurred on a periodic basis rather than each time a trip is made. This may help to retain 
public transport patronage, and in some cases may assist diversion from cars to public 
transport. The practice may be extended by accepting renewal of travelcards by 
banker’s order, and thus making renewal virtually automatic.” 
 
This change in perception of costs does not occur when paying with a prepaid card, as the 
passenger still perceives the cost of each trip he makes. It could be argued that the 
perception of costs changes as the user has to charge the card in advance (probably doing 
so for several trips), and therefore does not pay (cash) at every trip. But this effect is lower 
than in the case of travelcards, when the payment is independent of the number of trips. 
 
Although recognising that Transantiago will strongly improve the pricing system of the public 
transport in Santiago (because of the fares’ integration), given the interesting characteristics 
of the travelcards analysed above, the implementation of a travelcard in Santiago is 
recommended here in order to improve its public transport fare system. 
 
Critical analysis of the introduction of travelcards in Santiago 
 
Contrary to the previous proposal of a reduced fare for frequent users’, travelcards do not 
present the difficulties discussed above. It does not imply a relevant complication in the fare 
structure because the old fare structure can be fully maintained. The travelcard is simply 
added as a new fare-product. As both single fares and the travelcard have a fixed price, 
there is no difficult in knowing its prices in advance. 
 
But there are other problems that would complicate the implementation of a travelcard in 
Santiago. Although very common in Europe, travelcards are completely unknown in Chile 
and, as far as the author knows, in Latin-America. This would imply a problem for the users, 
who would face a new type of public transport ticket. But a travelcard is a very simple ticket, 
and therefore it should be easy for the users’ to learn how to use it. Nevertheless, the fact 
that travelcards are unknown would produce a previous difficulty because the concept of a 
travelcard is also unknown for most of the decision-makers in Santiago. At the 
decision-maker level, the problems that can be expected are:  
 
                                                                                                                                        
relevant information for such an analysis (which is beyond the scope of this work). 
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• Travelcards are easily confused with multiple-trip coupons because of the name that 
is sometimes used in Spanish for travelcard: tarjeta multiviaje (literally translated into 
English: multiple-trip card). 
• At first view, there seems to be an obvious financial impact of travelcards: frequent 
users will buy the travelcard and pay less than previously, whereas less-frequent 
users will continue paying single fares. If this were true, the travelcard would 
necessarily have a negative effect on fare revenues. However, as discussed above, it 
is possible to find travelcard and single fare prices to make all users and operators 
better off than under a uniform single-price regime. 
• Finally, a new change in the fare structure could be politically interpreted as the 
recognition of a “failure” of the previous change (the introduction of Transantiago 
scheduled to occur by the beginning of 2007). However, it seems to be wise to wait 
some years after the introduction of this first pricing change before the 
implementation of a new change in the fare structure. This would allow the people to 
accustom themselves to the new fare system before changing it again, and in 
addition it would facilitate the acceptance of the decision-makers. 
 
Because of the reasons described above (especially the first and second ones), it would not 
be easy to convince the decision-makers of implementing a travelcard in Santiago. 
Nevertheless, the author thinks that the expected benefits of a travelcard are worth the 
effort. On the other hand, the fact that the decision-makers supported the implementation of 
Transantiago (a much more difficult and risky project) shows that the opportunity for 
important but difficult improvements in the public transport of Santiago (sometimes) exists. 
 
There is also a practical difficulty for the implementation of travelcards, namely that both the 
fare structure and the way in which the fare levels are determined are defined in the 
contracts between the transport ministry and the operators. As explained in chapter 2, this 
means that neither the authority nor the operators can change the fares at will. This 
procedure has been used since the first bus-operation tenders in Santiago in the early 
1990s. Previous to Transantiago, it would have been practically impossible for the authority 
to negotiate a change in the fare structure with the thousands of bus operators. However, 
the implementation of Transantiago reduced the number of operators to only 10 companies, 
making it possible to seriously discuss and agree such a change with them. Actually, a 
simplification of the fare structure for the first six months of operation of Transantiago 
(completely flat fare allowing up to three free transfers) was successfully agreed between the 
transport ministry and the operators. Given that the bus-operation concessions were given 
for different periods (between 2 and 19 years) it is not possible to wait until the end of all 
concessions to introduce changes in the future contracts in order to include a travelcard in 
the fare structure. Therefore, it is necessary to agree the introduction of a travelcard with the 
operators. However, if the travelcard has not been introduced yet at the time of the next 
tenders, we recommend including in those new contracts the possibility of having a 
travelcard in the future. 
 
The following characteristics of travelcards are important for the responsible authorities and 
the operators, and could be used as arguments to convince them of its benefits: 
 
• Every person owning a travelcard is not able to travel without paying anymore! 
Evasion is a common problem in public transport and Santiago is not an exception. 
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The experience elsewhere has shown that the massive use of travelcards is a good 
way to reduce evasion. Travelcards at special attractive conditions can be provided 
for specific groups where higher evasion levels are found (e.g. young people who are 
by nature more willing to accept risks). 
• Frequent users would benefit from a lower total fare and the possibility of making 
additional trips at zero cost if they buy the travelcard. Interestingly, most of the 
frequent users of the public transport system in Santiago belong to low-income 
families. This aspect should be of interest for the political authority as it represents a 
positive social policy. 
 
All difficulties discussed above, which are mainly political, seem to be soluble. But the 
introduction of travelcards needs also to be technically possible, for this idea to succeed. 
 
An electronic smartcard was massively introduced in Santiago with the implementation of 
Transantiago. Although it is currently only used as a prepaid card to pay single fares, a 
travelcard could be charged into this smartcard, as is done in London with the Oyster Card. 
Both travelcards use the same standard (Mifare), which is one of the more common 
standards for electronic smartcards. Therefore, no technological change seems to be 
needed in Santiago’s smartcard in order to use it also as a travelcard. 
 
Associated with the electronic smartcard, a selling and charging network was implemented, 
with more than 1,000 points where it can be charged throughout Santiago. This network 
could obviously also be used to sell and charge travelcards into the smartcard. 
 
There are several public transport operators in Santiago and the revenue generated by 
travelcard sales would have to be divided and distributed among them. Transantiago 
introduced an integrated fare scheme, implying that there are rules defined in the contracts 
about the distribution of fare revenues among the operators. As explained in chapter 2, 
prices for several fare products are determined with the aim of covering overall costs (see 
equations 1 and 2). The travelcards revenue would simply have to be added to the overall 
incomes of the system in equation (1). For instance, if there is only one travelcard product, 
the total income of the system (I) in equation (1) could be written as 
 
   TCTC
i
ii fdfdI ⋅+⋅=∑   , (3) 
 
where dTC and fTC are the demand and price of the travelcard, respectively, and di and fi the 
demand and price of the rest of the fare products. Thus, the travelcard is just one additional 
fare product and is handled as every other fare products without producing any new 
complication. 
 
As seen, there seem to be no important technical problems for a successful implementation 
of a travelcard in Santiago. On the contrary, the integrated fare system, electronic smartcard 
and charging network introduced by Transantiago make the implementation of a travelcard 
particularly easy. 
 
No one of the three conditions described above existed before the implementation of 
Transantiago. In fact, fares were paid in cash, no network existed for public transport ticket 
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sales (with the exception of the metro stations) and no revenue-distribution scheme among 
operators existed. There were thousands of bus operators and every bus produced its own 
revenue through the fares directly paid by the passengers to the driver. As there was no 
integrated fare and thousands of operators, the implementation of travelcards would have 
been absolutely impossible with the previous public transport organisation. 
 
Finally, travelcards would produce the following impacts from the users’ viewpoint: 
 
• A change in the fare structure will always imply a new complication, at least initially. 
Something new has to be understood and learnt. However, if the old fare system is 
maintained unaltered (what is perfectly possible when introducing a travelcard), the 
impact of the new fare product will be soften as people will not be forced to change 
immediately to it. They can simply ignore the travelcard at the beginning and continue 
paying as before. 
• Frequent users would benefit from a lower total fare and the possibility of making 
additional trips at zero cost as explained before. 
• There is a group of “less intensive” users for which the cost of the travelcard is more 
or less the same as the accumulated cost of their trips if paying single fares. For 
them it is indifferent if they buy the travelcard or continue paying single fares, in 
terms of their expenditure. Nevertheless, if they buy the travelcard they would benefit 
of the possibility of making additional trips at zero cost. 
• Infrequent users could be worse off if single fares are increased after the introduction 
of travelcards. This could be an important negative aspect. If single fares remain 
unaltered, then the introduction of travelcards would not affect them. 
 
Price and implementation strategy 
 
Prices of travelcards and single fares are commonly determined using a simple relation 
between them (e.g. the price of a monthly travelcard may be 35 times the price of the single 
fare). Interestingly, Carbajo (1988) developed a microeconomic framework to jointly 
determine optimal prices for a travelcard and a single fare. Considering only one period (i.e. 
ignoring differences between peak and off-peak), he obtains mathematical solutions for the 
optimal prices under different policy objectives as maximum profit or the maximisation of 
social benefit subject to a financial constraint. The use of such kind of models to estimate 
optimal fares should be used if travelcards are introduced in Santiago. 
 
White (1981 pp17-18) argued that the massive use of travelcards produce several benefits, 
for example: 
• Reduction in stopping times because of quicker boarding (implying both lower travel 
times and lower operating costs). 
• Simplification of cash handling and control through payment in advance. 
• Improvement in cash flow because revenue received in advance is equivalent to a 
saving of interest on short-term borrowing. 
• The possibility of network rationalisation as a result of reducing passenger 
interchange penalties. 
 
However, in the case of Santiago all these benefits will already by (partially) achieved 
through the massive use of an electronic smartcard after the implementation of 
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Transantiago13. Therefore, the achievement of a very high market penetration with the 
travelcard would not be an imperative task, as it has been in other metropolitan areas 
before.  
 
Nevertheless, the introductory strategy suggested by White (1981) to achieve high market 
penetration could still be used in Santiago to promote the use of the travelcard and 
accelerate its introduction: The price of the travelcard should be initially low, and then it 
should be increased until the long-term price defined for it is reached. Given the low (in 
absolute terms) price-elasticity of the travelcard (see Appendix A) this strategy should 
produce a higher travelcard use than if the long-term price was charged from the beginning. 
 
Another typical measure to promote the use of travelcards is to increase the value of single 
fares. However, an increase of the single fares because of the introduction of travelcards 
would be politically difficult to accept in Santiago, as it would be perceived as a direct fare 
increase. In addition, it is easy to predict that higher single fares would reduce public 
transport use by infrequent travellers (although the complete scheme could still produce 
demand increases). 
 
Is it possible to have a cheap single fare for travellers who use the public transport system 
infrequently but giving frequent users a pecuniary incentive (higher single fare) to buy the 
travelcard? 
 
If an electronic smartcard is massively used, it is possible to define a differentiated single 
fare whose value depends on the number of trips made before. For example, let us assume 
that there was a flat single fare at a price P before the travelcard was introduced. After the 
implementation of the travelcard, the single fare could have the following price structure: 
 
• P if the passenger made up to 20 trips in the last 30 days 
• 1.2P if the passenger made between 21 and 40 trips in the last 30 days 
• 1.4P if the passenger made more than 40 trips in the last 30 days 
 
With this single-fare structure, an infrequent user would not perceive an increase of its travel 
costs, whereas a frequent user would have to pay a higher single fare and therefore would 
have a pecuniary incentive to change to the travelcard. 
 
The capacity of smartcards to record the information of previous trips over a long period of 
time (months) is a key condition for this differentiated single fare scheme. It is absolutely 
impossible to implement a differentiated single fare if it is paid in cash. As explained before, 
a new smartcard will be massively used in Santiago, providing the fundamental condition for 
a differentiated single fare as described here. 
 
There is one problem that could be serious enough to make this differentiated single-fare 
strategy fail, and needs therefore to be carefully analysed before implementing it. If a 
passenger acquires several smartcards, he may pay always the cheaper single fare, even if 
he makes a lot of trips. Following the previous example, a person who wants to make 60 
trips per month could acquire 3 smartcards and pay 20 trips with each card. By doing so, he 
                                            
13
 Users without a smartcard will only be able to pay in cash in some buses, but at a higher fare and without the 
possibility of the integrated reduced fares when transferring. 
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would always face the cheapest single fare P. Although the electronic smartcard will not be 
given free of charge, its cost has to be paid only once and therefore does not completely 
avoid this problem. 
 
In addition, the implementation of this scheme would have some other difficulties that, being 
not as potentially serious as the previous problem, should be taken into account. The same 
difficulties as the above proposed reduced fares for frequent users would appear, as both 
ideas take advantage of the capacity of smartcards to store trips history and change the 
prices according to this record: fare structure would become more complicated and 
passengers would sometimes be uncertain about the price of the next trip. Another difficulty 
would arise before its implementation: Decision-makers may be sceptic about a fare product 
that increases it value when it is frequently used, as this sounds counterintuitive. 
Nevertheless, the author recommends considering the differentiated single-fare idea in the 
design of an eventual travelcard scheme for Santiago. It has to be emphasised that the 
differentiated single fare is not imperative for the introduction of a travelcard in Santiago. 
 
Expected impact on demand and additional comments 
 
As several (but not all) of the benefits of travelcards will already be partially achieved in 
Santiago due to the use of an electronic smartcard, the impact on public transport demand 
of the introduction of a travelcard is expected to be lower in Santiago than elsewhere. The 
reported patronage increases due to the implementation of a travelcard ranged between 
4.5 % and more than 20 %, as reviewed above in this section. In the case of Santiago the 
eventual patronage increase should be expected in the lower end of this range. 
 
Finally, there are interesting special “offers” that usually accompany travelcards. They can 
be really very imaginative and original, but some of them have already become typical. The 
eventual inclusion of some of these extras should be analysed before introducing a 
travelcard in Santiago. Sometimes travelcards with and without the extras are offered (at 
different prices) simultaneously. The following is a list of travelcards “extras” found in 
different cases: 
 
1. A second person and/or children can travel for free on the weekends and on 
weekdays after, let’s say, 20:00 using the same travelcard. 
2. The spatial coverage of the travelcard is extended in some off-peak periods. 
3. A bicycle can be taken along for free. 
4. Paying a supplement you can use better services (e.g. first class in local trains) or 
extend the spatial coverage of the travelcard. 
5. Mobility guarantee: if your bus or train is delayed more than, for instance, 30 minutes, 
you can take a taxi and let the travelcard provider pay for the taxi (with some price 
limit). 
6. If your clothes get dirty because the vehicle was not clean enough, you can let the 
travelcard provider pay you the laundry bill back (BVG – Berlin). 
 
Interesting is also the case of travelcards for university-students in Germany 
(Semesterticket). The public transport authorities and operators negotiate with the 
universities the provision of a special travelcard for the students, which is valid for the whole 
term and has to be paid by all the students as part of their fees. If the university accepts the 
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travelcard (which is the typical case), no student can reject paying for the travelcard, even if 
he/she does not want to use the public transport system (e.g. because he/she owns a car). 
So a strong incentive for the use of public transport is given to the students. Moreover, as 
the ticket is also bought by some students who are not going to use the public transport 
frequently, it can be offered at a very attractive price. For instance, in the Rhein-Ruhr-Region 
the travelcard for students costs approximately a third of a normal city-travelcard, and allows 
travelling in a much wider area (the whole Rhein-Ruhr-Region). 
 
 
8.3.3 Relation between fare and trip length 
 
None of the analysed fares structures shows a direct relationship between the travelled 
distance and the fare. Nevertheless, some of them seem to have an implicit relationship 
through fares zone systems in which trips passing through more zones are more expensive 
than trips using fewer zones. As explained before, Berlin is planning a new fares’ system in 
which the prices would be exactly related to trip length, but it is not certain yet if this change 
will be made. 
 
But let us analyse to which extent the current fares are related with the distance travelled. 
Table 8.11 summarises the number of fare zones used in each metropolitan area, together 
with the population and area of the capital cities. 
 
Table 8.11: Population, Area and Fare Zones in Each Metropolitan Area 
Metropolitan area Population (million) 
Area 
(km2) Fare zones 
Gran Santiago 5.7  648  1 (a) 
Greater London 7.3  1,560  6/1 (b) 
Berlin 3.4  892  1 (c) 
Madrid City 3.1  606  1 
Madrid Region 5.7  8,028  6 
(a)
 After Transantiago’s implementation cheaper fares for local trips inside specific areas will exist, but 
fares will not be related with the number of zones travelled. (b) 6 zones for metro, DLR and rail, 1 zone for 
buses and trams. (c) Berlin is divided into two internal zones (A and B) plus a third peripheral zone (C), but 
inside Berlin tickets are offered only for zones A and B together. 
 
Santiago has a single-zone flat fare, totally independent of the trip length. The 
implementation of Transantiago will introduce 10 different zones, but these are not fare 
zones as used in the European metropolitan areas, but local service zones, each one of 
them being operated by a different company. Longer trips travelling over several zones will 
be provided by the main bus services or metro lines, having a flat fare independent of the 
distance travelled. Nevertheless, there will be some relationship between trip length and 
fare, as local trips inside one local area using only local services will have a cheaper fare. 
This fare will be exactly the same in all areas and will also not depend on the distance 
travelled. 
 
Madrid has 6 fare zones in the whole Region, but in Madrid City itself there is only one 
single zone, i.e. a flat fare. 
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The fare system in Berlin has three zones (A, B and C) with Berlin itself being divided into 
the fare zones A and B, whereas the additional fare zone C corresponds to the surroundings 
of Berlin. However no tickets for zone A are offered, being zone A+B the smallest zone 
available. The reason for the existence of zones A and B is explained by the fares for trips 
with origin or destination outside Berlin (in zone C). Those trips have a higher fare if they use 
the city centre (zone A) than if they only use zones B and C. So considering only the trips 
inside Berlin, i.e. trips with origin and destination in zones A or B, the fare structure is a flat 
fare. Moreover, the prices of the tickets for zones AB, BC and ABC are quite similar, with 
less than 20 % of difference. The only exception to this “almost” flat fare is a ticket valid for 
very short trips (Kurzstrecke) that allows travelling over 3 to 6 stops at a reduced fare (55 % 
of the normal single fare). 
 
As explained before, there are 6 fare zones in Greater London, but these are not relevant 
for all public transport modes. Only the underground, DLR and national rail use the zone 
fares whereas buses and trams have a completely flat fare over all Greater London. Though, 
it has to be said that buses and trams are mainly used for shorter trips, because of their 
lower speeds in comparison to the underground, DLR and rail. While buses had an average 
commercial speed of 17 km/h, the figures for the underground, DLR and national rail were 
32 km/h, 29 km/h and 56 km/h respectively. So in 2004, the average length of bus and tram 
trips was 3.8 km and 5.2 km, while the average trip length in the underground was 7.8 km 
(TfL, 2005d). Moreover, 80 % of the national rail trips were more than 10 km long, and from 
them 30 % more than 16 km long. 
 
The cheapest tickets for travelling in the central zones of London are offered for fare zones 1 
and 2. Again, as was the case in Berlin, tickets for the smallest zone 1 (alone) are normally 
not sold, although some exceptions exist in the case of single fares. The main reason for the 
existence of zone 1 is that travelcards and single tickets that do not use this zone are offered 
at cheaper prices than similar tickets that include zone 1, similar to the situation in Berlin. 
Zones 1 and 2 cover an estimated area of some 200 km2. 
 
In Santiago, a high proportion of low income families live in the peripheral zones of the 
metropolitan area, as is typical in Latin-American and some African cities (Gwilliam, 2005 
p2). Therefore, there are “social” arguments in favour of not charging higher prices for 
longer trips. However, these flat fares may yield poorer services in the periphery, as Gwilliam 
states, as operators could shorten their services. This is an interesting point that should be 
considered when making recommendations about flat or distance related fares. However, 
this negative impact of flat fares has not been observed in Santiago, even when bus services 
were completely deregulated in the 1980s. Given that public transport services are currently 
regulated and (mainly) defined by the authority, service shortening because of flat fares is 
highly improbable to occur. 
 
Balcombe et al. (2004 p62) reports a case where a distance-related fare was changed into a 
flat fare in the Brighton area (England). They state that the scheme has been popular with 
passengers, as they now know exactly the cost of the fare. The scheme produced a year on 
year patronage growth of 8.5 %, in spite of the increase on the average fare that it meant. 
 
And what does the public transport pricing theory say about this issue? A deep revision 
and discussion of the pricing theory in urban public transport services was made by 
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Gschwender (2000) and then summarised in Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2005). About the 
relationship between fares and trip length, they show that a first theoretical analysis 
considering only the operators’ costs yields that the optimal fare should increase with the trip 
length. However, this common analysis is not complete, because it ignores that beside the 
operators also the users supply an important input for the production of trips: their time. In 
fact, the inclusion of users’ time in the analysis produces surprising results. In certain cases, 
even an optimal fare that decreases with the trip length is found (Jara-Díaz and 
Gschwender, 2005 p456). Therefore, the authors make the following recommendation: 
 
“As there is no clear relationship between optimal fare and trip length for a given route, 
flat fares seem to be a good option. Moreover, a flat fare is easier and cheaper to 
implement. Nevertheless, if routes with different lengths exist, it may be reasonable to 
have higher flat fares on the longer routes because of operators’ costs.” (Jara-Díaz and 
Gschwender, 2005 p457) 
 
The fare structure (mostly flat fare) found in the three European capital cities analysed fits 
well with the previous recommendation. Moreover, the fare structure in Santiago both before 
and after Transantiago seems also to be concordant with the here very briefly described 
public transport pricing theory. Therefore, considering both the practical evidence and the 
theoretical arguments discussed above, the recommendation for Santiago is to maintain a 
mostly flat fare like the one designed for Transantiago. A completely flat fare would also be a 
good option. 
 
 
8.3.4 Reduced fares in specific periods or areas 
 
In some of the metropolitan areas, the public transport fare structure includes reduced fares 
in specific periods or areas. From the four capital cities analysed only Madrid does not have 
time-related reductions in its public transport fares. 
 
In the case of Santiago, the metro had a 20 % reduced fare in the off-peak periods. 
However this time-fare-differentiation should be ended with the introduction of the new 
integrated fare system of Transantiago, which does not consider time-related price 
reductions in the fare structure defined in the contracts. In Greater London there are 20 % 
to 45 % reduced single fares in buses, trams, underground and DLR in off-peak periods. 
Moreover 20 % to 50 % reduced one-day and 3-day travelcards are also available (on 
weekdays they can only be used after the morning peak period). Berlin also has a 26 % 
reduced monthly travelcard that allows travelling after 10:00 on weekdays and anytime at the 
weekends. 
 
Interestingly, also zone-related reduced fares can be found in Greater London, where 
cheaper fares are available for trips that do not use the central zone of Greater London both 
for Tube/DLR single fares and monthly travelcards. For instance Tube/DLR single fares have 
a cost between € 2.3 and € 5.3 (depending on the number of zones) when using zone 1, and 
between € 1.5 and € 2.7 when not. The fare structure in Greater London clearly penalises 
the use of zone 1 through higher fares. This situation can be interpreted as an attempt to 
have higher prices in those parts of the lines where more demand exist, i.e. higher fares in 
the more congested sections of the public transport lines.  
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Although not so clear as in London, a similar situation is found in Madrid, in the case of the 
travelcard prices. A travelcard allowing trips in zones B1 and B2, but not in zone A (Madrid 
City) is 35 % cheaper than the travelcard valid for zones A, B1 and B2, 26 % cheaper than 
the A and B1 travelcard, and even 15 % cheaper than the travelcard for zone A. But in this 
case the difference is between the prices in Madrid City (zone A) and the surrounding areas 
of the region, not inside the capital city, as was the case in London. 
 
In Berlin, the prices of tickets and travelcards including zones AB, BC and ABC are similar 
and in some cases tickets BC are even slightly cheaper than AB (e.g. daily travelcard). 
Nevertheless, a fare penalisation of trips using zone A cannot be clearly recognised. In the 
case of Santiago, neither before nor after the introduction of Transantiago can any form of 
zone-related reduced fares be recognised, in terms of cheaper fares in the more congested 
sections of the public transport lines. 
 
Theoretical considerations and recommendations for Santiago 
 
There are two theoretical reasons why different fares should exist between peak and 
off-peak periods: 
 
• Firstly, price-elasticity is normally lower (in absolute terms) in the peak than in 
off-peak periods, because there are more work trips in the peak, and work trips have 
usually lower price-elasticities (see Appendix A). Optimal pricing rules suggest that 
higher prices should be related with lower price-elasticities, according to what is 
known as the Ramsey Pricing Rule (Ramsey 1927; Gschwender, 2000 p65). 
Therefore, it does make theoretical sense to have lower fares in off-peak periods.  
• Secondly, there is usually spare capacity in off-peak periods, yielding an almost zero 
marginal cost for an extra passenger. But even if more vehicles have to be added in 
the off-peak (e.g. to increase de frequency), the incremental cost is much lower than 
if more vehicles had to be added in the peak. This is so because extra vehicles in the 
peak mean that new vehicles have to be bought, and that new drivers have to be 
contracted, whereas extra vehicles to run in the off-peak may be already available (if 
more vehicles are used in the peak than in the off-peak) and drivers could also be 
partially available (Jansson, 1980; Gschwender, 2000 p46). So reduced fares in 
off-peak periods may offer an incentive to some passengers to change their trips 
form the peak to the off-peak, when operating costs are lower.  
 
Thus there is a clear match between the pricing theory and the reduced fares in the off-peak 
found in some of the observed metropolitan areas. As a result, we recommend the 
implementation of different fares in peak and off-peak periods in the public transport system 
of Santiago. This could be done in the form of reduced fares in the off-peak and special 
fares for elderly valid only in off-peak periods (as existed in the metro before Transantiago), 
but also as reduced travelcards for off-peak periods, if travelcards are introduced in the 
future. 
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Both previous theoretical arguments could also be extended to the case of reduced fares 
outside city centres14. In fact: 
• city centres usually concentrate work trips and 
• the more congested sections of the public transport lines are also normally in the city 
centres. 
 
However, higher fares in the centre of Santiago would only be applicable if a zonal fare 
system was introduced (like in London). This has not been considered in Transantiago and is 
also not recommended here. Therefore, we do not recommend the introduction of 
zone-related reduced fares in Santiago. 
 
Critical analysis and impact estimation of time-related fare differentiation 
 
Interestingly, short before the implementation of Transantiago it was announced that the 
metro would have a 10 % higher fare in the peak hour15. The reason for this decision was 
the dramatic increase in the metro trips that the fare integration would produce. Eventually, 
its capacity could be exceed in the peak periods. Therefore buses should complement the 
metro in that periods and the fare difference between buses (which would not have a higher 
fare in the peak hour) and the metro should give an incentive to some users to avoid using 
the metro. In this case, the main impact of the scheme should be in the modal split of the 
public transport, moving users from the metro to buses. A small impact in the time-of-travel 
decision may also occur (passengers changing the time of travel to avoid the higher fare in 
the metro). 
 
A general price differentiation in the peak hour for all the public transport (buses and metro) 
as recommended above would not impact the public transport modal split, but would have a 
higher impact in the time-of-travel decision. In this case the main objective is to give an 
incentive to those who can change their time of travel to avoid peak periods. 
 
It has to be emphasised that both previous schemes (higher fare in metro than buses and 
higher fare in peak hour than off-peak periods on all public transport) can be combined, to 
achieve a high impact both in the public transport modal split and in the time-of-travel 
decision. For example, the value of the fares could be: 
 
• P in off-peak periods in both buses and the metro 
• 1.1P in peak periods in buses 
• 1.2P in peak periods if using the metro 
 
If peak and off-peak fares are to be differentiated, their new values should be calculated 
using adequate microeconomic pricing models. If the scheme is forced to have a neutral 
financial impact (which is highly probable in Santiago) and therefore maintain the revenue 
level, the peak fare would increase and the off-peak fare would decrease in comparison to 
the previous non-differentiated fare. Thus, users who normally travel in off-peak periods 
would benefit from a lower fare. On the contrary, the peak fare increase would produce a 
                                            
14
 It has to be emphasised that this zone-related price differentiation has absolutely no connection with the issue 
discussed above about the relationship between fare and trip length. 
15
 And it was also announced that the reduced fare for elderly people would be maintained in the metro in 
off-peak periods. 
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direct disbenefit to the passengers who continue travelling in the peak. And those who 
change their time-of-travel would also perceive a disbenefit because of that time change. 
Additionally, it has to be taken into account that an increase in the public transport fare in the 
peak hour can also have an impact in the general modal split encouraging car use in the 
most congested hour. 
 
What would be the impact in total demand and revenue of introducing a time-differentiated 
fare? This will of course depend on the extent in which the fares are changed. Nevertheless, 
a numerical exercise will help us to illustrate some interesting qualitative results. Let us 
assume an initial situation in which, for instance, 37 % of the public transport trips are made 
in peak periods and the other 63 % are made in off-peak16, with the same fare in both 
periods. If the peak fare is increased by 10 % and the off-peak fare is reduced by 5.9 %, the 
weighted average fare would be maintained. An estimation of the impact on demand that 
these changes produce can be made using price-elasticities for each period. We will use 
elasticity values in the middle of the ranges recommended by Litman (2004), both for the 
short and the long term (see Appendix A). As the demand will change, the total revenue will 
also be modified. 
 
Table 8.12 shows the results for the short-term elasticity. The demand is reduced by 2.3 % 
in the peak period and incremented by 2.6 % in the off-peak, yielding an overall demand 
growth of 0.8 %. The revenue in the peak period is increased by 7.5 %, whereas the 
off-peak revenue decreases by 3.4 %. As the fare changes are higher than the demand 
variations (which have opposite sign), the impact of revenue has the same sign that the fare 
change in each period. The overall revenue is increased by 0.6 %. 
 
Table 8.12: Impact of Time-Differentiated Single Fare on Demand and Revenue (Short Term) 
Period 
Initial trip 
distribution 
(%) 
Fare change 
(%) 
Price-
elasticity 
Impact on 
demand 
(%) 
Impact on 
revenue 
(%) 
Peak 37 10.0 -0.23 -2.3 7.5 
Off-peak 63 -5.9 -0.45 2.6 -3.4 
TOTAL 100   0.8 0.6 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Qualitatively, the same happens in the long term. But given the higher elasticities, the 
impacts on demand and revenue are more pronounced (table 8.13). In this case the overall 
demand growth is 1.5 % while the total revenue increases by 1.1 %. 
 
                                            
16
 These figures correspond to the motorised trips on a weekday in Santiago according to the last 
origin-destination survey (EOD, 2001). 
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Table 8.13: Impact of Time-Differentiated Single Fare on Demand and Revenue (Long Term) 
Period 
Initial trip 
distribution 
(%) 
Fare change 
(%) 
Price-
elasticity 
Impact on 
demand 
(%) 
Impact on 
revenue 
(%) 
Peak 37 10.0 -0.5 -5.0 4.5 
Off-peak 63 -5.9 -0.9 5.3 -0.9 
TOTAL 100   1.5 1.1 
Source: own elaboration 
 
This exercise shows that it is possible to increase both the demand and the revenue through 
the implementation of different fares in peak and off-peak periods. In general, an overall 
demand increase can be expected as a result of the fare differentiation between peak and 
off-peak periods because of the relative values that the price-elasticities have in those 
periods: Although the exact values may vary, the price-elasticity is always lower in the peak 
hour (when the fare increases) than in the off-peak (when the fare decreases), as explained 
above in this section. 
 
Although the fare changes of the numerical exercise were determined maintaining the 
weighted average fare (weighted considering the initial peak and off-peak trip distribution), a 
revenue increase was obtained due to the overall demand increase. However, this revenue 
increase does not necessarily happen for every fares selected. As further numerical 
simulation showed, the overall revenue decreased when the fare changes (always 
maintaining the weighted average fare) were large enough. How large the fare changes 
need to be depends on the relation between the peak and off-peak elasticities. If they are 
very different, a very large fare change is needed. But the opposite occur if they are closer. 
For example, if the peak elasticity is -0.40 and the off-peak elasticity is -0.45, the same fare 
changes used in the previous exercise (10 % increase in the peak fare and 5.9 % decrease 
in the off-peak fare) are enough to produce an overall revenue decrease. 
 
Finally, there seem to be no technical problems for the implementation of a 
time-differentiated single fare in Santiago. The fact that different fares in peak and off-peak 
periods will exist in the metro shows that the electronic smartcard used in Santiago is able to 
provide this kind of schemes.  
 
Political difficulties may arise, but at a much smaller extent than in the case of the travelcard, 
because the concept of higher prices in peak periods is known at the decision-making level. 
Nevertheless, the argument of “why should the user pay more (in the peak hour) when the 
service is worse (higher congestion)” has been repeatedly used in opposition to the higher 
peak prices charged in the new urban highways in Santiago, and would surely also be used 
in opposition to the here proposed scheme. However, time-differentiated prices exist in Chile 
in several other public services (e.g. telephone, electricity, water) and they are completely 
accepted. Moreover, higher peak-fares have been applied in the metro for more than 15 
years. 
 
From the users’ viewpoint, the fare structure would become more complicated. But users are 
already familiar with this scheme in the metro and therefore they should not have serious 
problems to accustom themselves to a time-differentiated fare in all public transport modes. 
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8.3.5 Average fare 
 
Now we want to compare the fares of the public transport in the analysed metropolitan 
areas. Which capital city has the more expensive (for the user) system? How does this 
change if we include into the analysis the facts that 
1. the disposable income of the people varies in the different metropolitan areas and 
2. the acquisition power of the money also varies among them? 
In order to do that, we will compare the average fares in the different metropolitan areas. 
 
The easiest way to calculate the average fare is by dividing the total fares’ revenue by the 
number of public transport trips (table 8.14). By doing so the average fare includes all type of 
fares: single fares and travelcards. The average fare in Santiago is slightly lower than the 
average fares in Berlin and Madrid, whereas the average fare in London is almost twice as 
high as the others. 
 
Table 8.14: Average Fare (a) 
Metropolitan area 
Yearly public 
transport trips 
(million) 
Revenue from 
ticket sales 
(million €/year) 
Average fare 
(€) 
Average fare 
(US$) 
Santiago     1,400 (b)      570 (c) 0.41 0.49 
Greater London 3,189 2,805 0.88 1.06 
Berlin 1,205 N/A    0.52 (d)    0.62 (d) 
Madrid Region 1,514 797 0.53 0.63 
(a) Data for years 2002 to 2004 (b) Shared-taxi trips not included. (c) Estimation. (d) Estimated only for BVG: 906 
million trips in 2004 (BVG, 2005b p3) and 468 million EUR fare income in the same year (SfS, 2006b p7) 
Source: own elaboration based on data of the previous chapters 
 
Given the important difference in the GDP per capita of Santiago and the three European 
capital cities (see table 8.15), it is interesting to include in the analysis of the average fare 
the effect of this difference. The idea is to compare the relation between the average fare 
and the average disposable income of the population, taking the GDP as a proxy for the 
disposable income. This gives an idea of how expensive the public transport is in relative 
terms. To do that, we assume a fictitious user that makes a certain amount of yearly public 
transport trips (for instance 600 trips/year) and calculate his total yearly expenditure in public 
transport fares, supposing that he pays the average fare. Then we divide this expenditure by 
the GDP per capita, yielding the relative importance of the average fare in the GDP per 
capita. It has to be emphasised that the aim of this analysis is not to accurately estimate the 
expenditures in mobility, but just to compare the relative fares in the different metropolitan 
areas. 
 
The results are presented in table 8.15. It can be seen that when the nominal GDP per 
capita is taken into account, the average fare in Santiago appears hugely higher than the 
average fares of the three European capital cities. The expenditure of our fictitious traveller 
represents 4.2 % of the GDP per capita in Santiago, in comparison to only 1.7 %, 1.1 % and 
1.4 % in London, Berlin and Madrid respectively. Normalising with respect to Santiago, it can 
be seen in the last column that the average fares in London, Berlin and Madrid vary between 
26 % and 42 % of the average fare in Santiago, when considering the disposable income of 
the population (using the GDP as a proxy). 
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Table 8.15: How Expensive is Public Transport in Each Metropolitan Area? – Nominal GDP 
Average fare * 600 / 
GDP per capita Metropolitan 
area 
GDP (nominal) 
per capita 2005 (a) 
(US$) 
Average 
fare 
(US$) % Normalised 
Santiago 7,040 0.49 4.2 100 
Greater London 36,599 1.06 1.7 42 
Berlin 33,922 0.62 1.1 26 
Madrid Region 27,226 0.63 1.4 33 
(a) Source: International Monetary Fund (2006a) 
 
But the analysis so far does not consider the different acquisition power of the money in the 
different countries. It is well known that one Euro may allow buying more things in one 
country than in another. To take this effect into account, economists developed purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which equalise the purchasing power of different 
currencies. One very simple example of an index that measures the PPP is the Big Mac 
index, introduced by The Economist newspaper in 1986. Instead of considering a basket of 
goods that can be bought in the different places, this informal index only considers the price 
of a single Big Mac, as sold by the McDonald’s fast food restaurant chain (University of 
British Columbia SSB, 2007).  
 
Table 8.16 shows the Big Mac index, i.e. the price of a Big Mac hamburger in the four 
metropolitan areas (The Economist, 2006) converted from the local currency to US$. The 
idea of the index is that you can buy exactly the same product (a Big Mac) in Santiago for 
US$ 2.94 and in London for US$ 3.65. Thus the purchasing power of a US$ is higher in 
Santiago than in London. In fact, US$ 2.94 in Santiago is equivalent to US$ 3.65 in London. 
Using this index, it is possible to correct the comparison of the average public transport 
fares. This can be done by simply dividing the fares by the respective Big Mac index and 
comparing the results. 
 
Table 8.16: How Expensive is Public Transport in Each Metropolitan Area? – Big Mac Index 
Metropolitan 
area 
Average fare 
(US$) 
Big Mac index 
May 2006 
(US$) 
Average fare / 
Big Mac index 
Average fare / 
Big Mac index 
(normalised) 
Santiago 0.49 2.94 0.166 100 
Greater London 1.06 3.65 0.289 174 
Berlin 0.62     3.77 (a) 0.164 99 
Madrid Region 0.63     3.77 (a) 0.168 101 
 
(a) The Big Mac index presents a single value for the entire Euro zone 
 
After dividing the average fares by the respective Big Mac index and normalising (last 
column in table 8.16) the average fares are surprisingly similar in Santiago, Berlin and 
Madrid, but some 74 % higher in London, after correcting the average fares in order to 
include the effect of the different acquisition power of the local currencies (through the 
use of the simple and informal Big Mac index). 
 
Finally, it is possible to include both previous corrections in the comparison of the average 
public transport fares: first the inclusion of the GDP per capita and second the inclusion of 
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the purchasing power of the local currency. This can be done using the GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) that is estimated by the International Monetary Fund, which 
reflects the cost of living in the different countries as explained before. GDP (PPP) is 
calculated in “international dollars”, a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same 
purchasing power that the U.S. dollar has in the United States. The international dollar 
shows how much a local currency unit is worth within the country’s borders (World Bank, 
2007). 
 
The same procedure used in table 8.15 is used now in table 8.17, but considering the GDP 
per capita at purchasing power parity. The results of this table show that when the 
disposable income of the population (using the GDP as a proxy) is taken into account 
together with the purchasing power of the local currency, the average fare in Santiago 
is still higher than the average fares of the three European capital cities. Now the average 
fares in London, Berlin and Madrid are between 50 % and 85 % of the average fare in 
Santiago, as can be seen in the last column. 
 
Table 8.17: How Expensive is Public Transport in Each Metropolitan Area? – GDP (PPP) (a) 
Average fare * 600 / 
GDP per capita Metropolitan 
area 
GDP (PPP) per 
capita 2005 (b) 
(international US$) 
Average 
fare 
(US$) % Normalised 
Santiago 11,937 0.49 2.5 100 
Greater London 30,470 1.06 2.1 85 
Berlin 30,579 0.62 1.2 50 
Madrid Region 26,320 0.63 1.4 59 
(a) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) is 
used. (b) Source: International Monetary Fund (2006a) 
 
This exercise clearly refutes a wrong belief that is common in Santiago, namely that the 
fares of its public transport system are lower than the fares of the public transport in 
European metropolitan areas. This wrong idea comes from a too superficial analysis: the 
simple comparison of the single fares (which actually are higher in Europe than in Santiago) 
without considering the importance of European travelcards that give frequent travellers a 
better value for money. But as table 8.14 and table 8.16 show, the average public transport 
fares (including both single tickets and travelcard users) are very similar in Santiago, Berlin 
and Madrid. And when the GDP per capita is included in the analysis (as a proxy of the 
disposable income) the average fare in Santiago is even higher than in London. This 
happens mainly because of the lower GDP per capita in Santiago, both when considering 
the nominal GDP (table 8.15) and the GDP at purchasing power parity (table 8.17). 
Comparing only the European metropolitan areas, London presents a higher fare than Berlin 
and Madrid under all the analyses made. 
 
 
8.3.6 Subsidies and financial equilibrium 
 
The public transport systems in London, Berlin and Madrid receive important subsidies for 
their operation (table 8.18). This is not the case in Santiago, where there is no operational 
subsidy and the public transport system (buses and metro) has to cover all its operational 
costs through fares incomes and other minor incomes (e.g. publicity). The absence of 
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operational subsidies for urban public transport is a common situation in Latin-American 
countries, especially in metropolitan areas without urban rail systems. This is a political 
decision that has normally to be considered as a border restriction for public transport 
planning. In the case of Santiago, the last operational subsidies were received by Metro in 
the 1990s. Metro reached financial equilibrium covering its operational costs without financial 
support by the central government, as wanted by the economic policies of the government. 
Private bus operators did not receive subsidies, at least not in the last 30 years. The new 
integrated public transport system Transantiago does also not consider any financial support 
for the operation of the services. 
 
Table 8.18: Operation Costs, Fare Revenues and Subsidies 
Metropolitan 
area 
Year 
Operation 
costs 
(€ mill./year) 
Revenue from 
ticket sales 
(€ mill./year) 
Subsidies 
(€ mill./year) 
Relation between 
subsidy and 
operation costs (%) 
Santiago 2003 N/A  570 (a)  0  0 
Greater London (b) 2003 7,200  3,450  4,200  58 
Berlin (c) 2004 994  468  420  42 
Madrid Region 2003 1,255  623  667  53 
(a)
 Estimation. (b) Data for Transport for London including street management and infrastructure 
investment. (c) Data for BVG (underground, buses and trams) 
Source: own elaboration based on data of this and previous chapters 
 
But there are good economic justifications for public transport operational subsidies. 
Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2005) show that a careful optimal pricing analysis in urban 
public transport yields lower optimal fares than the average cost, implying that a subsidy is 
necessary. This happens because the relevant cost (users’ and operators’ costs) increases 
less than proportional with the demand, i.e. there are decreasing average costs and scale 
economies. The underpricing of cars, an alternative mode, is an additional argument in the 
direction of public transport subsidy. So public transport subsidies should not be seen only 
as a burden on the public budget, but also as a correct (economically justified) decision. 
 
The high levels of subsidy in the reviewed European capital cities (about 50 % of the 
operational costs) make it very difficult to imagine how public transport could be operated 
without subsidies. But this actually happens in many Latin-American metropolitan areas. 
How is it possible for public transport systems there to operate without subsidies? One 
possible explanation could be the typically worse quality of public transport in Latin-America 
(e.g. older vehicles). However there are at least a few examples of high quality services in 
Latin-America that also operate without subsidy, for instance the metro in Santiago, and the 
Bus Rapid Transit system Transmilenio in Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
In addition to the lower quality of the public transport systems in Latin-America, there are 
other reasons that explain why it is possible there to operate without subsidies: 
 
1. Labour costs are cheaper in Latin-America than in Europe, and labour costs are an 
important part of the operating costs of a public transport company. For example, in 
Santiago the costs of drivers represent about 30 % of the total operating costs of the 
bus system (Sectra, 2003), whereas in Germany drivers can represent up to 70 % 
(Leuthardt, 1998) of the total costs (in both cases including the capital costs of the 
vehicles). 
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2. The vehicles used in Latin-America are normally cheaper than those used in Europe, 
because of different technological standards, for instance, high-floor vehicles in 
Latin-America and low-floor vehicles in Europe. 
3. The occupancy factor of the public transport vehicles in Latin-America is higher 
than in Europe due to the acceptance of higher crowding levels inside the vehicles 
there. Comfort inside public transport vehicles receives much more attention in 
Europe than in Latin-America. For instance, CRTM in Madrid has the aim of reducing 
passenger density inside their vehicles to 3.5 people/m2 (Cristóbal-Pinto, 2005), while 
values of up to 6 people/m2 are typically considered in Latin-America. Moreover, 
high-capacity systems (e.g. metro) are much wider provided in the European 
metropolitan areas than in Latin-America. The European metropolitan areas accept to 
build metro lines in corridors with much lower demands than what would be 
necessary for a Latin-American metropolitan area to invest in a high-demand rail 
system. In addition, a higher population density in Latin-American metropolitan 
areas could also help explaining the possibility of zero operational subsidies for the 
public transport. 
 
It is often wrongly argued that the total demand for public transport is higher in 
Latin-American metropolitan areas than in Europe. However, the total demand for public 
transport and the number of public transport trips per inhabitant are not higher in Santiago 
than in the European capital cities reviewed, as we showed in section 6.2. 
 
Subsidies in Santiago? 
 
The fact that operational subsidies for public transport are given in European metropolitan 
areas can be understood as a recognition of their economic justification, and also as an 
explicit policy decision in order to promote the use of public transport (obviously the 
subsidies allow a better quality of the system). Because of these reasons, operational 
subsidies for the public transport are also recommended here for Santiago. 
 
However, the political opposition to a direct subsidy for the operation of public transport in 
Santiago would be huge. It cannot be ignore that there is a general economic policy in Chile 
that tries to avoid direct subsidies as much as possible. For example, the fact that Metro 
does not receive operational subsidies since the 1990s is seen as a great success of the 
company. Even more, Metro is increasingly financing part of the new infrastructure (new 
metro lines). The absence of an operational subsidy and the partial financing of its new 
infrastructure are perceived as extremely positive characteristics of Metro. Both 
characteristics obviously have an impact in the users’ fare. 
 
In the case of the bus system, users will also pay part of the new infrastructure for 
Transantiago. For instance, some segregated busways are being built through public-private 
partnerships, in which a concessionary has to finance and construct the works and then 
maintain it over some period (e.g. 20 years). The payments that the private concessionary 
will receive over the concession period are fully charged to the public transport fare. There 
are even cases in which a cross-subsidy from public transport users to car users exist, 
because the works will benefit both the public transport and the private car, but will be paid 
only by the public transport fare. The regressive characteristic of this cross-subsidy is 
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evident, as public transport users in Santiago mostly belong to medium and low-income 
families. 
 
In the author’s opinion, there seems to be some kind of implicit agreement between the main 
political parties in Chile about avoiding direct subsidies17 in order to reduce “unnecessary” 
fiscal expenditure. This consensus applies not only to transport policies. But at the same 
time, a cross-subsidy is absolutely not a matter of concern as far as it does not affect fiscal 
expenditure. 
 
Thus a direct operational subsidy for the public transport is very unlikely to be accepted at 
the decision-making level in the short term. Nevertheless, its convenience and justification 
have to be highlighted in order to increase the possibility of its implementation in the medium 
or long term. A more likely alternative for the short term could be a “cross-subsidy” for the 
public transport that would not imply a direct fiscal expenditure. 
 
Cross-subsidies for the public transport 
 
A possibility to introduce a subsidy in Santiago could arise if a congestion-charging scheme 
similar to the one in London is introduced. Such a scheme is being studied in the 
transportation planning agencies, although no political decision exists yet. If it is introduced, 
the revenues of the congestion charging (or at least a part of it) should be used to improve 
the public transport system implying a cross-subsidy from car users to the public transport, 
as is the case in Greater London. This would help those users that decide not to use the car 
anymore because of the charge, giving them better public transport services. In addition, an 
improvement of the public transport services through this subsidy would complement the 
congestion-charging scheme, because users facing a better public transport AND a more 
expensive private transport will probably be more willing to change to public transport. 
 
But the implementation of congestion charging in Santiago would not be an easy task. 
Again, the main difficulty would be at the political level, where generalised opposition already 
made fail a similar initiative presented by the government to the congress at the beginning of 
the 1990s, after several years of analysis and discussion. Now, the fact that a 
world-metropolis like London successfully operates a congestion-charging scheme would 
surely be very helpful in order to convince the decision-makers about the convenience of the 
measure. 
 
Another interesting idea to finance a subsidy for the operation of the public transport was 
found in London. It was proposed there that penalty charges for enforcement of traffic rules 
could be partially used to finance public transport (e.g. penalties to cars using bus lanes), 
generating a cross-subsidy in benefit of public transport. This would require a law 
modification and is therefore neither easy nor quick to implement in Santiago. Nevertheless, 
the author believes that this measure could have a better chance to succeed in comparison 
to the other discussed so far. 
 
 
                                            
17
 The political parties from which the author would expect opposition to the idea of a direct subsidy for the 
operation of public transport received almost 85 % of the votes in the last parliamentary election in 2005 
(diputados). This represents both the parties in the government and in the conservative opposition. 
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Cross-subsidies “against” the public transport 
 
On the other hand, regressive cross-subsidies that have a negative impact on public 
transport users should be avoided. The case of infrastructure paid by public transport users 
that also benefit car users was already discussed above. 
 
Another regressive cross-subsidy exists in Santiago in the case of the reduced fares for 
students. Public transport operators receive no compensation for these lower fares implying 
a cross-subsidy between passengers paying the full fare and those that pay the reduced 
fare. But public transport users paying the full fare are mainly poorer people (those who do 
not have a car), whereas students, especially at the higher educational levels (e.g. 
universities), come mainly from middle and high-income households. Thus it can be seen 
that this cross-subsidy is regressive18. 
 
This issue is solved in a very simple way in other metropolitan areas. For example, the public 
transport system of Berlin receives an explicit subsidy because of the existence of reduced 
fares for certain groups (e.g. students and disabled people). The BVG (operator of metro, 
tram and buses in Berlin) received € 91 million from the Federal State of Berlin through this 
subsidy in 2004, as a compensation for the reduced fares offered (BVG, 2004j, 2006e pp25-
26). 
 
Following this experience, we recommended here to maintain the reduced students’ fare in 
Santiago, but incorporating an explicit compensation for the public transport system, in order 
to eliminate the regressive cross-subsidy. To achieve this, this regressive cross-subsidy 
needs to be clearly identified and made known first. The decision-makers in Santiago seem 
not to be aware of its existence and as long as this unconsciousness remains, it will be 
impossible to correct the problem. But if it is recognised and understood, there should be a 
political interest in finishing it. In fact, the correction of this regressive cross-subsidy, even if 
it requires a direct subsidy from the government, seems to be much more feasible than the 
implementation of a general subsidy for the public transport. In order to increase the success 
probability of this measure, it should be highlighted that this is a subsidy for the educational 
system, i.e. a subsidy that benefits students and schoolchildren, and not a subsidy for the 
public transport operators. Given that subsidies for the educational system are common in 
Chile, this should be easier to accept at the decision-making level. 
 
Impacts on demand and additional comments 
 
A subsidy for the operation of the public transport in Santiago would have a positive impact 
on demand. If the subsidy is totally used to reduce the fare, its impact on demand could be 
estimated using the fare elasticities reviewed in Appendix A. This impact would obviously 
depend on the subsidy level. 
 
As an example, let us assume a subsidy of 10 % of the total fare revenue, which is 
estimated in € 570 million per year (table 8.18). This would imply a subsidy of € 57 million 
per year. If it is totally used to reduce the fares, it can be assumed that all fares will be 
                                            
18
 A similar situation is described by Gwilliam (2005 p2) for the metropolitan area of Dakar in Senegal, where 
middle class students were found to be the main beneficiaries of reduced fares. There, the imposition of reduced 
fares without direct compensation to the operator had a negative effect on service quality. 
Chapter 8 Fares’ Structure in the Public Transport: European Experiences and Recommendations for Santiago 149 
 
reduced by 10 %. Assuming fare-elasticity values in the middle of the ranges recommended 
by Litman (2004), the impact on demand is an increase of 3.5 % in the short term and 7.5 % 
in the long term (table 8.19). In absence of a demand growth, the fare revenue with the 
reduced fare would obviously be 90 % of the initial figure. But as the demand increases, the 
final fare revenues are higher than that: 93.2 % in the short term and 96.8 % in the long 
term. As a result, the total income (fare revenue + subsidy) has an increase of 3.2 % (€ 18.0 
million per year) in the short term and 6.8 % (€ 38.5 million per year) in the long term. 
 
Table 8.19: Impact of a Subsidy on Demand and Revenue (Overall Fare Changes) 
Term 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Fare change 
(%) 
Price-elasticity 
short term 
Impact on 
demand 
(%) 
Final fare 
revenue 
(%) 
Short term 10.0 -10.0 -0.35 3.5 93.2 
Long term 10.0 -10.0 -0.75 7.5 96.8 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The demand growth would also imply that the capacity of the system would have to grow 
(more vehicles, more frequency). Therefore, at least part of the higher income would have to 
be used to increase the capacity. 
 
To avoid the necessity of important service expansions (and their costs), the subsidy could 
be used to reduce the off-peak fare only. Assuming that 63 % of the trips are made in 
off-peak periods and that the same subsidy is provided (€ 57 million per year), the off-peak 
fare has to be reduced by 15.9 % to “compensate” the subsidy and maintain (initially) the 
total income19. Following the same procedure as for the example above, the demand 
increases (only in off-peak periods) in the short and long term are estimated (table 8.20), 
yielding slightly higher final fare revenues that in the previous case. Now the total income 
(fare revenue + subsidy) has an increase of 3.8 % (€ 21.6 million per year) in the short term 
and 7.6 % (€ 43.2 million per year) in the long term. But as only off-peak demand increased 
in this example, the cost of the necessary service expansions would be much lower than in 
the case of an overall fare reduction. Therefore, the extra funds could be used to improve 
the quality of the service. 
 
Table 8.20: Impact of a Subsidy on Demand and Revenue (Off-Peak Fare Changes) 
Term 
Subsidy (a) 
(%) 
Fare change 
(%) 
Price-elasticity 
short term 
Impact on 
demand 
(%) 
Final fare 
revenue 
(%) 
Short term 10.0 -15.9 -0.45 7.1 93.8 
Long term 10.0 -15.9 -0.90 14.3 97.6 
(a): As a percentage of the total fare income previous to the subsidy 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The reduction in the off-peak fare could have an impact in the peak demand (some 
passengers could change their time-of-travel). However, this effect is ignored in this 
example, as only an off-peak fare-elasticity is used. A cross-elasticity representing the 
                                            
19
 A 15.9 % reduction in the fare paid by 63 % of the trips yields a revenue decrease of 10 % (0.159 * 0.63 = 0.1) 
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impact on peak demand of an off-peak fare change would be needed to take this effect into 
account. 
 
It has to be noticed, that a subsidy could also be used to directly improve the service 
(instead or in addition to a fare reduction). Special attention should be put in the possibility of 
increasing the frequencies of bus services in order to reduce the occupation levels of the 
public transport vehicles. This is important because comfort will become more and more 
important for public transport users, as income and motorisation rates increase. In fact, the 
number of captive public transport users will continue decreasing, and travellers will become 
more sensitive to crowding inside the vehicles. The European experiences show that their 
successful public transport systems have lower passenger densities inside the vehicles than 
typically accepted in Latin-American metropolitan areas. 
 
The way in which an operational subsidy is given has to be carefully designed, in order to 
avoid negative incentives. For example, as stated by Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2005 
p458), various authors found that a subsidised public transport operation may increase 
operational costs, because of higher salaries and productivity reductions (Bly et al., 1980; 
Pucher and Markstedt, 1983; Anderson, 1983). 
 
 
8.3.7 Conclusions 
 
Travelcards as found in London, Berlin and Madrid should be included in the public transport 
fare system of Santiago. They usually have a very positive impact on public transport 
patronage. However, the expected impact in Santiago is lower than in other metropolitan 
areas because some of the benefits of travelcards were already achieved by the massive 
introduction of an electronic smartcard. 
 
Evidence suggests that it is possible to find appropriate fare levels (for travelcards and single 
tickets) to make both users and operators better off, avoiding a negative financial impact for 
the operators due to the introduction of travelcards. Given the low price-elasticity of 
travelcards, it is recommendable to introduce them at a low initial price to achieve a quick 
market penetration, and later increase their cost to reach the desired long-term price. By 
doing so, a higher market share should be achieved than if the long-term price was charged 
from the beginning. 
 
The integrated fare system, electronic smartcard and charging network introduced by 
Transantiago allow an easy implementation of travelcards, from a technical viewpoint. 
However, some difficulties were detected for its implementation, mainly in terms of expected 
unwillingness at the decision-making level. 
 
In the short-term other forms of price incentives for frequent users could be provided in the 
public transport of Santiago. For instance, a reduced fare could apply after the passenger 
reaches a certain amount of trips in one month. This could be easily done thanks to the 
technology of the smartcard that will be used in Transantiago. However, the benefits of this 
fare reduction are expected to be much limited than the ones resulting from the introduction 
of travelcards. 
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Public transport fares in London, Berlin and Madrid use concentric zones. Nevertheless, 
Berlin and Madrid actually have flat fares inside the main urban areas and the zonal fare 
system in London does not apply for buses, which also have a flat fare. Theoretical evidence 
suggests that a flat fare should be preferred inside an urban area, instead of 
distance-related fares. In Santiago there is also a “social” argument for flat fares because 
many low-income households are situated in the periphery of the metropolitan area. 
Therefore we recommend maintaining the mostly flat fare introduced with Transantiago. 
 
Reduced fares in the off-peak period exist in London and Berlin, in agreement with the 
theoretical evidence. The public transport system of Santiago should include time-related 
price differentiations in the future as well. This could be done through differentiated single 
tickets and also through reduced travelcards allowing travel only after the morning-peak, as 
used in London and Berlin. A numerical exercise helped showing that it is possible to 
increase both demand and revenue when different fares are introduced for peak and 
off-peak periods. 
 
Time-differentiated single fares would be technically simple to implement. Moreover, no 
serious difficulties seem to exist at the decision-making level for its implementation, and 
users’ should be able to quickly become familiar with them. 
 
The average public transport fares (including both single tickets and travelcard users) are 
very similar in Santiago, Berlin and Madrid, but higher in London. When the gross domestic 
product  (GDP) is included in the comparison (as a proxy of the disposable income) the 
average fare in Santiago becomes even higher than in London. This happens because of the 
lower GDP per capita in Santiago. Thus public transport expenditure represents a higher 
proportion of the available income in Santiago than in the European metropolitan areas. 
 
Unlike Santiago, the public transport systems in London, Berlin and Madrid receive important 
operational subsidies. This kind of subsides is fully justified by the economic theory in the 
case of urban public transport and also represent a clear policy decision of promoting the 
use of public transport. Therefore it is recommended here to introduce subsidies for the 
operation of the public transport system in Santiago, as shown in a numerical example. 
However, an important political opposition to this measure is expected, as it would imply a 
fiscal expenditure. Therefore, the possibility of financing the subsidy through other sources is 
especially interesting (congestion charging, enforcement of traffic rules). On the other hand, 
an explicit subsidy should replace the current regressive cross-subsidy between 
full-fare-payers and students.  
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9. Conclusions 
 
9.1 Comparison between the Metropolitan Areas 
 
An important part of this research was the presentation and comparison of the 
socio-economic and transport data of the four analysed metropolitan areas (Santiago, 
London, Berlin and Madrid). The socio-economic comparison yielded an important difference 
not only in the average income of the population, but also in the distribution of the income 
among them. Santiago has a lower income per capita, and in addition the distribution of its 
income is more regressive, i.e. it is more concentrated in the high-income groups than in the 
European cases (table 9.1). Mainly as a result of this, the motorisation rate in Santiago is 
lower than in Europe. Nevertheless, it has increased rapidly in the last decades, following the 
increase of the per capita income. 
 
Table 9.1: Summary of Main Socio-Economic Characteristics (a) 
Metropolitan 
area 
Population 
(million) 
Average 
family 
size 
Per 
capita 
annual 
GDP 
(US$) 
Inequity 
Index (b) 
Motorisation 
rate 
(cars per 
1,000 inhab) 
Area 
(km2) 
Density 
(people 
per km2) 
Santiago 5.9 3.8 7,040 40.6 148 860 6,900 
Greater London 7.5 2.4 36,599 13.8 344 1,579 4,750 
Berlin 3.4 1.8 33,922 6.9 327 892 3,810 
Madrid Region (c) 6.0 2.9 27,226 9.0 550 8,028 750 
(a)
 Data for 2005 except motorisation rate (2001/2002).  (b) Average income of the richest 10 % divided by the 
average income of the poorest 10 %. (c) Madrid City has 3.2 million inhabitants, a surface of 606 km2 and 5,280 
people/km2. 
 
The modal split between private and public transport was similar in the four metropolitan 
areas, with some 50 % of the trips in each subsystem. Santiago and Madrid had a slightly 
higher public transport modal split, whereas London and Berlin had a slightly higher private 
car proportion (table 9.2). 
 
Interestingly, it could be shown that the public transport demand in Santiago is not higher 
than in the selected European metropolitan areas, as is commonly believed in Santiago. On 
the contrary, Santiago has a lower rate of public transport trips per inhabitant than London 
and Berlin. Only Madrid presents a slightly lower figure than Santiago. 
 
Table 9.2: Summary of Main Pubic Transport Characteristics 
Metropolitan 
area 
Public transport 
modal split (a)  
(%) 
Yearly public 
transport trips 
per inhabitant 
Number of 
buses 
Metro 
network  
(km) 
Tram 
network 
(km) 
Santiago 57 291 8,000  83 - 
Greater London 44 437 6,800  435  28 
Berlin 42 354 1,426  144  188 
Madrid Region 53 275 1,494  227 - 
(a)
 Considering motorised trips only 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusions 153 
London, Berlin and Madrid have larger rail systems than Santiago. The first metro line was 
built in London in 1863, in Berlin in 1902 and in Madrid in 1919, whereas Santiago started 
the construction of its metro only in 1965. Although having a smaller network, the quality of 
the metro service in Santiago is comparable to the quality of the services in the selected 
European metropolitan areas. However, the bus system is clearly of lower quality in 
Santiago. This can be explained by the organisation of the bus system which includes bad 
practices like on-the-street competition. Hence the improvement of the bus system is an 
urgent task in Santiago. The imminent implementation of a major restructuring scheme of 
the bus (and metro) system under the name “Transantiago” seems to be a step in the right 
direction, because the main problems of public transport in developing countries need to be 
solved by comprehensive reorganisation and institutional improvements. 
 
Transantiago should be in operation by 2007 and will reduce the number of buses in 
Santiago to approximately 5,000. Bus lines will be divided into main lines and feeder lines, 
and an integrated fare system will be implemented (also including the metro). The 
recommendations for the improvement of the public transport system of Santiago drawn in 
this research assume that Transantiago is already in operation. 
 
 
 
9.2 Institutional Organisation of the Public Transport 
 
The comparison of the institutional organisation of public transport in the four metropolitan 
areas showed another important difference between Santiago and the selected European 
capital cities. The absence of a public transport authority in Santiago was a key problem. 
The analysis of the European experiences allowed interesting conclusions and 
recommendations for Santiago. 
 
The term “(public) transport authority” is usually used in reference to the following two similar 
related concepts, which have to be distinguished:  
 
1. The political authority that is responsible for (public) transport issues. 
2. Its technical and administrative office, which is in charge of implementing the policies 
and plans defined by the political authority and assists it in the creation of these 
plans.  
 
Currently, the president of Chile is the political transport authority in Santiago, as he is the 
only elected authority accountable for the complete metropolitan area. In fact, the regional 
authority is not elected but appointed by the president and has almost no responsibility in 
transport issues. The mayors, who are directly elected, are responsible for small areas of the 
metropolitan area (there are more than 30 municipalities and mayors in Santiago). The 
transportation responsibilities of the municipalities are mainly administrative: maintenance of 
the local road network (smallest streets), installation and maintenance of the street furniture 
at bus stops and permissions for the installation of private bus depots. 
 
Different ministerial offices are partially responsible for the main transport-related issues. 
The transport and telecommunications ministry (Ministerio de Transporte y 
Telecomunicaciones, MTT) is responsible for transport policies in Chile, including the 
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metropolitan areas and its public transport. Its regional secretary is responsible for the 
regulation of the bus system in Santiago. The traffic control operative unit (Unidad Operativa 
de Control de Tránsito, UOCT), dependent on the MTT, manages all the traffic signals of 
Santiago. The public works ministry (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, MOP) is responsible for 
the construction and maintenance of interurban roads, including several highways 
constructed inside Santiago in the last years. The housing and urban planning ministry 
(Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, MINVU) is responsible for the maintenance of the rest 
of the urban roads through its regional secretary. Together with the municipalities, MINVU is 
also responsible for land-use planning: the municipalities at the local level, and MINVU at 
metropolitan and regional levels. In addition there are three relevant inter-ministerial 
coordinating commissions: SECTRA (responsible for transportation strategic planning), 
CONASET (responsible for security issues in the transport system) and Transantiago 
(responsible for the implementation of the new integrated bus and metro system). 
 
The president of the country is the only single authority above all public bodies with 
transportation responsibilities in Santiago. Having studied some examples of international 
experiences, a citywide or metropolitan authority seems to be more suitable than a 
countrywide authority to handle the transportation issues in a large metropolitan area.  
 
The three European metropolitan areas analysed present different institutional solutions for 
the organisation of its transport system. Transport for London (TfL) is the local authority 
responsible for the transport system in the capital of the UK since 2000. It is accountable to 
the Mayor of London and is responsible for delivering the Mayor's transport strategy. TfL 
manages London's buses, the underground, the Docklands Light Railway and London’s 
trams. It also runs London River Services, Victoria Coach Station and London's Transport 
Museum. Although TfL is not directly responsible for national rail services, a partnership has 
been established with the Strategic Rail Authority to develop national rail’s contribution to an 
integrated public transport system in Greater London. In addition, the responsibility for the 
management of the rail services known as the North London Railway will be transferred to 
TfL by 2007. As well as running the central London congestion-charging scheme, TfL 
manages a 580 km network of main roads (including 900 bridges and 10 major tunnels), all 
of London's 4,600 traffic lights and regulates taxis and the private hire trade. TfL also 
coordinates schemes for transport users with mobility impairments as well as running the 
Dial-a-Ride scheme. In addition, TfL undertakes works in order to improve conditions for 
walkers, cyclists, drivers and freight and to implement proposals for reducing congestion on 
Greater London's streets. Nearly all issues of transportation are handled by TfL. 
 
Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid (CRTM) is the local authority responsible for 
the public transport system in the Madrid Region. CRTM is an autonomous agency of the 
Regional Government (Comunidad de Madrid). It was created in 1985 as a unique public 
transport authority, gathering responsibilities of the Madrid Region and the adhered local 
governments. At the end of 2004 a total of 176 Municipalities, representing practically the 
entire population of Madrid Region, belonged to CRTM. The main functions of CRTM are the 
planning of transport services and the definition of coordinated operating programmes for all 
public transport modes, the establishment of an integrated fare system for all the different 
public transport modes, the planning of public transport infrastructures and the creation of an 
overall image for the public transport system. 
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There are two main operators in the public transport system of Berlin: the Berliner 
Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) and the S-Bahn Berlin Gmbh (S-Bahn). The BVG operates 161 bus 
lines, 9 underground lines, 27 tram lines and 6 ferry services and is a public company owned 
by the city of Berlin. The S-Bahn is totally owned by the DB Regio AG, part of the Deutsche 
Bahn AG, the former German public train operator, which began a long privatisation process 
in 1994. It operates 14 urban rail lines in Berlin. A public transport authority called 
Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (VBB) exists in Berlin and the surrounding region of 
Brandenburg since 1996. The VBB is a private company run in co-operation by the federal 
states of Berlin and Brandenburg, 14 municipal districts (Landkreise) and 4 towns (kreisfreie 
Städte) of Brandenburg. The main tasks of the VBB are the coordination of the services run 
by the 43 public and private owned public transport companies, the introduction and 
development of a common fare system for all companies in the VBB area, the improvement, 
standardisation and quality control of public transport services, the provision of users’ 
information and assistance to the authorities in charge of public transport, for example, for 
the planning and ordering of regional railway services. However the VBB has only a 
secondary role inside Berlin, where the planning and coordination tasks are handled by the 
two operators (BVG and S-Bahn) themselves, in direct coordination with the city 
administration. The VBB is responsible for these tasks mainly outside Berlin, i.e. in the 
Brandenburg Region. 
 
In spite of having different institutional organisations and powers, the distinct public transport 
authorities have the following common tasks:  
 
1. The coordination of public transport services. 
2. The development of a common fare system for all public transport services and the 
distribution of its revenues among the operators. 
3. The provision of users’ information. 
4. The creation of a unified image for the complete public transport system and its 
marketing. 
 
Interestingly, the technical transport authority in Greater London (TfL) is responsible not only 
for public transport issues, but also for many aspects of the private transport system and 
non-motorised modes. This is a positive characteristic, as public, private and non-motorised 
transport are strongly related. Urban planning and land-use definitions are not a direct task 
of any technical transport office. Nevertheless, the political authority responsible for transport 
issues is normally also responsible for urban planning, an issue that is also strongly related 
with transport policies. 
 
Though implying a difficult institutional change that would take several years to be 
completed, the most suitable solution for the institutional design that is needed for the public 
transport system and the transport system in general in Santiago is the creation of a regional 
transport authority. In terms of the transport system, this authority should be responsible for 
the planning and implementation of both public and private transport policies, strategic plans 
and projects. It should also be responsible for the non-motorised modes and for urban 
planning and land-use definitions at the regional level. The different central government 
agencies that have urban transport responsibilities should transfer them to this regional 
authority. Responsibilities from other areas different to the transportation could also be 
transferred to the regional authority, as long as they have a regional scope, but that is 
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beyond the analyses of this research. The regional government should change its 
appointment system, in the direction of directly elected head (intendente) and 
representatives. The municipalities would not suffer any drastic institutional change in terms 
of their transportation responsibilities. 
 
To implement the proposed elected regional transport authority, an agreement of the political 
forces would be needed in order to make the necessary modifications in the law. This 
authority would become the second most important political figure in Chile. It cannot be 
assure that there would be enough political concurrence for the creation of such a strong 
political post. The creation of a regional transport authority with all the responsibilities 
defined in the proposal but still appointed by the president should be accepted as a 
temporary second best solution. 
 
As the organisational problems found in Santiago are also observed in many other 
developing cities around the world, it could be possible to extend the conclusions and 
recommendations of this thesis regarding institutional organisation to other metropolitan 
areas in developing countries. However, the way in which a transport authority is organised 
is necessarily a response to the own administrative structure of that particular metropolitan 
area. Therefore, a deep analysis of each particular case is strongly recommended before 
suggesting a specific institutional design. 
 
 
9.3 Fare Structure and Price 
 
Two main types of public transport tickets could be recognised in the analysis of the three 
European metropolitan areas:  
1. Single tickets that allow one or several trips.  
2. Travelcards that allow unlimited trips in their validity period (year/month/week/day).  
 
The concept of a travelcard is completely independent of the technology used for its 
implementation. It can be a simple piece of paper or a very sophisticated electronic device. 
On the other hand, an electronic payment device (like the Oyster card in London) can be 
used both to pay for single tickets and to buy travelcards. 
 
In contrast to the European examples, only single tickets are available in Santiago. 
Travelcards in London, Berlin and Madrid are intermodal-integrated, i.e. they allow travelling 
on different public transport modes. Single tickets are only intermodal-integrated in Berlin20, 
where the passenger can change vehicles and modes using the same single ticket, i.e. 
paying only once for the entire trip. Single tickets in London and Madrid are mainly not 
integrated, i.e. a new fare has to be paid each time the passenger boards a bus or enters 
the metro network. The same situation existed in Santiago, but this will change with the 
introduction of Transantiago (in 2007) and its new integrated fare system in which transfers 
at zero or reduced fares will be possible between buses and metro. London and Madrid 
could improve the modal-integration of their single tickets (as in Berlin) in order to offer a 
better and easier-to-use public transport system for infrequent travellers (those for which a 
travelcard is not convenient). 
                                            
20
 The intermodal integration of the fares in Berlin is common to all German cities. 
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The multi-modal fully integrated travelcards found in Berlin, London and Madrid do not exist 
in Santiago (and are not being planned there as far as the author knows). It was found that 
travelcards have a very positive impact on public transport patronage. Although they can 
also have a negative financial impact for the operators, evidence suggests that it is possible 
to find the appropriate fare levels to make both users and operators better off than under a 
uniform single-price regime. Therefore, we recommend including travelcards in the fare 
system of Santiago in the future. However, the positive impacts of travelcards in Santiago 
should be lower than in other metropolitan areas before, given that some of its benefits were 
already achieved by the massive introduction of an electronic smartcard. 
 
Given the low price-elasticity of travelcards, it is recommendable to introduce them at a low 
initial price to achieve a quick market penetration, and later increase their cost to reach the 
desired long-term price. This strategy also allows to achieve a higher market penetration 
than if the long-term price was charged immediately. 
 
From a technical viewpoint, the implementation of a travelcard in Santiago would be 
relatively easy, thanks to the already existing integrated fare system, electronic smartcard 
and charging network. A difficulty would be the necessary agreement with all public transport 
operators, but given that there are currently less than 15 relevant operators (in contrast to 
several thousands before Transantiago!) this should not be an important problem. The main 
problem for the implementation would be the likely unwillingness at the decision-making 
level, which is to be expected because travelcards are practically unknown there and they 
fear that they may have an obvious and inevitable negative financial impact (which is not true 
as already discussed). In addition to the expected positive impact on public transport 
demand, there are two characteristics of travelcards that could be useful to convince the 
decision-makers about its implementation: firstly, travelcards can help reducing evasion 
because users that already bought it can not travel without paying anymore. And secondly, 
frequent users (mostly belonging to medium and low-income households) would benefit from 
lower expenditure on public transport. 
 
In the short-term the electronic contactless smartcard that will be used in Santiago allows 
another simple strategy to reward frequent users: after a passenger has reached some 
minimum amount of trips in a certain time period (e.g. one month), he could face a reduced 
fare for the rest of the trips in that period. However, this reduced price scheme does not 
have all the positive effects of a travelcard, as it does not change the cost perceptions of the 
users. Therefore, it is not suggested here as a substitute for the travelcard, but only as a 
temporary easier-to-implement alternative. 
 
In relation with this contactless smartcard, it would be interesting to extend its use (which 
initially will be restrained to urban buses and metro in Santiago) to other public transport 
modes not only in Santiago, but also in other cities in Chile and even for interurban trips. A 
very interesting example of such a wide coverage of a single modern paying device can be 
found in Denmark, were a national-wide ticketing scheme is being implemented (EMTA, 
2005). 
 
Although concentric zones are common to the fare structures of the public transport in 
London, Berlin and Madrid, a careful analysis of these zones and the fares available yields 
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that both Berlin and Madrid actually have flat fares inside the main urban areas, with fare 
zones being relevant only in the surroundings of those areas. Only London has really a zonal 
fare structure inside the urban area, but with quite a large “smallest fare zone” 
corresponding to fare zones 1 and 2. So, the “flat fare areas” have surfaces of about 200 
km2 in London, 600 km2 in Madrid and 890 km2 in Berlin. From this practical evidence, and 
given that Santiago has a total surface of about 650 km2, it could be suggested for Santiago 
to maintain a flat fare. The theoretical arguments reviewed also suggest that a flat fare 
should be preferred inside the urban area. Moreover, given that many low-income 
households are situated in the periphery of Santiago, there is a social argument for a flat 
fare. Therefore, in regard to distance-related fares and zonal fares, it is recommended for 
Santiago to maintain the mostly flat fare introduced with Transantiago. A completely flat fare 
as used before Transantiago is also a recommendable option inside the urban area. 
Nevertheless, trips starting or ending outside those boundaries (interurban trips) should face 
higher prices. 
 
Reduced fares in the off-peak period were partially found in London, Berlin and Santiago. 
The practice in the selected metropolitan areas as well as the pricing theory suggests that 
time-related price differentiations should exist. The theoretical arguments here are related 
to the following two facts: firstly that price-elasticity is normally lower (in absolute terms) in 
peak periods, and secondly that marginal operating costs are lower in off-peak periods. Thus 
we recommend introducing different fares for peak and off-peak periods in Santiago on 
buses and metro. As shown in a numerical exercise, it is possible to increase both patronage 
and revenue through this measure. Also the public transport system of Madrid should include 
some form of fare differentiation between peak and off-peak periods. 
 
Time-differentiated single fares would be technically simple to implement in Santiago and no 
serious difficulties seem to exist at the decision-making level. If travelcards were introduced 
in Santiago, reduced travelcards allowing travel only after the morning-peak should also be 
implemented (providing a time-differentiated fare), as used in London and Berlin. 
 
A zone-related price differentiation yielding higher fares in the centre of Greater London 
could be recognised, probably as an attempt to have higher charges in the more congested 
sections of the public transport lines. The theoretical arguments in favour of time-related 
price differentiation can be extended to the case of higher fares inside city centres21. 
However, for the practical implementation of zone-related fare differentiations fare zones 
seem to be needed. Given that Santiago does not have fare zones and we do not 
recommend them, the way in which zone-related price differentiations could be implemented 
should be carefully analysed before recommending changes in that direction. 
 
When the public transport fares in the four metropolitan areas are compared in terms of 
nominal prices, i.e. converting all the fares to a common currency using market exchange 
rates, the average fare in Santiago results to be marginally lower than the average fares in 
Berlin and Madrid, whereas the average fare in London is about twice as high as the fares of 
the other capital cities. But when the average fare in each case is compared with the 
disposable income of the population (using the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as 
                                            
21
 It has to be emphasised that these zone-related price differentiations are not related to the trip length, but to 
the use of specific parts of the network. 
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a proxy), the public transport of Santiago is more expensive for an average user22, followed 
by London, Madrid and Berlin. This result is explained by the lower GDP per capita in 
Santiago. The use of a purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate does not affect the 
qualitative results, although it produces quantitative changes in the figures. Interestingly, it is 
often believed in Santiago that its public transport fares are cheaper than in Europe. This 
wrong idea comes from a too superficial comparison of only the single fares. But in the 
European metropolitan areas single tickets are deliberately made more expensive when a 
travelcard is implemented, in order to create an incentive to prefer the travelcard. For 
example, more than 60 % of the public transport trips in Madrid are made using a travelcard. 
 
All proposed changes would make the fare structure of the public transport in Santiago much 
more complicated. Therefore, it would be better to implement them one by one, to make it 
easier for the users to accustom themselves to the changes. It has to be taken into account 
that the fare structure of public transport has been historically very simple in Santiago: a flat 
fare that has to be paid in every vehicle. In general terms, there has to be a trade-off 
between the efficiency and the simplicity of the fare structure. 
 
 
 
9.4 Subsidy for the Operation of the Public Transport 
 
Unlike Santiago, the public transport systems in the European case study areas receive 
operational subsidies. This kind of subsidies is fully justified by the economic theory in the 
case of urban public transport, and also represent a clear policy decision in the direction of 
giving incentives to the use of public transport.  
 
The main reasons why the public transport in Santiago can operate without subsidy were 
detected. In comparison to the European capital cities, Santiago 
1. presents lower labour (drivers’) costs,  
2. uses cheaper vehicles (simpler technology) and  
3. has a higher occupancy rate of the vehicles (higher crowding levels are accepted). 
 
The first two facts are expected to change in the future, getting closer to the European 
situations. In fact, as the country gets richer, labour should become more expensive, and the 
use of more expensive technologies (e.g. low floor buses) can already be observed as a 
response to general higher income levels and the desire to have better public transport 
services. In relation with the third fact, although no efforts can be recognised in the last 
years in order to reduce crowding levels inside the vehicles in Santiago, it is strongly 
recommended here to do so in the future (e.g. higher frequencies) to improve the quality of 
the services. It has to be considered that the income growth in Santiago yields higher private 
motorisation rates and therefore the number of captive public transport users will continue to 
decline, as has been happening in the last decades. In addition, the fast extension of the 
metro network may reduce the general occupation factors of the vehicles, as new lines are 
built in corridors with lower demand. 
 
                                            
22
 This fact partially explains the lower number of public transport trips per inhabitant in Santiago. 
Chapter 9 Conclusions 160 
Therefore, given these expected future changes and, especially, the economic justification 
that exists for public transport operational subsidies, it is recommended here to introduce 
subsidies for the operation of the public transport system in Santiago. However, the political 
opposition to this measure is expected to be huge, as it is contrary to the accepted practice 
in Chile of avoiding direct subsidies as much as possible to reduce “unnecessary” fiscal 
expenditure. A subsidy would be more likely to be accepted if it is financed through other 
sources. An interesting possibility would be a congestion-charging scheme that could 
provide a cross-subsidy from car users to public transport. But congestion charging is also 
politically difficult to implement in Santiago. Penalty charges for enforcement of traffic rules 
may be a politically easier way of financing public transport (e.g. penalties to cars using bus 
lanes), although it would need a modification of the law. The way in which subsidies are 
given has to be carefully designed in order to avoid incorrect incentives for the operators, the 
users and the authority. 
 
Some numerical examples show the impact of subsidy on demand and revenue, if it were 
used to reduce the fares. An increase in the demand is expected, implying that the final total 
income (fare revenue + subsidy) is higher than the original total fare revenue. Because of 
the demand growth, at least part of this higher income would have to be used to increase the 
capacity of the system (e.g. more vehicles, higher frequencies). If the subsidy were used to 
reduce only the off-peak fare, the resulting off-peak demand growth would imply a much 
lower increase in the operation costs. 
 
Regressive cross-subsidies that have a negative impact on public transport should be 
eliminated. This is the case if some new infrastructure is paid by public transport users but 
also benefit car users, a formula that should be avoided in the future. Moreover, the reduced 
students’ fare represents a cross-subsidy from full-fare payers to the students. As the former 
mainly come from middle and low-income households and the latter (especially at the higher 
educational levels) mainly belong to middle and high-income families, it can be seen that this 
is a regressive cross-subsidy. A compensation for the public transport system is necessary. 
It should be highlighted that this would be a subsidy for the educational system (it would 
directly benefit students and schoolchildren) to improve its chance to be accepted at the 
decision-making level. 
 
 
 
9.5 Future Research 
 
Other topics where the European experiences can be helpful for the development of the 
public transport systems in Latin-America and particularly in Santiago were detected in this 
investigation. The following themes are suggested for future research:  
 
1. The development of dynamic information systems and provision of users’ information 
in all its forms (at the stops, inside the vehicles, through internet, etc.). 
2. The definition of different hierarchies for bus and tram lines (main and feeder lines as 
in Santiago, Metrolines as in Berlin) and the structuring of a main complementary 
metro + bus + tram network. 
3. The definition and publication of exact timetables, which would be especially helpful 
in low demand periods or areas. 
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4. The design of contracts and incentives for private operators (e.g. quality incentive 
contracts in the buses in London). 
 
In addition, other policies are necessary to complement public transport in order to 
accomplish a sustainable urban transport system. Experiences on car parking restrictions, 
congestion charging, bicycle facilities and pedestrianisations, among others, could be 
investigated in the future. 
 
 
 
9.6 Summary of Recommendations 
 
In conclusion we recommend for the improvement of the public transport in the metropolitan 
area of Santiago: 
 
1. The creation of a regional transport authority responsible for the planning and 
implementation of both public and private transport policies, strategic plans and 
projects. It should also be responsible for the non-motorised modes and for urban 
planning and land-use definitions at the regional level. This authority should be 
directly elected by the population of the region. 
2. The implementation of travelcards allowing unlimited public transport use in their 
validity period (e.g. a month). 
3. The maintenance of a mostly flat fare in the public transport of Santiago. 
Distance-related fares should be avoided. 
4. The differentiation of peak and off-peak single-fares both in buses and metro, and 
the introduction of reduced travelcards for travelling in off-peak periods. 
5. The implementation of operational subsidies for the public transport which can be 
(partially) financed by a congestion-charging scheme or penalty charges for 
enforcement of traffic rules. 
6. The public transport system should receive a compensation for the reduced students’ 
fare, to avoid the current regressive cross-subsidy financed by full-fare payers. 
7. New infrastructure benefiting both public and private transport should not be financed 
by public transport fares anymore, to avoid the regressive cross-subsidy from public 
transport passengers to car users. 
 
I hope I will be able to help introducing this measures. 
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Appendix A: 
Bibliographic Review about Factors that Affect the Demand for 
Public Transport and their Elasticities 
 
If a normative opinion about the development of public transport has to be given, it is useful 
to know how its patronage is affected by variables like the fare, the frequency, the lines’ 
density, the income of the population, etc. The estimation of demand-elasticities is a way to 
help understanding and predicting that kind of interactions.  
 
The demand-elasticity with respect to a variable represents the percentage change of the 
demand when that variable is modified in 1 %. If Y is the demand and P the fare, the 
demand-elasticity with respect to the fare (EP), also called fare elasticity of the demand, is 
written as 
 
 
PP
YYEP /
/
∆
∆
=  . (A-1) 
 
Gschwender (2000) makes a review of public transport demand-elasticities, mainly based on 
estimations elaborated in the 1970s with data from several developed countries reported in 
TRRL (1980). An interesting conclusion is that there are only a few variables that have been 
deeply studied in terms of the demand-elasticities with respect to them. These are two policy 
variables (fare and vehicle-kilometres) and a socio-economic condition (average income of 
the population). 
 
Other interesting reviews of public transport demand-elasticities are Litman (2004), Goodwin 
(1992) and Balcombe et al. (2004), where elasticities of many studies are summarised. The 
main focus of Litman’s review is on demand-elasticities with respect to the fare, while 
Goodwin examines the differences between short term and long-term elasticities. Balcombe 
et al. update the TRRL (1980) report re-examining the evidence on factors that affect the 
public transport demand in the last decades. 
 
In what follows, a review of the evidence on demand-elasticities found in the literature is 
presented. 
 
 
 
A.1 Demand-elasticity with Respect to the Fare 
 
TRRL (1980) found that the fare elasticity of the demand is in general between -0.1 and -0.6, 
with a typical average value of -0.3. The negative signs imply that the demand reacts 
inversely with a fare change, i.e. a fare increase produces a decline in the demand. The 
average value of -0.3 indicates that when the fare rises in 1 %, the demand decreases in 
0.3 %. 
 
Kain and Liu (1999) report a fare elasticity of -0.32, which is practically equal to the average 
value indicated by TRRL (1980). This elasticity was obtained from cross-section models 
based on data for the 75 largest transit operators in the USA. Bresson et al. (2003) estimated 
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a mean fare elasticity close to -0.3, for a panel data of 62 French urban areas between 1987 
an 1995. Although not published, an analysis made with data available from modal split 
models for Santiago de Chile in 2003 yielded a fare elasticity close to -0.3 as well. It is 
interesting to note the similarity between estimations of the fare elasticity in different parts of 
the world. 
 
There is evidence that the fare elasticity is higher in the long term than in the short term. So 
the fare elasticity values indicated in the previous paragraph should be interpreted as 
short-run elasticities. Litman (2004) indicates that the fare elasticity is usually in the -0.2 to 
-0.5 range in the short run (first year), and increases to -0.6 to -0.9 over the long run (five to 
ten years). Bresson et al. (2003) also found that in the long run the elasticity was about twice 
as high as the short-run elasticity. They estimated a mean long-run fare elasticity of -0.6 for 
the French cities’ sample indicated above. They also found that 99 % of the long-run effect 
was realised within 6 years. Goodwin (1992) reviewed 50 demand elasticities for bus use, 
based on studies for the UK and elsewhere, and reported an average short-run fare elasticity 
of -0.28 and a mean long-run fare elasticity of -0.55. Balcombe et al. (2004) report an 
average bus fare elasticity around -0.4 in the short run (1 or 2 years), -0.56 in the medium 
run (5 to 7 years) and -1.0 in the long run (12 to 15 years); an average metro fare elasticity 
around -0.3 in the short run and -0.6 in the long run, and a local suburban rail fare elasticity 
around -0.6 in the short run. According to Balcombe et al. and comparing with TRRL (1980), 
short run elasticities increased in the last decades. 
 
When different fare elasticities are estimated for distinct periods, higher elasticities are 
typically found for the off-peak and lower values for the peak. This is mainly explained by the 
different purposes of the trips: more leisure trips in the off-peak and more work trips in the 
peak. TRRL (1980), Goodwin (1992) and Balcombe et al. (2004) state that off-peak fare 
elasticities are about twice as high as peak elasticities. Litman (2004) recommends the 
overall, peak and off-peak elasticities presented in table A-1. 
 
Table A-1: Fare Elasticities Recommended by Litman (2004) 
Period Short term Long term 
Overall -0,2 to -0,5 -0,6 to -0,9 
Peak -0,15 to -0,3 -0,4 to -0,6 
Off-Peak -0,3 to -0,6 -0,8 to -1,0 
Source: Litman (2004) 
 
The TRRL (1980) report indicated that the fare elasticity values did not seem to depend on 
the direction of the change (increase or decrease), while Balcombe et al. (2004) state that 
there is little convincing evidence of this possible asymmetry. Nevertheless, Hensher and 
Bullock (1979), Madre (1982) and Litman (2004) point out that the fare elasticity is slightly 
higher in the case of fare increases. Litman reports values of -0.4 in the short run and -0.7 in 
the long run when fare rises, and -0.3 in the short run and -0.6 in the long run when fare falls.  
 
Although TRRL (1980) did not found the fare elasticity to be dependent on the initial price 
level, Bresson et al. (2003), Litman (2004) and Balcombe et al. (2004) found evidence of 
greater fare elasticities when the initial prices are higher. The magnitude of the fare change 
may also affect the elasticity value, according to Balcombe et al. (2004). Greater fare 
increases produce higher values of elasticity than lower increases, especially for long-run 
elasticities. 
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Although TRRL (1980) stated that public transport demand elasticities with respect to the 
fare were higher in smaller cities than in larger cities, the opposite was found in later studies. 
In fact, Pham and Linsalata (1991) studied 52 transit systems in the U.S.A. during the late 
1980s and found short-run fare elasticities of -0.43 in smaller cities (less than one million 
inhabitants) and -0.36 in large cities. After the study of 89 European cities, Preston (1998) 
reported fare elasticities of -0.34 for smaller cities (less than 0,5 million inhabitants) and -0.50 
for large ones. Preston argues that the lower elasticities in large cities are explained by a 
greater captivity to public transport because the travel distances are higher than in smaller 
cities (making walking and bicycle less attractive), and by higher congestion levels and 
parking problems in large cities which make car travel less attractive. However, Balcombe et 
al. (2004) show that contradictory results are found in different studies, suggesting that 
evidence on this issue is not clear enough. 
 
Regarding free fare experiences, TRRL (1980) reports public transport demand increases of 
between 10 % and 45 %, though only a very small part of the growths correspond to previous 
car drivers. Bresson et al. (2003) argue that in many instances, free fare programmes have 
proven quite costly for each new transit user attracted and have rarely lured motorists to 
transit. Balcombe et al. (2004) state that demand increases due to the introduction of free 
travel seem to be consistent with normal elasticity values, and that there is no convincing 
evidence that free travel diverts journeys from cars to public transport. 
 
In qualitative terms, it is typically found that public transport demand is more sensitive to fare 
changes when more alternatives are available. This is the case for example for trips that can 
also be made by car, or short trips that can be made walking or by bicycle. 
 
If travelcards and single tickets are available, the latter appear to be more price-sensitive 
than the travelcards. Matas (2004) and García-Ferrer et al. (2002) estimated price elasticities 
for travelcards in Madrid and both could not find a value statistically different from zero. 
White (1981) suggests negligible or very low price elasticities for moderate increases in the 
price of travelcards. Hensher (1998) and Tegner et al. (1998) estimate elasticities of -0.1 and 
-0.2 respectively for a monthly travelcard. White provides two arguments to explain the lower 
price elasticity of travelcards in comparison to single fares. Firstly, most travelcard users 
travel in peak hours. Given that price elasticities are lower in peak hours, a lower elasticity 
may be expected for this reason alone. Secondly, if only single tickets are available, a fare 
increase will imply that (a) some passengers cease travel entirely, perhaps purchasing a car, 
and (b) remaining passengers may reduce the frequency of their public transport trips. But 
when the price of a travelcard is increased, only the first effect occurs. Remaining 
passengers do not reduce their trips, because the marginal cost for them is zero. Only if the 
price increase is high enough to make users return to buying single tickets the second effect 
will appear. However, some evidence of higher price elasticities for travelcards can also be 
found in the literature: Dargay and Pekkarinen (1997) obtained an elasticity of -0.5 for bus 
trips in two regional areas of Finland, but the authors suggest that a possible explanation for 
this unexpected result can be the small market share of travelcards. Preston (1998) in a 
literature review reports a wide range of variation, from very inelastic demand (-0.1) to very 
elastic demand (-2.4). These results should be analysed further. Balcombe et al. (2004) cite 
other studies which also found travelcards to have lower price-elasticities than single tickets 
in the UK: York (1995) and McKenzie and Goodwin (1986). 
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A.2 Demand-elasticity with Respect to the Vehicle-kilometres 
 
There are much fewer reports in the literature about elasticities of public transport demand 
with respect to vehicle-kilometres than about fare elasticities. In addition, there are some 
methodological difficulties in the estimation of veh-km elasticities, as stated by TRRL (1980). 
On the one hand, when time series data are used, veh-km elasticities tend to be 
overestimated, because it is not possible to distinguish between cause and effect. Therefore, 
part of the measured elasticities may represent the response in the number of veh-km to 
changes in the patronage. On the other hand, elasticities calculated with cross-section data 
may also be overestimated, because areas with higher demands normally have better 
services, i.e. more veh-km. Thus, TRRL (1980) suggests that the more reliable estimations of 
vehicle-kilometre elasticities are those made with “before and after” data. 
 
TRRL (1980) reports veh-km demand elasticities from time series in the 0.2 to 1.2 range, 
with an average of 0.7. Very close values were found by De Rus (1990) from time series for 
Spanish cities. Using cross-section data, TRRL (1980) found veh-km elasticities in the 0.6 to 
1.4 range, with a mean of 0.7. Kain and Liu (1999) report a veh-km elasticity of 0.71, 
obtained from a cross section of cities in the USA. Nevertheless, these elasticities may be 
overestimated, as explained above. 
 
In the more reliable “before and after” studies reported in TRRL (1980), veh-km elasticities 
between 0.2 and 0.5 are found. Bresson et al. (2003) estimated veh-km elasticities for the 
long and short run, using a panel data of French cities. They found a short-run veh-km 
elasticity of 0.29 and a long-run elasticity of 0.57. All these elasticities are, in absolute value, 
very close to the fare elasticities. 
 
Reviewing some 25 studies, Balcombe et al. (2004) report an average veh-km elasticity of 
0.4 in the short run and 0.7 in the long run for bus services. For rail services the elasticity 
seems to be higher, but there is much fewer evidence in this case. 
 
Preston (1998) obtained higher veh-km elasticities in large cities than in small ones (0.49 and 
0.33 respectively). This seems to be because of greater modal competition in bigger cities. 
The same qualitative result is reported in Balcombe et al. (2004). 
 
An increase in the number of veh-km may be explained by different service expansions as 
higher frequencies, higher lines’ density or new service areas. Does the value of the elasticity 
depend on the type of service expansion? 
 
Higher frequencies imply lower waiting times, and higher density of lines yield lower access 
or walking times. TRRL (1980) reports that the public transport demand elasticity with 
respect to the waiting time is in the -0.1 to -0.6 range, with an average of -0.4. This elasticity 
tends to be higher (in absolute value) when the initial frequencies are lower. Balcombe et al. 
(2004) reports a higher average waiting time elasticity of -0.64. They state that values for 
off-peak journeys and journeys to non-central destinations tend to be higher. 
 
Regarding the elasticity with respect to the walking time, the range reported by TRRL 
(1980) is between -0.1 and -0.5, i.e. similar to the waiting time elasticity. When new service 
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areas are added, the veh-km elasticity seems to be higher, in the 0.6 to 1.0 range, as 
reported by Litman (2004). 
 
Although the reliability or punctuality of the services seems to be very important, there is 
little information about it. TRRL (1980) reports that the impact in the demand of a veh-km 
reduction is 33 % higher if this reduction is not planned (unreliability). In a stated preferences 
experiment in Netherlands, Rietveld et al. (2001) found that an “uncertainty minute” in the 
arrival time was valued 2.4 times higher than a certain in-vehicle minute. They concluded 
that the respondents showed a substantial dislike for unreliable transport services. Hensher 
and Prioni (2002) found that bus reliability (in terms of minutes late) is valued at around 1.82 
times in-vehicle time (Balcombe et al., 2004). Balcombe et al. state that punctuality, reliability 
and dependendability are rated by public transport users as a very important feature, 
affecting both their perceptions and levels of use for different modes. 
 
Again, as was the case for the fare elasticity, transport demand is more sensitive to veh-km 
changes when more alternatives are available (for instance, short trips that can be made by 
bicycle or walking, and when the trip can be made by car). 
 
 
 
A.3 Demand-elasticity with Respect to the Income of the Population 
 
The income level impacts on the public transport demand in two different ways. On the one 
hand, higher incomes imply a greater mobility, i.e. more trips are made in general when more 
income is available. On the other hand, higher income has an impact on modal split, through 
a greater motorisation rate and therefore a bigger proportion of the trips made by car. As the 
two effects have opposite signs, the final impact of income in the public transport demand will 
depend on which of both effects is greater. 
 
The studies reviewed in TRRL (1980) showed negative net impacts of income in public 
transport demand. Income elasticities in the -0.16 to -0.8 range were found for some 
developed cities. Balcombe et al. (2004) reviews a few studies with data from the UK, finding 
values for the income elasticity of public transport demand between -0.5 and -1.0 in the long 
run and somewhat smaller in the short run. Bresson et al. (2003) found also negative income 
elasticities for a panel data of French cities, but the values were close to zero. They 
estimated a mean income elasticity close to -0.05 in the short run, and an average long-run 
income elasticity of -0.08. 
 
Both TRRL (1980) and Bresson et al. (2003) indicate that the negative impact of income in 
public transport demand will be higher when motorisation rates are lower. As car ownership 
approaches saturation, the income elasticity can be expected to become less negative 
(Balcombe et al., 2004) or even positive (Bresson et al., 2003). 
 
A different result is found by Matas (2004) for the case of Madrid. Estimating demand 
equations using a double log specification and time series data between 1979 and 2001 for 
the city of Madrid, a positive short-run income elasticity equal to 0.15 is found for buses and 
metro. Basing on a study by Asensio et al. (2003), Matas argues that in small cities the 
relative quality of public transport tends to be worse, and therefore car ownership levels are 
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more income elastic and public transport services have characteristics of inferior goods, i.e. 
the income elasticities are negative. On the contrary, in larger cities like Madrid the quality of 
public transport is usually better, and public transport is seen as an alternative for the car, so 
that its use is less sensitive to changes in income (Matas, 2004 pp205-206). It has to be 
taken into account, that Madrid is considered a “successful example” of improving public 
transport service and increasing ridership, after several measures started in 1986. Thus, it 
can be argued that in a big city with high-quality public transport, income elasticities can be 
expected to be positive. 
 
Previously, FitzRoy and Smith (1998) estimated income elasticities of the public transport 
demand between 0.4 and 0.8 for the German city of Freiburg (200,000 inhabitants) using 
time series data between 1969 and 1995. Again, the city of Freiburg is considered a model of 
success in increasing public transport demand, which more than doubled between 1983 and 
1995, thanks to an integrated policy of improving public transport, restricting car use and an 
integrated transport and urban planning (FitzRoy and Smith, 1998). Being not a very big city 
but a medium sized city, it could be argued that the size of the city is not really a key factor, 
so that income elasticities should be expected to be positive in medium sized or large cities 
with high quality public transport. 
 
 
 
A.4 Other Factors that Affect the Demand for Public Transport 
 
There are other variables for which some evidences of their impact on the public transport 
demand exist. 
 
Hass-Klau and Crampton (2002) examine 24 cities with light rail systems in Europe, North 
America and Australia. They analyse how successful the light rail systems of these cities 
have been, using the number of passengers per light rail track-km and passenger-km per 
light rail track-km as general measures of success. In order to explain the differences in the 
success of the diverse cities, they estimate multiple regression success models, using the 
following characteristics as explanatory variables: 
 
• Average speed of light rail service, 
• newness, i.e. percentage of light rail vehicles that are less than 5 years old, 
• peak service headway, 
• network density (total light rail track-km per urban population), 
• percentage of light rail passengers using a travel card, 
• monthly light rail fare relative to the country’s GDP/capita, 
• suburban rail stations (competing mode) relative to urban population, 
• number of car parking spaces in the city centre (competing mode) relative to city 
centre area, 
• population density in 300 m light rail corridor either side of lines per km of track, 
• pedestrian street length per city population, 
• number of park and ride spaces per km of light rail track. 
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Other explanatory variables were identified but not included in the statistical analyses, mainly 
because of data difficulties. These variables were related with hours of light rail service or 
headways, the price of city centre parking spaces and the average distance between stops. 
 
Although the sample was relative small in relation with the high number of explanatory 
variables analysed, it was possible to conclude that some variables were especially 
significant in explaining the success of the light rail systems. The most important variables 
were the percentage of light rail passengers using a travel card, the pedestrian street length 
per city population, the population density in 300 m light rail corridor either side of lines per 
km of track and the monthly light rail fare relative to the country’s GDP/capita. 
 
Instead of using patronage indicators as the dependent variable in the regression analyses, 
Hass-Klau and Crampton (2002) used a performance index, because it was empirically seen 
that it was easier to obtain a good statistical fit this way. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain 
elasticities from these regressions. 
 
Kain and Liu (1999) report elasticities for two socio-economic variables, which they found 
affect importantly the demand for public transport, namely the metropolitan area 
employment and the central city population. From a cross section of cities in the USA, 
they obtained an elasticity of the public transport demand with respect to the metropolitan 
area employment of 0.25, and an elasticity with respect to the central city population of 0.61. 
Regarding the location of the employment, they point out that CBD workers are normally 
much more likely to use transit than people who work in other parts of the city. 
 
Bresson et al. (2003) indicate that riders are approximately twice as sensitive to changes in 
travel times (in-vehicle time) as they are to variations in fares. Nevertheless, TRRL (1980) 
reports lower elasticities with respect to the travel time in the -0.3 to -0.5 range. Balcombe et 
al. (2004) report slightly higher values for bus services in the range -0.4 to -0.6, and for urban 
or regional rail in the range -0.4 to -0.9. Moreover, according to TRRL a transfer is perceived 
as 3 or 4 extra waiting minutes (in addition to the actual walking and waiting time in the 
transfer). Balcombe et al. (2004) report that a transfer is perceived as an equivalent of 21 
minutes in-vehicle time in the case of bus trips, and 37 minutes in-vehicle time in the case of 
rail journeys (in both cases including additional walking and waiting time as well as the 
inconvenience of interchange per se). They state that there is considerable variation between 
journey purposes and from place to place, and that interchange penalties may be much 
smaller in urban environments with high-frequency public transport services. Although there 
is little quantitative evidence on the negative impact of interchanges in public transport 
demand, in several studies the importance of this effect is emphasised (Ben-Akiva and 
Morikawa, 2002; Hensher, 1999; Cullinane, 2003). 
 
The operating cost of the car also affects the demand for public transport, as they are 
alternative modes. Goodwin (1992) summarises the results of 3 studies on cross-elasticity of 
public transport demand with respect to petrol prices, finding a range between 0.08 and 0.8 
with an average value of 0.34. Litman (2004) recommends elasticities with respect to the 
auto operating cost in the 0.03 to 0.1 range in the short run, and between 0.15 and 0.3 in the 
long run. 
 
Van Exel and Rietveld (2001) analyse the effect of strikes in the public transport demand. 
They review 13 studies of public transport strikes in different developed cities, finding that the 
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magnitude of the effects of a strike varies strongly according to the type and circumstances 
of it. They report that in the long term a strike can cause a 0.3 % to 2.5 % reduction in public 
transport use, because the strike impacts upon the perceived reliability of public transport 
services. In addition, the transit user is forced to look for an alternative, and he may find a 
better one. 
 
Other variables that can increase transit use, particularly in areas where service is less 
frequent, are schedule information, easy-to-remember departure times and more 
convenient transfers (Litman, 2004). The availability of road space for the car use can 
also affect the demand for public transport, as they are competitive modes (Gschwender, 
2000). In fact, road capacity expansions will induce new car traffic and therefore reduce 
transit use. Furthermore, car capacity reductions can suppress traffic and increase transit 
use (Cairns et al., 1998). 
 
In a survey in Hong Kong, Cullinane (2003) found that the public transport attributes that 
were declared to be the most important were frequency, reliability, fares, speed and comfort. 
Although the reliability was in average the second most important attribute, considering only 
the attribute declared as most important, reliability came out top. So there is an important 
group for which the reliability is in fact the principal attribute. This implies that the preferences 
of the people could be better understood if the analysis was made separating the population 
in different groups. 
 
 
 
A.5 Conclusions 
 
Elasticities are place-specific. Therefore, local estimations should be used when possible. 
Nevertheless, the revision presented in this chapter allows drawing some conclusions about 
elasticities values that can be useful if no better information is available. Furthermore, other 
variables that affect public transport use, for which quantitative information was difficult to 
find, were discussed. 
 
In general, elasticities are higher in the long term than in the short term. Moreover, they are 
higher in the peak period, when more work trips are made, than in the off-peak period, when 
a higher proportion of leisure trips are made. 
 
The variable for which more quantitative information is available is the fare elasticity. Its 
value is typically in the -0.2 to -0.6 range in the short run, with an average of -0.3 to -0.4. In 
the long run the fare elasticities are twice as high as in the short run. Fare elasticities 
increased in the last decades. Travelcards elasticities are lower (in absolute value) than 
single ticket elasticities. 
 
As fare elasticities are, in absolute value, less than 1, revenue rising by fare increases is an 
effective policy, but demand increases only by fare reductions is rather limited. But in the 
longer run the effectiveness of the first policy is reduced, and of the second is increased 
(Goodwin, 1992). Moreover, the newer estimations reported in Balcombe et al. (2004) show 
that long-term fare elasticities can exceed -1. While the immediate effect of a fare rise might 
be a temporary increase in revenue, the long-term effect is likely to be a decrease. They 
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state that attempts to counter falling revenue with fare increases alone will eventually fail, 
and that reversal of negative trends in public transport patronage requires service 
improvements and possibly fare reductions. 
 
Time series and cross-section studies yield veh-km elasticities that are higher than the fare 
elasticities (in absolute values). This would imply that it would be a good policy to increase 
fares and veh-km, in order to increase the patronage. Nevertheless, those veh-km elasticities 
seem to be overestimated. In more reliable studies the veh-km elasticities are similar to the 
fare elasticities (in absolute values). So it is not clear if a better policy would be to reduce 
veh-km and fares. This has to be analysed deeper in each specific case. 
 
The elasticities of public transport demand with respect to the income are mostly negative, 
which implies that public transport is an inferior good, i.e. it is less consumed when economic 
conditions improve. However, as car ownership reaches saturation, additional income growth 
could have a positive effect on public transport demand. On the other hand, in cities with high 
quality public transport income elasticities can be expected to be positive. 
 
Other policy variables that seem to be especially important for the public transport patronage 
are the use of travelcards, the length of pedestrian streets, the frequency and conditions of 
transfers and the reliability of the services. Socio-economic variables that are also important 
are the population density, the level of employment and the central city population. 
 
It is important to note that not all the public transport demand growth resulting from fare 
decreases, service improvements, etc. represents reductions in car use. In fact, part of this 
new ridership may substitute for walking, cycling or rideshare trips, or even come from 
increases in personal mobility. Litman (2004) indicates that only a quarter to a half of 
increased transit ridership represents a reduction in automobile use, though this figure can 
vary considerably between different areas. In order to predict the impact that changes in 
transit fares can produce in car use, Litman recommends cross elasticities of automobile 
travel with respect to transit fares between 0.03 and 0.1 in the short run, and between 0.15 
and 0.3 in the long run. 
 
The impact of attribute changes in public transport demand are normally analysed at an 
aggregate level. Nevertheless, different population groups can have distinct reactions to the 
changes. For instance, Iida et al. (1992) conducted a laboratory experiment to analyse route 
choice behaviour and identified individual variation in how the decisions were made: some 
individuals are less likely to change route, while others tend to change very frequently. 
Therefore, in order to better understand the preferences of the people, analyses considering 
different population groups should be made. 
 
Integrated policies of improving public transport services, together with complementary 
measures of urban planning and restricting car use, seem to be the most success 
experiences. Cases like Freiburg in Germany, where patronage more than doubled between 
1983 and 1995 are mainly explained by several improvements in the public transport service 
(network expansion, frequency increase, introduction of travelcards with interpersonal 
transferability and regional validity, introduction of park-and-ride facilities) and also traffic 
calming and parking restrictions, pedestrianisation in the city centre, a dense network of 
bicycle lanes and a simultaneous transport and urban planning (FitzRoy and Smith, 1998). 
